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Executive Summary 
 
In the past century a wide range of organizations has tried to solve development 
problems in Africa. The focus of these efforts was often on the third world’s 
agricultural sector where the impact of drought has severe impacts. In order to 
fight the consequences of droughts, a variety of organizations started 
constructing small reservoirs in rural areas such as the Upper East region in 
Ghana. However, not all water reservoirs proved successful. Often the small 
reservoirs were not maintained properly and became dysfunctional.   
 
The ‘Small Reservoir Project’, for which this research is performed, does 
research on these small reservoirs. The objective of the ‘Small Reservoir Project’ 
is to create a set of tools and procedures. This toolbox aims to support the 
planning, the development and the management of small reservoirs ensembles 
and to promote and support the use of these small reservoirs 
(www.smallreservoirs.org). 
 
A recent study of two reservoirs in the Upper East of Ghana, Tanga and Tonde, 
shows that the way rural communities manage their reservoirs do differ 
significantly. Tonde reservoir seems to have reached a more sustainable 
situation than Tanga. However, for these two communities the geographical, 
climatologically, formal macro and meso institutional settings are not significantly 
different. By performing a research in these communities one allows the focus to 
be on the differences on micro level. 
 
When problem owners are in, or foresee, unwanted situations, policy designs or 
adjustments can be made so these situations can be changed or avoided. In 
order to achieve this objective a multi actor analyses is made to gain insight in 
the system in which the policy will be implemented. However, traditional policy 
analysis seems to be unable to give a full explanation for certain behavior, mainly 
in development efforts. Why, for example, do reservoirs which have a central 
function in life supporting activities for farmers, fall into disrepair while knowledge 
and means are present to maintain these systems. 
 
Interesting would be to investigate how social aspects in these dry-season 
farming communities, defined in a framework called ‘social capital’, influences the 
usage and management of the two reservoirs. In the framework of social capital, 
social cognitive configurations are used to enable quantitative comparison of the 
actors’ perception of the structural network characteristics in which they act. 
 
This leads to the following research question: 
 
‘Which explanations can social capital theory provide for the differences in 
the management and usage of small reservoirs in the rural farming 
communities of the Tanga and Tonde systems?’ 
 
In order to answer this question, a research was performed in the months March 
and April of 2006 in the Upper East Region of Ghana. The analysis was made in 
three separate parts. First, a contextual analysis of the farming communities was 
made in which the findings can be placed. Aspects as decisions cycles, 
strategies and so on are investigated. Second, an adapted questionnaire of the 
World Bank is used to determine numerical differences in the social capital of 
both farming communities. A 10% confidence interval was used to determine 
whether the numerical differences are significant. Lastly the impact of the 
differences in social capital on the life cycle of the reservoirs is traced back by 
means of interviews.  
 
It was concluded that the farming community in the Tonde reservoir has a 
significant greater social capital compared with Tanga. Tonde and Tanga have 
distinct and significant differences in at least three aspects of social capital, 
which played an important role in the implementation and usage of the 
reservoirs. The most significant differences between the two reservoirs were in 
trust, networks and social cohesion & inclusion. These differences find their roots 
in the history of the rural dry season farming communities and are a reason for 
the differences of the lifecycle of the two reservoirs, measured in earlier 
research. 
 
Social cohesion and inclusion possibly created the greatest difference between 
the Tonde and Tanga reservoirs. Whereas in the farming community of the 
Tonde reservoir, no history of violence or conflict is recorded, the history in 
Tanga contains several incidents between two groups in the farming 
communities. These partly ethnic based incidents are significant as these two 
groups are the current users of the dam. The incidents created tension and 
mistrust between the networks.  These tensions and mistrust caused a lack of 
central coordination and communication.  
 
Groups and networks play an important role in the differences between Tonde 
and Tanga as well. In Tonde, a cohesive, gender and ethnic homogenous group 
functioned was the initiator of the coming of the dam. It provided a fundamental 
success factor that was lacking in Tanga. The already acknowledged and 
existing power structure of this network formed a basis for the WUA to function. 
In Tanga the networks characteristics were different.  Multiple loosely connected 
networks were present in Tanga. Each of the networks had their own objectives 
and conflicting perspectives. Due to the lack of an overall connecting network, 
the mutual dependency was limited and individual actions ruled over coordinated 
actions. 
 
The limited maintenance, the weak management, the individual walls in Tanga 
and the differences in water distribution can partially be explained by the 
differences in social capital. For these aspects coordination and cooperation are 
needed. Strong cohesive networks form a basis for this. The differences between 
the reservoirs find a more likely reason in the differences in social capital, rather 
than the different water availabilities as was suggested by Faulkner (2006). 
 
It is worth investing time and money in choosing the community for whom the 
reservoir will be built. It will determine a very essential part of the future 
sustainability of the dam. Corrections afterwards will be very hard to implement 
and will mostly lack prosperity of success.  
 
It was recommended to use existing, strong cohesive, ethnic & gender (female) 
homogenous groups as a basis for implementations of reservoirs. Reasons for 
locating proper sites for building a dam should not only be based on technical 
reasons but on social factors as well.  Social capital is a good start to examine 
these factors that will influence the implementation of a reservoir, yet it is a start 
only. Additional research on social issues is therefore recommended. When one 
wants to implement reservoirs, solve the land (property) issues before 
constructing the dam and involve all stakeholders in this process.  
 
A lack of social capital or other forms of social inappropriate circumstances in a 
community is a sensible reason to abandon, or to postpone, the idea to 
implement a small reservoir.  
 
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tanga 
 
 
Tonde 
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Notice 
 
 
 
In order to avoid further confusion: 
 
During the research in the Upper East region of Ghana there was confusion 
created when there was referred to the Weega reservoir. This was because in 
the report of Joshua Faulkner two reservoirs were studied under the names 
‘Weega and Tanga reservoirs’. Yet, the ‘Weega reservoir’ is called ‘Tonde 
reservoir’ by the locals. The assembly man reckoned as well, although he was 
hesitant to confirm this and afraid of solely being responsible for possibly 
changes, that the reservoir is referred as the Tonde reservoir in official 
documents. The Tonde reservoir is mostly used by four villages of which two of 
them are Weega and Tonde, closely located from each other, which may created 
the confusion.  
 
In the coming report, the name ‘Tonde’ will be used and when there are 
references to the report of Joshua Faulkner, the name ‘Weega’ is replaced by 
‘Tonde’.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In the past century a wide range of organizations has tried to solve development 
problems in Africa. The focus of these efforts is often on the third world’s 
agricultural sector where the impact of drought has severe impacts. 
 
In order to fight the consequences of droughts, a variety of organizations started 
constructing small reservoirs in rural areas such as the Upper East region in 
Ghana (Fig. 1). These reservoirs can be seen as small lakes where water is 
stored during the rainy seasons in order to use it later on in the dry season. 
These reservoirs have a wide variety of functions. ‘The reservoirs are a widely 
used form of infrastructure in the Upper East Region for the provision of water 
mainly for irrigation and for livestock watering, fishing, and domestic-use. But 
also serve a purpose for wildlife watering, harbouring crocodiles, recreational 
purposes and for contracting purposes (Poolman, 2005: 4).’  
 
Figure 1: Ghana and location of study sites. Adjusted picture from 
worldswitch.com 
 
However, not all water reservoirs proved successful. Often the small reservoirs 
were not maintained properly and fell in disrepair.  In order to restore these 
reservoirs many initiatives were undertaken. Often with little success and a 
familiar claim heard in the field is that ‘Despite concerted efforts by both state 
agencies and private-sector firms to discover a secret recipe for economic 
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success in the countryside, rural areas continue to follow their own stubborn 
logics of change and stasis’ (Murdoch, 2000: 407).  It seems that in some sort of 
way, the rural communities do not follow the paths of the western theoretical 
rationality, on which traditional policy analyses is based. Rather, they have their 
own rationality which is distinctly different than the western rationality. 
 
‘During the 1980s it was realized that the problems were not due to incompetent 
farmers per se, but were caused by the fact that the knowledge of the farmers 
had not been used and that local economic, social and cultural contexts had not 
been taken into account in designing the systems’ (Poolman, 2005: 5). And 
because of this, the technology introduced to many villages was inappropriate for 
the (social) circumstances and equipment deteriorated fast without having any, or 
at least not as much, of the initial intended effects.  
 
Despite these new insights and the understanding that part of the success of 
small reservoirs does depend on social aspects, many of these reservoirs 
nowadays do still not function optimally, possibly due to reasons described 
above. ‘That a significant number are functioning sub-optimally and/or are falling 
into disrepair indicates that there is room for improvement in the planning, 
operation, and maintenance of small reservoirs’ (www.smallreservoirs.org).  
 
A change of strategy may interfere with this course and improve the situation. 
The intended improvements by the Small reservoir project might find important 
policy design aspects or changes within this social field in which the stakeholders 
are studied. ‘Typically, stakeholder analyses are undertaken as part of policy, 
plan or strategy change exercises; or organizational development efforts’ 
(Bryson, 2004: 27). ‘The general purpose of stakeholder analyses may be seen 
as providing a methodology for better understanding environmental and 
development problems and interactions through comparative analysis of the 
different perspectives and sets of interest of stakeholders at various levels’ 
(Grimble, 1997: 177). And because the sustainability of introduced technology in 
rural contexts is based on the socio-environmental networking of local 
stakeholders, a point generally ignored (Campbell, 2005: 367) it is worthwhile to 
get a better view on these aspects.  
 
One way of analyzing these social aspects of the communities, is the concept of 
‘social capital’. Social scientists developed the concept as a way to measure 
relationships qualitatively and quantitatively and it was first introduced by Putman 
in 1990-ties. It combines the frameworks of ‘social networks analysis’ and 
‘configuration analysis’.  By combining these 2 frameworks one can quantify the 
actors’ perception of structural characteristics of the network in which these 
actors act. 
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‘Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the 
norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in 
which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together’ 
(Serageldin: foreword of Grootaert, 2001).  
 
The World Bank attempts with the help of a standardized questionnaire to 
measure the social capital of communities. The framework in which it is 
measured contains the following 6 sections: 
 
1. Groups and Networks 
2. Trust and Solidarity 
3. Collective Action and Cooperation  
4. Information and Communication  
5. Social Cohesion and Inclusion 
6. Empowerment and Political Action  
 
(Source: Grootaert et al, 2004) 
 
The theory of social capital might provide additional insights that can be used in 
the context of multi actor analyses. A quantitative comparison of the actors’ 
perception of the structural characteristics of the network in which they act might 
form an explanation why certain reservoirs fall into disrepair while other 
reservoirs are well maintained.  
 9 
Problem description 
 10
2 Problem description 
 
In a recent report of the Small reservoir project written by Faulkner (2006), two 
reservoirs were investigated: Tanga and Tonde located in the upper east part of 
Ghana nearby Zebilla (Fig. 1).  
 
The way these small reservoirs function are quite straight forward. Rain is 
captured in the wet season so it can be used in the dry season. This is done with 
a dam that is placed in a valley. Pipelines, with valves on the end, are 
constructed through the dam. By opening these valves, the main channels are 
filled with water. With the use of holes in these main channels, water can be 
directed to the plots of the farmers who use this to water their crops. 
 
Figure 2: the Tonde reservoir 
 
The Tonde Reservoir (fig. 2), is a stand alone system (not connected to other 
reservoirs), and has a surface area of 11.9 ha. The total area under cultivation is 
6.0 ha and had 241 farmers in 2005 (Faulkner, 2006). Inhabitants of the four 
villages Tonde, Weega, Ganide and Atolombisi, are using the reservoir. The 
villages are closely located to the Tonde reservoir. The inhabitants are mostly 
Kusaasis. A distinct characteristic of Tonde is that about half of the irrigation field, 
the half closest to the dam, is mostly used by women only.  
 
 Dam Reservoir   Irrigation fields 
 Weega  Tonde 
 Main 
channel 
 Main 
channel 
     Border 
man/woman 
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Figure 3: the Tanga reservoir.  
 
The Tanga reservoir (fig. 3), which is part of a cascading reservoir system, is 
10.6 ha in surface area and the total area under cultivation is 1.6 ha. In 2005, 73 
farmers maintained plots at this study site (Faulkner, 2006).  The ethnical 
background of the majority of farmers is Kusaasi. But farmers of ethnical 
minorities, such as Moshis and Fra Fras, can be founds in the reservoir as well. 
In the village Gunga lives a big Mamprusi family. Apart from this, the Tonde 
reservoir has upstream farmers. These farmers are mainly inhabitants of the 
village Tang Dabot. 
 
The two reservoirs are located about three km from each other and are roughly 
the same size. The same crops are grown on the fields and supply the same 
market on which it is sold. Macro and meso settings such as climatologically and 
formal institutional characteristics do not differ significantly. The time of 
construction of the reservoirs does differ about 5 years and both dams fall under 
the same regional and national institutional settings.  
 
Yet, the systems have remarkably differences in the management and the usage 
of the reservoirs. Some of these differences were measured in the report of 
Faulkner (2006) and showed in aspects such as the inputs and outputs of the 
system, the efficiency, the profit and the maintenance. 
 
 Dam Reservoir   Irrigation fields 
  Tang Dabot  Gunga 
 Main 
channel 
 Main 
channel 
   Fra Fra 
community 
    Moshi 
community 
Upstream    
farmers 
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One aspect the reservoirs differ is the usage of fertilizer, seeds and pesticides. 
Per hectare, Tanga farmers spent 110% more on fertilizer, 67% more on 
pesticide, and 52% more on seeds than did Tonde farmers. All other costs per 
hectare were very similar between the two systems’ (Faulkner, 2006: 22). These 
differences lead to remarkable difference in output in favour of Tanga which 
enjoyed a 60% better crop yield per hectare compared with Tonde. But because 
of the high investments in Tanga, (marginal) profit could only be made when the 
market prices of the crop were favourable too.  
 
As the output was measured only once, it is difficult to determine whether these 
differences are structural as harvests are known to fluctuate over the years. Next 
to this, output mainly affects individual benefit and is based on individual 
decisions made in the beginning of the dry farming season. Possibly more 
interesting are the more structural differences mentioned by Faulkner in the 
(general/maintenance/water) management of the two reservoirs as it directly 
affects the sustainability of the reservoirs.  
 
While Tanga has two leaking valves, deteriorated canals, and very limited 
maintenance, the Tonde reservoir shows opposite characteristics. It is well 
maintained and seems to have reached a more sustainable situation as one 
compares the situation with Tanga. More visual evident is the difference in the 
way the enclosure is arranged. Where Tonde managed to build a common mud 
wall around the irrigation field, Tanga consists of plots surrounded by individual 
walls. For the maintenance, significant differences are mentioned.  
 
Another point is how farmers distribute the water in their fields. While Tanga uses 
buckets/calabashes which can be filled in a sort of wells to spread the water over 
their land, Tonde uses a system of channels and plugs to irritate their plots. Apart 
from this, the punctuality of opening the valves in order to let the water reach the 
irrigation fields differed a lot. ‘As an example, the opening and closing of the 
canals at the Tanga system was not always performed by the caretaker. Farmers 
wanting water would sometimes open when they desired, finding the valve key 
near the head of the canal. This has resulted in massive canal failure and water 
wastage, due to the failure to close the release valve at the end of the day. The 
management and organizational structure at the Tonde system was strong, and 
the opening and closing of the canals was only performed by the caretaker and 
was fairly punctual’ (Faulkner, 2006: 26).   
 
As a result, Tanga uses about triple the amount of water per surface area 
compared with Tonde, which comes down to just under 6 times the associated 
demand of the crops grown on the field. A suggestion was made to locate the 
cause of this difference. ‘At the Tanga site, (…), the high water availability allows 
the farmers to choose a less efficient irrigation method. It can be speculated that 
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the basin and bucket irrigation method was chosen because water scarcity was 
not an issue, and there was no incentive to choose a more efficient method’ 
(Faulkner, 2006: 25).  
 
Scarcity of water however doesn’t seems to be a full explanation of the 
differences because Tonde uses about 2.4 times the associated amount of water 
for the crops on the fields and the differences between the reservoirs are much 
bigger than can be attributed to differences in the irrigation method only. 
Therefore it will be very interesting to investigate what the causes are of these 
very different (management) strategies and use these two reservoirs as study 
cases to explain why some reservoirs fall into disrepair.  
 
Because the sustainability of introduced technology in rural contexts is based on 
the socio-environmental networking of local stakeholders, a point generally 
ignored (Campbell, 2005: 367) a possible cause may be found from this 
perspective. With the framework of social capital, explained in chapter 
‘theoretical framework’ of this report, to describe the social contexts of the two 
farming communities, the following research question can be formulated: 
 
‘Which explanations can social capital theory provide for the 
differences in the management and usage of small reservoirs in the 
rural farming communities of the Tanga and Tonde systems?’ 
 
Sub-questions that will be answered in the research are: 
 
• What is social capital? 
• How does social capital form an addition in the current knowledge of 
network analysis?  
• What are the influences of social capital in the different phases of 
existence of the reservoirs in Tonde and Tanga? 
• Which additional explanations, other than social capital, might be a 
causing the differences between the two reservoirs? 
 
When one determines essential factors that determine the successful utilization 
of small reservoirs, recommendations can be made on those insights. Analyses 
of the actors will be made based on standardized questionnaires, adapted to the 
local circumstances, provided by the World Bank.  
 
 14
 
Theoretical framework 
 15
3 Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Policy analyses and developmental efforts   
 
When problem owners are in, or foresee, unwanted situations, policy designs or 
adjustments can be made so these situations can be changed or avoided. In 
order to achieve this objective a policy analyses is made to gain insight in the 
system in which the policy will be implemented. ‘Every (system engineering) 
policy analyses problem occurs within a network of actors (…), the term actors is 
a generic indication of individuals or groups that play an important role within a 
problem case’ (Bots, 1999: 11). ‘A policy problem is the gap between an existing 
or expected situation and a criterion’ (Enserink, 2004: 9). Because the 
pluriformity of actors in a network, the perspective of what a favorable future 
situation (that sets the criterion) might be, can be very different among actors in 
one system.  
 
Within the field of developmental and poverty problems, these gaps between the 
current and the wanted situation within the policy area are relatively easy to 
clarify from a western perspective. But the past decades proved that finding and 
implementing possible solutions, suggested by donors, policy makers, target 
groups and development organizations, is much more difficult. Without any 
doubt, this is partly caused by the differences of criteria and perception of the 
target group and the policy makers. 
 
One of the reasons different parties have different perspectives and perceptions 
are the different frames of references. ‘Stakeholders are likely to be from diverse 
institutional backgrounds; have dissimilar frames of reference; use disparate 
vernacular vocabularies and knowledge bases; and aspire to different agendas’ 
(Alsop and Farrington, 1998). 
 
An important aspect of ‘traditional’ policy analysis is that it assumes that all 
actors behave rational. ‘Rationality assumes a logical consistent relation between 
the objectives that an actor wants to achieve and the things he does. Each action 
contributes to, directly or indirectly, the achievement of an objective (Bots, 2002: 
26)’ 
 
When looking into developmental problems, behavior of the population in 
developing counties did not follow the ideas of rational behavior where traditional 
western policy analysis is based on. A lack of cultural and societal insights was 
often the grassroots’ cause of this course of action (Poolman, 2005). This has 
often led to mal-functional policies that lacked to achieve the objectives of the 
policy makers. Creating more insight in the rationality used by the actors, one 
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can adapt the policies more efficient and the chance of success will significantly 
improve.   
 
3.2 Stakeholder and network analyses  
 
So in order to get to a good analysis and implementation of the problem, one 
needs to know who is involved within the problem area, their perception, means, 
interests and objectives and how the actors are interlinked. ‘It is of vital 
importance that a problem analyses provides an understanding of the range of 
involved actors and their network (Enserink, 2004: 105)’. In order to get a better 
view on these aspects, policy analyses developed a framework in which these 
aspects can be investigated. 
 
‘Typically, stakeholder analyses are undertaken as part of policy, plan or strategy 
change exercises; or organizational development efforts’ (Bryson, 2004: 27) such 
as can be seen in the small reservoir projects. ‘The general purpose of 
stakeholder or actor analyses may be seen as providing a methodology for better 
understanding environmental and development problems and interactions 
through comparative analysis of the different perspectives and sets of interest of 
stakeholders at various levels’ (Grimble, 1997: 177). The actor and network 
analysis is seen as a powerful tool to get more insight in the complexity of the 
environment. ‘One reason social problems are so complex is because they 
involve different parties, each of whom is affected by the problem situation in 
their own way. Moreover, they each have their own perspective of the problem 
and are intent on their own solutions’ (Enserink, 2004: 105).  
 
Policy analysis analyses complex worlds with the help of multi-perspective, actor 
and multi-objective analyses. It is a way to analyze and structure the views and 
needs of all different actors while those actors often dependent on each other. 
The interests of actors and their perceptions of reality determine their objectives 
– that is, the outcomes they want to achieve (O. van de Riet, 2003, p.23). The 
more actors, the more complex the situation becomes. ‘A multi-actor setting is 
characterized by both single-actor complexity and multi actor complexity. The 
single actor complexity exists within each actor, possibly in a unique form.’ (O. 
van de Riet 2003: 24).  
 
With each action of an actor to try to achieve its objectives, the situation changes 
and this affects the other actors within the system. ‘Given that organizations and 
societies live in a complex and highly interconnected world, independent actions 
from each can produce non-anticipated, and uncontrollable consequences for all’ 
(Bouwen et al, 2004). So for successful policy implementations, one will have to 
investigate this interconnected and complex world to improve the chances of 
success.  
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So the more actors, the more objectives and perspectives the system contains 
and the less clear the outcome of certain interventions becomes. And often, with 
a growing number of actors in a system, the more relational factors will play part 
in the game in which the objectives are tried to be achieved.  
 
Within the field of developmental problems the differences in perspectives even 
get an extra dimension. Relatively often, NGO and other development 
organisations will have a significant impact on the policy making. These policies 
are made from the perspective of, what are often foreign investigators and 
donors that will view the problem area from within their own perspective. 
Examples can be found in the earlier stated differences in criteria and perception 
for example. These perspectives are often different and sometimes even 
opposing from the perspectives of the people that will be affected by the policy.  
 
A wide range of examples can be found in the field. A very concrete situation, not 
related to the research but serves as a good example to show the difference in 
perspectives, is the way some rural farmers in the Upper East deal with mentally 
disabled children. In some (not all!) cases, when the child is too much a burden 
to the mother/family instead of an asset, the child is poisoned. Where westerns 
see this as very unethical, for farmers this is sometimes necessary to survive. 
(This story was verified by multiple local sources). 
 
A better documented example of misplaced western intervention is the Gambaga 
Witch camp. In this camp, witches find refuges when they are found guilty of 
witchcraft (Bradt travel guide, 2004). Western feminist and human activists 
however saw this camp, from their perspective, as a prison where the women 
faced a life long sentence for an imaginary crime. With the ‘help’ of foreign force, 
the women were released in 1997 but most of them refused to leave. The ones 
who left to their original villages had to flee back to the camp due to violence 
(such as ears that were cut off) from the local villagers. Misplaced perceptions 
and difference of criteria, whether a person is guilty or not, were clearly the cause 
of this incident.  
 
So being aware of these fundamental differences of frames of references and 
being cultural sensitive are essential within development of policies in settings as 
such. 
 
3.3 Characterization of networks and its implications 
 
Within the current knowledge of a network it is stated that a network has basically 
four characteristics that separate a network from a hierarchical structure: 
pluriformity, interdependency, closedness and dynamic of structure dominate. 
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(de Bruijn and heuvelhof, 2000) These characteristics are often used in order to 
determine policies and policy changes and a short description will be given in the 
following paragraphs.  
3.3.1 Pluriformity 
 
Pluriformity is the diversity in the network. Every actor has its own objective, 
resources and so on. In any society these characteristics can be seen as well. 
Every household or individual has its own characteristics, knowledge, power, 
financial resources, and objectives and so on. More African oriented are the 
differences in ethnics and tribes and for example the great variety of linguistic 
background one can find on a relative small area.  
 
When implementing a new policy, one will need to take the pluriformity into 
account. The more diversity, the more likely opposite or conflicting objectives 
there are in the network. And the more pluriform the network, the more likely 
actors will act differently due to unique characteristics these actors have that they 
will use strategically. Next to this, not all actors will respond equally to the policy 
and different actor will reinterpret policies differently.  
 
This is the case in societies in Africa, where inventions such as small reservoirs 
are tried to be implemented, as well. Some actors will happily accept certain 
interventions while others will try to avoid or even disturb such interventions. 
Social structures, knowledge, financial power, background and so on, determine 
the position of a person within the network and the assets the actor can use in 
order to obtain his objective.  
3.3.2 Closedness 
 
Closedness of the network is a characteristics that is easily been recognised in 
the societies. In African villages, often rivalry between different ethnic groups 
exists and kinship is a crucial factor of being part of the group or not. ‘The 
closedness of an organisation (read: village/community) is the result of its frame 
of reference which is formed by core values deeply rooted in the organisation 
and which determine its action to a large degree. Organisations are usually 
sensitive to interventions that fit their own frame of reference’ (de Bruijn and 
Heuvelhof, 2000: 27). So being able to determine that frame of reference will, 
partly, determine the successfulness of the intervention.  
3.3.3 Interdependency 
 
Interdependency exists in every group or society between actors. The amount of 
interdependency is partly dependent on the amount of connections made with 
 19
those groups. The more bonding ties, the more interdependency will exist in a 
network. Inter dependencies are what make the network hard to predict.  
 
Often interdependencies are very hard to oversee which makes it very difficult in 
a society to oversee the consequences of an intervention or action by one of the 
actors within the system boundary. Some actors will take advantage of the 
dependency other actors have and use a hit and run tactic. Multiple objectives 
and multiple relations make a non-transparent situation which is hard to measure 
and as information is used tactically.  
 
Different types of interdependency exist. Single/multiple, multilateral/bilateral, 
synchronically /a-synchronically, simultaneously/sequential, dynamic/static, each 
with their own consequences on the network (de Bruijn and Heuvelhof, 2000) 
3.3.4 Dynamics 
 
The dynamics of a network, such as a society/community, can be seen as power 
shifts, people die or come into the society, people loose or gain 
power/resources/etc and this affects the network. The more dynamic the network 
is, the harder it will be to predict certain consequences of interference. Policies 
may be adjusted to this characteristic as well by making the policy more 
adaptable or, possibly, loosely defined.  
 
3.4 Steps of network and actor analyses 
 
In order to investigate these networks and the actors involved, Enserink (2004, 
page 105) suggest there are 5 steps to do so: 
 
1. Formulating a problem as a basic principle 
2. Listing the involved actors 
3. Determining their problem perceptions, objectives and interests 
4. Charting dependencies between actors based on the list of means or 
means and the subjective commitment of actors to the problem 
5. Examining the structure and culture of the network by charting formal and 
informal relationships 
6. Estimating the dynamics within the network 
7. Determining the consequences of these findings for the formulations of the 
problem 
 
On the fifth point, the structural and cultural characteristics of the network are 
being investigated. Both formal and informal relations are analyzed by interviews, 
articles, observations and by other means.  
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Within dealing in this aspect, policy analysis does get into social sciences. By 
pointing out the ‘relational tasks’ it becomes clear for the different parties how the 
contributions of social and engineering science can be distinguished but also that 
they are dealing with the same problem domains, albeit from a different angle. 
(Bouwen et al, 2004)  
 
3.5 Formal and informal networks 
 
Policy analysis is seen as a social as well as a technical discipline. It analyses 
the formal and informal efforts of actors to improve policy outcomes by applying 
systematic evaluative rationality (Howlett, 2005). Therefore concepts in the field 
of social sciences are possible useful additions for the field of policy analyses 
and the characteristics of networks given by the Bruijn and Heuvelhof (2000).  
 
Nevertheless, there are distinct differences between policy analyses and social 
sciences. ‘Where the engineering perspective concentrates on the progress of 
the task, the social science perspective focuses on the relational renegotiation 
through interpersonal conversations, creating new roles and identities’ (Bouwen 
et al, 2004: 141). This characteristic possibly might be helpful as the description 
by de Bruijn and Heuvelhof (2000) appear rather generally descriptive, 
unquantifiable and leave little concrete points to measure the nature of the 
network. 
 
Informal and formal relationships prove to be very important within systems. It 
can explain, partially, why it sometimes appears that actors behave irrational. 
This is of great importance due to the fact that policy analysis has the 
assumption that an actor acts rationally.  
 
Actors act in complex and multiple relationships, accept responsible 
memberships and a proper role and contribution in continuous negotiations with 
other members. This implies that actors no longer want to ‘solve’ social dilemmas 
but are able and willing to live with imbalances and inequalities in a flexible and 
evolving way of giving and taking, towards lasting and sustainable interaction 
patterns (Wilber, 1981). So it could be really worthwhile for policy analysts to look 
more into these relations. Informal and formal networking may partly explain why 
developmental organizations struggle to effectively implement policies while rural 
areas continue to follow their own stubborn logics of change and stasis as stated 
by Murdoch (2000). 
 
3.6 Current knowledge Network and actor analyses 
 
The difference between network and actor analyses is that network analyses 
focuses on how actors are interrelated and which rules apply within the system 
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boundary. Actor analysis focuses on the level where the perceptions, objectives 
and resources of the actors are analyzed. ‘When combined, the three concepts 
of perceptions, objectives and resources lead to actions: recourses can be used 
to act, objectives are used to determine if the resulting actions are indeed useful 
to an actor, whereas perceptions are used to indicate whether an actor also 
recognizes this link between the use of resources and realizing its objectives’ 
(Hermans, 2005, p:17). So the difference between network and actor analyses is 
the aggregation level.  
 
One of the more basic approaches to analyze actors, is the stakeholder analysis: 
tables and matrixes are used to list the key characteristics of the stakeholders 
and are used to structure the data. ‘Stakeholder analysis contains fairly abstract 
factors such as interests, resources or influences that are difficult of an analyst of 
assess in practice. They float around and are not clearly connected to each 
other, to underlying theory or to real world observations.’ (Hermans, 2005, p:24). 
Depending on time and effort used for the analysis, listing the involved actors 
combined with their characteristics and examining those, does not always meet 
the requirements for analytical soundness. The usage of theoretical frameworks 
from which models can be derived is likely to improve the quality of the actor and 
network analysis (Hermans, 2005).  
 
There are a range of different network and actor analyses based on models. On 
the basis of the criteria that models should have explanatory power, should be 
scientifically valid and accessible for future use, Hermans (2005) located different 
analytical models for policy making that are focusing on different characteristics 
of models gaining different insights: 
 
• Network analysis: Models are used for structuring networks in which 
actors act; they are creating insights in the influence of actors, the 
decision making, the linkages between actors, the interaction patterns and 
so on. Social network analysis, dynamic access models and configuration 
analysis are examples of network analyses. Mathematical graph models 
and algebraic models are used within these analyses to predict behavior.  
• Discourse analysis: These models are used for policy making through 
exchanging arguments; it creates insights in the perception of actors, the 
perceived roles of actors, underlying values, incompatible believes, and 
disagreements and so on. Argumentative, narrative policy analysis and Q-
methodology are forms of discourse analyses. Coding input information 
and questionnaires are used in these types of analyses.  
• Cognitive mapping: These models are used for problem solving based 
on the problem perceptions of the individual actors.: The model create  
insights in the potential conflicts, shared problem(s), perception(s), the 
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instruments and objectives of the actors and so on. DANA, SODA and self 
Q-interviews are examples of cognitive mapping models. 
• Conflict analysis: These types of models are used for policy making 
through strategic games; they generate insights in strategic behavior, 
power and positions of actors, coalitions of actors, bargaining, and so on. 
Analyses of options, meta-game analysis, GMCR are examples of conflict 
analyses models.  
• Transactional analysis: These models are used for policy making 
through exchanging control; they give insights in interest in issues of 
actors, voting outcomes and so on. Transaction process models and vote 
exchange models are examples of this type of analyses.  
 
Transactional-, conflict-, discourse- and cognitive mapping- analysis focuses on 
the actors and the processes that will influence the implementations of policies. 
With means of games, exchanging control, locating possible conflicts, 
exchanging arguments and other tools, analyses are made of the system in 
which the policies will be implemented. With the help of these insights, policies 
and processes related to the implementation are adjusted (if needed) to increase 
the success-rate of such implementations.  
 
Part of the differences between the two reservoirs Tonde and Tanga might be 
explained with insights that will be created by transactional-, conflict-, discourse- 
and cognitive mapping- analyses. The aim of the research on Tonde and Tanga, 
however, is to explain the differences in usage and management of the two 
reservoirs from the organizational and network perspective of the 2 communities. 
Did the differences in the existing networks in the two farming communities 
cause the differences in the two reservoirs, as ‘sustainability of introduced 
technology in rural contexts is based on the socio-environmental networking of 
local stakeholders’ (Campbell, 2005, p:367)? 
 
The most applicable analyses are therefore the network analyses. Social network 
analysis and configuration analysis seem the most promising approaches. 
Dynamic access modeling seems less appropriate for the purpose of the 
research on Tanga and Tonde due to the focus on formal decision making 
process rather than on network characteristics. Dynamic access models 
emphasize the concept of access to actors and decision making centers where 
algebraic equations are used in models to explain or predict formalized decision 
making processes where voting power plays a central role (Hermans, 2005). 
Therefore theoretical frameworks and models used in social network analyses 
and configuration analyses will be examined in the coming chapters. 
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3.7 Configuration analysis and cognition 
 
Configuration analysis has the (scientific) philosophical position that the ‘social 
reality’ is considered to be ‘the reality’. This reality is constructed and 
reconstructed by the people through interactions. It therefore rejects the position 
in which objective realities or different interpretations of reality are used 
(Termeer, 1993, p25-26).  Related to these realities is cognition: ‘Cognition is a 
general term referring to awareness and thinking as well as to specific mental 
acts such as perceiving, interpreting, remembering, believing, and anticipating’ 
(Larsen, 2005. p:377). 
 
So there is not one reality but a constant range of realities which are created 
from a range of social contexts. These realities are exchanged, developed and, 
negotiated, and so opposing views are created as such.  The main focus of the 
analysis is on the interactions of actors in these processes. These processes 
determine the structure of the networks rather than that the structure of the 
networks determines the interactions. Configuration analysis creates a method to 
examine these dynamic and complex organisational processes (Termeer, 1993, 
p28). 
 
Central themes of the analysis are (Termeer, 1993, p.29-35) 
• Ongoing interaction: Double-interaction is the basis of interaction were an 
act of an entity leads to a reaction of another entity. This reaction creates 
a learning process for the first entity that acted and allows him to react on 
the reaction caused by his action. For change, a third facet in the form of 
an actor, an interaction rule or a reality definition is needed. 
• The definition of the reality is the result of these (inter)-actions in which the 
different realities are exchanged between the actors.  Examples of 
attempts to define these realities are for example the frames of reference 
described by Rein and Schon (1993). 
• With the interactions, the actors create a collective structure. This 
structure depends on the perception of the actors towards 
interdependency and interaction rules. These rules will determine who will 
be involved in the process, who will fulfil which role, how conflicts will be 
handled and so on. These rules are dynamic. 
• Social-cognitive configurations are a central theme in the configuration 
analysis. The social cognitive configuration is a ‘snapshot’ of the social 
process in the construction of reality. In this configuration one determines 
the interaction patterns, the interaction rules and shared cognitions: who, 
how and what. These who, how and what are so interrelated and 
depending on each other that analysis that focus on one aspect will be 
incomplete without integrating the other parts. Actors will be part of or feel 
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attached to multiple configurations and will never be fully attached to one 
configuration only.  
 
The configuration analysis uses standardized statements on a policy issue to 
enable a quantitative comparison of actors’ perception. The results of this 
analysis are combined with a statistical analysis of the interactions among actors 
and form a combination of Q-methodology and social network analysis 
(Hermans, 2005, p.29). The Q-methodology is used to quantify the reality 
definitions (Termeer, 2005, p 48-49) to obtain an impression on the cognitive 
configurations (who thinks what) and how actors thinks about the policy issues. 
With the help of in-depth interview interaction patterns are constructed and 
quantified. Matrixes are made that contain the frequency of actor interactions for 
example. 
 
3.8 Social networks analysis 
 
 ‘Social network analysis is an interdisciplinary methodology developed mainly by 
sociologists and researchers in social psychology, further developed in 
collaboration with mathematics, statistics, and computing that led to a rapid 
development of formal analyzing techniques which made it an attractive tool for 
other disciplines like economics, marketing or industrial engineering.’ (Uwe 
Cantner and Holger Graf, 2006, p: 465) ‘It is based on an assumption of the 
importance of relationships among interacting units relations defined by linkages 
among units are a fundamental component of network theories.’ (Wassermann 
and Faust, 1994, p. 4) 
 
Instead of analyzing individual behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs, social network 
analysis focuses its attention on social entities or actors in interaction with one 
another and on how these interactions constitute a framework or structure that 
can be studied and analyzed in its own right (Galaskiewicz, 1994). The concept 
has a range of other assumption such as (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.7): 
 
• Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than 
independent autonomous units 
• Relational ties between actors are channels for transfer of resources such 
as money, material, information and so on) 
• Network models conceptualize structure as enduring patterns of relations 
among actors 
 
Network analysis begins with data that describes the set of relationships among 
the members of a system. The goal of analysis is to obtain from the low-level 
relational data a higher-level description of the structure of the system which 
identifies various kinds of patterns in the set of relationships. These patterns will 
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be based on the way individuals are related to other individuals in the network 
(Seary and Richards, 2003). 
 
Networks are a form of ‘relational data’. Relational data that arise in many social 
science fields and graph models are a natural approach to representing the 
structure of these relations. In these applications, the nodes usually represent 
people and the edges represent a specified relationship between the people 
(Handcock, 2003, p: 229).  
 
Relational data are rooted in cultural values and symbols. (Scott, 2005, p2): they 
are the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachment and meetings, 
which relate one agent to another and so cannot be reduced to the properties of 
the individual agents themselves: they are the property of the systems rather 
than the individuals.  
 
Other type of data, such as attribute data (attitudes, opinions and behavior) are 
more for variable analysis. Techniques for the analysis of this type of data are 
less well developed than those or relational data. Ideational data (meanings, 
motives, definitions and typifications) are more for typological analysis (Scott, 
2000).  
 
Relational data is modeled in matrices and sociograms. The networks are 
represented as graph of points and lines and concepts such as distance, 
direction and density are used. Centrality and sub groups in networks (named 
cliques and circles) are modeled in these representations. With the help of 
computer multidimensional those maps can be analyzed and predictions can be 
made (Scott, 2000) 
 
3.9 Cognition and social networks analysis 
 
Social network analysis recognises the importance of social cognition and tries to 
explain social cognition processes by the insights created with the help of social 
network analysis models. ‘Although many of social cognition processes have 
been argued to depend on the context of social relationship in which they occur, 
relatively little systematic examination has been undertaken of the relationship 
between social cognitions and the social context. (…) No doubt the difficulty of 
specifying and measuring relevant aspects of social context have contributed to 
its status as an acknowledged but rarely studied component of social cognition’ 
(Pattison, 1994, p. 79). 
 
With the help of social contextual models Pattison (1994, p 93-103) argues that 
cognition is influenced by the social contexts in at least 3 different ways: 
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1. The specific information individuals are exposed to, is determined by the 
social context in which these individuals are located. Social relations serve 
as information channels in social processes. Information is communicated 
through these channels and as a result the position or the setup of the 
network will determine the information the individual gets. 
2. Social contexts are related to patterns of social interaction. These patterns 
are likely to be associated with particular associations about future social 
events and may lead to types of cognitive bias. 
3. An individuals’ social context frames social cognition because cognitive 
processes may directly involve the individuals’ perception of his or her 
role. It is based on the observation that a person’s cognitions occur within 
a context of evaluations of the situations of others in the social 
environment.   
 
Recent developments in network analysis offer a useful contribution to the 
investigation of the role of social context in social cognition (Pattison, 1994, 
p:104). So social network analysis examines the structuring of the networks and 
handles cognition as applications of the insights created by these analyses. 
 
3.10 Cognition and networks: Social Capital 
 
Cognition and reality are handled fundamentally different in social network 
analysis compared to configuration analysis. Social network analysis looks at 
cognition from the perspective that ‘many of social cognition processes have 
been argued to depend on the context of social relationship in which they occur’ 
(Pattison, 1994, p. 79). The networks are seen as the reality (and) in which 
actors are influenced. However, configuration analysis sees this the other way 
around. The reality is seen as the result of interaction. Even the network in which 
the actor acts can be the discussion of the definition of reality (Termeer, 1993). 
Or to summarize it: social network analysis states that actors’ cognition is 
influenced by the network in which they are in and configuration analysis says 
that networks are determined by the cognition of actors.  
 
Apart from the differences in approach of reality and cognition, policy issues are 
handled differently as well. The focus of social network analysis is limited to 
structural network characteristics, but unlike the other actor- and network- 
models, no assumptions are modelled as to how policies are made. 
Configuration analysis is used to analyse the social cognitive configurations, 
based on standardized statements on a policy issue to enable a quantitative 
comparison of actors’ perception (Hermans, 2005, p28-29) 
 
A more recent framework, compared to social network analysis, combines these 
2 approaches in a way that social cognitive configurations are used to enable 
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quantitative comparison of the actors’ perception of the structural network 
characteristics in which they act. It includes a range of perceptions and 
investigates these perceptions with the help of a questionnaire. The analysis 
deals with  the most important network in the system in the perception of the 
actors, the trust in the individuals within the system, the perception whether 
people are taking advantage of one another and whether people are willing to the 
help, and the perception of what important information sources are and so on. 
The questionnaire used for this research can be found in the appendix. 
 
The framework was first introduced by Putman in 1990 and was called ‘social 
capital’. Using the lens of the social capital framework provides new insights into 
policy design (Narayan, 1999, p:43).  
 
3.11 Definition of Social capital 
 
Social capital has many ways in which it is described and even used. Yet, for this 
purpose, the following description is used within the report: ‘Social capital can be 
defined as the web of groups, associations, networks, and norms of trust at the 
community level that form the social underpinnings of poverty and 
prosperity‘(Putnam 1993). It does not only analyze the perception of the actors 
but also the activity of the network such as jointly writing petitions. 
 
The intention of social capital as introduced by Putman (1990) is not to use the 
framework of social capital as a network analysis as it is used in this report. The 
intention is to measure the amount and strength of social networks which are 
seen as an asset for the community and individuals. By measuring social capital 
with the help of questionnaire and the use of indexes, one can relate amount of 
social capital to other community characteristics such as financial prosperity.  
 
 ‘It is a useful metaphor that suggests that a society with a rich web of 
relationships and widespread participation in community organizations will 
flourish, and that individuals who hold large accumulations of social capital will be 
at an advantage over others with less’ (White, 2002: 1). Both for individuals as for 
the society, social capital is an asset which pays of to invest in. As with other 
forms of capital, one will need to invest time, effort and sometimes money in it. 
To create networks, one will need to take time to make contact, make them 
valuable and maintain these. The more time, effort, money and so on will be put 
in these aspects, the more likely it is that one will create a bigger amount of 
social capital. 
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3.12 Impact of social capital 
 
In social sciences and beyond, social capital proved itself valuable to explain and 
predict certain facets of society. ‘A range of social problems— crime, health, 
poverty, unemployment—have been linked empirically to a community’s 
endowment of social capital (or lack there of)’ (Grooteart, 2004: 3). And the 
amount of social capital in a community influences the efficiency of production, 
happiness, life satisfaction and wellbeing (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004). 
 
To get a grasp of the impact of it, ‘one standard deviation increase in village 
social capital increases household expenditures per person (a proxy for income) 
by at least 20 to 30 percent. This impact is as large as an equivalent increase in 
non-farming assets or tripling the level of education’ (Narayan, 1997: 1).  
 
Social capital is often, relative to the other types of capital, the most powerful and 
abundant sort of capital that exists in the communities of third world countries. 
‘Social ties are now viewed as important assets, a form of capital on a par with 
natural, physical, financial, human, and political capital, and a potential 
instrument for building these other forms of capital’ (Meinzen-Dick et al, 2004: 
202). 
 
Because social capital can be of importance for policy design, it is important to 
know how social capital can be influenced. Social capital is interlinked with often 
aspired aspects of developmental programs: community driven development and 
self empowerment. Social capital, community driven development (CDD), and 
empowerment are related but not equivalent concepts. ‘Success in enhancing 
the level of any one of these concepts will have the tendency as well of improving 
the prospects for the other two concepts’ (Anirudh Krishna, 2003: p1). 
 
‘Community Driven Development is a process that recognizes that poor people 
are prime actors in the development process, not targets of externally-designed 
poverty reduction efforts. In CDD, control of decisions and resources rests with 
community groups who may often work in partnership with demand-responsive 
support organizations and service providers, including elected local 
governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central government agencies.’ 
(Gillespie Stuart, 2003: 4). Empowerment will later on be discussed in the report. 
3.12.1 Cons of social capital  
 
It must be understood that in the scope of development, social capital can be 
positive as well as negative. Clubs, coalitions, movements, organizations, and 
other forms of networks can include individuals which may lead to improvements 
for the individual. But the other way around, when excluded from these 
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organizations, the individual may be exposed to more poverty. This exclusion can 
be on various aspects -political, social, cultural, emotional, and economical- and 
can have severe impact on an individual’s life. 
 
Another downside of a high social capital is when networks tend to feel 
threatened by other strong networks. This may lead to side effect that threatens 
both sides of the networks. ‘Not all the externalities of social capital are positive. 
Some networks have been used to finance and conduct terrorism, for example’ 
(Helliwell, 2004, p1437). Or more to the African context: ethnic groups that are 
very cohesive may start to clash as more than 1 network wants a scare resource, 
such as chieftaincy or land.  
 
How communities gain social capital, is uncertain, which makes social capital 
hard to implement in policy making when the objective is to increase the capital 
in order to let certain implementations of technology function. The origins of 
social capital are shrouded in uncertainly; no one knows as yet for sure why 
some communities have a higher stock of social capital than other communities. 
(Anirudh Krishna, 2003). Yet, social capital can be used in policy making in 
multiple ways.  
 
3.13 Different types of ties within social capital 
 
One can distinguish three different types of ties within social capital: bonding, 
bridging and cross cutting ties. ‘Social capital includes both horizontal ties among 
a group, referred to as ‘‘bonding social capital’’ as well as vertical ties between 
different groups referred to as ‘‘bridging social capital’’’ (Meinzen-Dick, 2004: 
201). Bonding ties reflect the cohesiveness of the group and the intensity of the 
usage of the network.  
 
More recently it was realized that a third, the vertical ties, was missing. These are 
called the cross cutting ties. On the subject of cross-cutting ties, several writers 
have pointed to the importance of ties outside the primary network as a means to 
access resources and power outside the group (Narayan, 1999: 15). It basically 
comes down to linkages that are established to higher social levels. To know 
somebody important can help to bring one higher up as well. One can argue that 
these ties are organized differently in third world countries in some cases than in 
western countries. Usage of some of those ties will be described as corruption in 
western countries while in third world countries these are, at least informally, 
accepted. Having a family member in certain organisation, for example the 
government, can bring externalities that are not accepted in many western 
countries.  
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3.14 Aspects of social capital 
 
One can measure and evaluate social capital on a range of aspects. However, to 
measure a concept such as social capital, which is vague and difficult to define, 
is inherently problematic, partly because it is very dependent on the definition 
one will give to it and the different weights one will give to the different aspects of 
it.  
 
The attempts, such as the standardized questionnaires of the World Bank to 
quantify it are increasingly seen as an over-ambitious endeavor (White, 2002). 
The World Bank made such an attempt with the help of a standardized 
questionnaire containing the following 6 sections: 
 
1. Groups and Networks 
2. Trust and Solidarity 
3. Collective Action and Cooperation  
4. Information and Communication  
5. Social Cohesion and Inclusion 
6. Empowerment and Political Action  
 
(Source: Grootaert et al, 2004) 
 
The social capital in a community increases when one or more of the 6 aspects 
increases and the other aspects stay constant. More extended are these aspects 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
The adapted questionnaire used for the research can be found in the appendix. 
The majority of the answers that can be given to the questions are either ‘open 
questions’ or based on a rating system. This rating system, depending on the 
question, mainly goes from 1 to 5 (such as question 19: In general, how safe 
from crime and violence do you feel when you are alone at home?: 1. Very safe, 
2. Moderately safe…to 5. Very unsafe) 
3.14.1 Groups and Networks  
 
The Groups and Networks section forms the most recognisable link with the 
network and actor analyse of policy analyses. ‘Social networks could be defined 
as a web of social relations or resources that surround individuals, groups or 
organizations and the characteristics of their ties. Analysis of the networks 
focuses on the patterns of the ties between actors as a social system, or 
connections, where the unit of the entity in some way relates to other units’ 
(White, 2002:261).  
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This section investigates the social networks and is therefore sometimes 
described as the structural part of social capital (Grootaert et al, 2004). The 
questions in the questionnaire focus on the number and the size of the networks 
in a community, the perception of importance of networks and the homogeneity 
of them. The ethnic, linguistic, gender, occupational and educational 
characteristics and constellations are examined. With question 5: ‘does this 
group (the most important group of which the family is part of) work with or 
interact with groups outside the reservoir?’ the bridging ties of the groups are 
examined. It enables to get more insight into the actual formal and informal 
networks that are existent in the society and how they are used.  
3.14.2 Trust and solidarity 
 
Social trust—that is, the belief that others around you can be trusted— is itself a 
strong empirical index of social capital at the aggregate level. High levels of 
social trust in settings of dense social networks often provide the crucial 
mechanism through which social capital affects aggregate outcomes. (Helliwell 
and Putnam, 2004: 1436). Solidarity is the unity and agreement resulting from 
shared interests, feelings, actions, sympathies etc (Source: Oxford advanced 
learners dictionary, 1989).  
 
Trust is an important aspect of cognition. The questions in the questionnaire 
focus at the trust towards neighbours and strangers, government and the trust 
one needs to join a collective action. For the collective action, which is the next 
part of the analyses, one will need to trust the other that they will add their part of 
the effort into the project as well. If not, the initial effort by the individual would be 
lost or the project is not as effective as wished for.  
 
Trust is a feeling that individuals have often due to feedback on experiences of 
themselves or other actors. The perception of trust comes forward in statements 
such as question 9b: ‘In this village, one has to be alert or someone is likely to 
take advantage of you in the dry season’ (1: agree strongly,…, 5: disagree 
strongly)’. When a lot of people have the perception that people will take 
advantage of him or her, during farming activities for example, collective action is 
less likely. 
 
Trust comes down to whether an actor is willing to accept and give information, 
services, material and so on to another actor. It is a measure on how eager one 
is to rely on the other. One could see it as the strength of a connection when a 
connection is already established and the willingness to make such a connection 
when it is not there. Nevertheless, trust is not deterministic for this; many other 
factors play a role in this. For example, what the other actor has to offer.  
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3.14.3 Collective Action and Cooperation 
 
This category explores whether and how household members have worked with 
others in their community on joint projects and/or in response to a crisis 
(Grootaert et al, 2004)). ‘Cooperation has always been fundamental for human 
society, and plays a particularly prominent role in rural development programs’ 
(Meinzen-dick, 2004:198) mainly because NGO’s or other organisations active in 
the field assume certain cooperation from the target group. 
 
‘Although not often mentioned, this action should be voluntary, to distinguish 
collective action from hired or corvee labour’ (Meinzen-dick, 2004:200). 
Collective action requires the involvement of a group of people, a shared interest 
within the group and some kind of common action that works in pursuit of that 
shared interest.  
 
Much of the willingness of farmers to participate in collective action will depend 
on the perception whether other farmers will help as well. These facets come 
forward in the questionnaire, for example in  question 14: ‘If there was a water 
supply problem, such as in the reservoir, in this community, how likely is it that 
people will cooperate to try to solve the problem?’ 
 
Solving community problems effectively will be influenced by the response from 
within the network and the amount of actors that will respond effectively. 
Consequences of not participating will have effect on the objectives from each 
actor.  
3.14.4 Information and Communication 
 
The way one communicates, is partly culturally determined. ‘Theories of 
communication, which posit that the medium upon which a message is 
transmitted is itself an integral part of the communication process, clarify the 
analytical utility of the culture concept in ways that account for empirical data.’ 
(Lyon, 2005: 1)  
 
This category of questions explores the ways and means by which poor 
households receive information and the extent of their access to communications 
infrastructure in the rural communities. With the use of open questions, such as 
question 16: ‘what are your three main sources of information about what the 
government is doing (such as the agricultural extension)?’, biased -ness towards 
cultural elements is avoided.  
3.14.5 Social Cohesion and Inclusion 
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Social cohesion refers to networks and institutions that combat inequalities and 
enhance social solidarity and shared identity (Berman and Philips, 2001: 183). It 
looks into whether the community experienced violence in the past based on 
inequalities or differences based on ethnic, linguistic, social or educational 
background. Whether individuals feel safe in their direct environment and how 
the social interaction with friends and family takes place.  So this goes into the 
perception of farmers whether differences in the network form a threat or a 
problem. 
 
The questionnaire was partly adapted by removing some of the questions. The 
questions regarding the violence based on ethnic difference for example were 
removed. These questions could be an unwanted catalyst of feelings which could 
lead to a heated situation.  
3.14.6 Empowerment and Political Action 
 
This section explores a rather wide range of concepts as the personal sense of 
happiness and the feeling of being able to change the course of life. Most of 
these concepts are based on the perception of the individual. For example 
question 20: ‘how happy do you consider yourself now?’ is examining this 
perception. However, not all questions go into the perception of the farmers. For 
example, political activeness and whether the community was able to organise 
themselves in order to benefit the community as a whole are examined.  
 
Much of these aspects however have links with perceptions as awareness forms 
a cognitive aspect. Empowerment can be seen as the awareness of the power of 
the network and the performed action as a result of the awareness. 
‘Empowerment can be either understood as an internalized attitude or as an 
observable behaviour. The goal of empowerment processes is to change the 
cognitive, social, and/or political conditions by an intervention in the form of 
personal cognitive and emotional change. Empowerment presupposes that many 
competencies are already present or possible and that there are given 
opportunities to act. In a state of cognitive, personal, or social discontent, a group 
of involved persons discovers its own strength by coming together and 
cooperating with other individuals being in a similar situation’ (Schaurhofer and 
Peschl, 2003: 261). 
 
3.15 Analyses of frame of reference 
 
Yet another improvement in the actor and network analyses can come from 
improving the insight in the frame of reference of the different actors. As 
suggested in the list of network and actor analyses by Enserink, in step 3: 
‘Determining their problem perceptions, objectives and interests’ 
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These new insights can come from the side of anthropologists. Using local 
knowledge and transform this in knowledge that is helpful in the policy planning, 
could help and avoid problematic situations. It is the local people that will have to 
adopt certain solutions. And in order to be successful in this, the local needs will 
have to be known and possible adaptations will have to be made to the system, 
rather than try to let the local people adapt.  
 
As stated before, policy analysis analyses complex worlds with the help of multi-
perspective and multi-objective analyses. It is a way to analyze and structure the 
views and needs of all different actors while those actors often depend on each 
other. The interests of actors and their perceptions of reality determine their 
objectives – that is, the outcomes they want to achieve (O. van de Riet, 2003, 
p.23). This perception of reality is determined by the frame on which situations 
are reflected on and referenced to: their frame of reference.  
 
Each individual within the problem area as well as the policy makers that try to 
solve the problem view the problem from within their frame of reference. ‘Framing 
is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex 
reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting. A 
frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic 
situation can be made sense of and acted on (Rein and Schon, 1993).’ These 
differences in frames do not only exist within the system to be analyzed, but also 
on the side of the researchers.  
 
So any firmly analysis will have to include a well analyzed and thought through 
frame of reference of the actors. Within these frames, local knowledge is 
embedded. Yet, this is not done in many cases. Ineffective implementations of 
(technical) systems in third world countries are often also part of a certain 
groupthink that existed and still exists within the field of researchers that were 
involved in developmental problems. This is exacerbated by the lack of 
opportunity that a farmer may have to either use or challenge a scientist’s views 
or knowledge and that the scientist mainly look into traditional objectives such as 
yield increase (Alsop and Farrington 1998). This increased the un-sustainability 
of the suggested solutions and new insights are needed to break through this 
impasse.  
 
3.16 Policies in the local context 
 
But a firm analysis of the actors, their network and their frame of references will 
not be fully adequate to obtain appropriate policies. Local circumstances, cultural 
characteristics and a wide range of other different aspects should try to be 
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combined in the design of policies. Including this, yet from another angle of 
approach, possible new and better policies can be made.  
 
With the coming of Hofstede and Trompenaars, the field of engineers was 
confronted with the usefulness of cultural anthropology due to its attractiveness 
of the quantitative approach. In the world of anthropology the approach by the 
two writers was received with scepticism.  Nevertheless it proved its usefulness 
in management and policy making by giving insight in cultural characteristics of 
societies. And so an attempt will be made to take this into account with the 
analysis. Yet, the approach taken by the two writers will not be of much use with 
the making of policies towards management of water reservoirs for various 
reasons. A more, vaguely, but possible useful way is described by the 
anthropologist named Geertz.  
 
The approach used is described by Geertz as the following: ‘to cling-as, in my 
opinion, we must- to the injunction to see things from the native’s point of view’. 
But with the note: ‘we had been taught to believe, through some sort of 
extraordinary sensibility, an almost preternatural capacity to think, feel, and 
perceive like native, how is anthropological knowledge of the way natives think, 
feel and perceive possible?’ (Geertz, 1983:56) 
 
He does not give a straight answer to this, but he gives a sensible clue of an 
approach to describe the natives point of view: ‘The trick is to figure out what the 
devil they think they are up to’ (Geertz, 1983: 58).  
 
Using this insight given as a parallel approach to social capital could give new 
insights and improve the success rate of policy implementations. It will be used to 
give the framework of social capital a context in which the outcomes can be 
placed and interpreted.  
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Research Methodology 
 
 37
4 Research methodology 
 
The analysis is split in three parts: 
 
1. The contextual analyses 
2. The measurement of social capital 
3. The analyses of the lifecycle of the reservoir 
 
The contextual analysis is a broadly defined analysis in which local 
characteristics such as social facets, the impact of seasonality, religious systems, 
and governmental institutions and so on are described. The second part of the 
analyses focuses on the social capital in the two farming communities after 
which, in the 3rd part, the impact of the differences of social capital on the 
lifecycle of the reservoirs is analyzed.  
 
For the communication with the two farming communities a local translator will be 
used.  
 
4.1 Contextual research approach 
 
The first step of the analyses is to determine the context in which the networks 
and communities are analyzed. In order to determine contextual aspects, no pre-
set framework is used. These contextual aspects can be related to the history, 
traditions, culture, their value systems toward water and so on; the frame of 
reference of the local people. These aspects can be so diverse that a preset 
framework possibly could exclude factors that are of importance in the local 
context. By means of interviews with local farmers and the help of common 
sense it will be tried to get more insights on these facets. 
 
The approach that will be taken will be from an anthropologist names ‘Geertz’ 
who wrote articles on how to use local knowledge as a basis on which the society 
should be studied on. This approach focuses on the usage of common sense as 
a manner in which to approach the local culture/society. Hereby an important 
aspect is understanding local common sense in order to understand the local 
frame of reference.” He states ‘treating common sense as a relatively organized 
body of considered thought, rather than just what anyone clothed and in his right 
mind knows, should lead on to some useful conclusions; but perhaps the most 
important is that it is an inherent characteristic of common sense thought 
precisely to deny this and to affirm that its tenets are immediate deliverances of 
experience, not deliberated reflections upon it. (…) Religion rests its case on 
revelation, science on method, ideology on moral passion, but commonsense 
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rests it is on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a nutshell. The 
world is its authority’ (Geertz, 1983: 75).  
 
The usage of common sense is in line with frame of reference. It basically comes 
down to how the actor relates problems, ideas and so on to his frame of 
reference in such way that it does not contradict itself and will be, when behaving 
rationally, done consistently.    
 
When one wants to know how information is used when it is stored, one will have 
to know what information is stored (and, as said before, of less importance is 
how it is stored). So being able to know how an actor acts involves 
understanding, or knowing, what he knows as well. One could see this as local 
knowledge and is therefore of essential value as well.  
 
Clearly it can be seen that this approach doesn’t have any concrete framework. 
Therefore by means of in-depth interviews, more insight in the frames of 
references of the local people will be tried to be gathered. Ideas of decision 
cycles, the reasoning behind tactic decision regarding the use of fertilizer, water 
and seeds, position of women and so on will be tried to be investigated. Or as a 
summary, with the use of common sense it will by tried to figure out what the 
devil the communities they think are up to. 
 
4.2 Determination of social capital in the Tonde and Tanga 
 
The World Bank developed a standardized questionnaire to measure social 
capital. This questionnaire examines the framework that is described in chapter 
4.9. The questionnaire itself can be found in the appendix. In this research, this 
framework and questionnaire of the World Bank will be taken to determine the 
different aspects of social capital in the two different farming communities.  
 
This choice has been made due to a limited time for the research and the 
assumption that 10 years of research of the World Bank and other organizations 
will be at least a more valuable approach than this research could create. And 
the fact that the World Bank made the questionnaire in the scope of development 
work makes it applicable for the purpose. Yet, the definition of social capital is 
still developing and should not be seen as a final definition. 
 
The shortened version of the questionnaire, containing only the core questions, is 
used to measure the social capital in the villages. The reason for this is the 
limited time and resources. In perspective: the core questions contain four pages 
of questions, the extended version 20 pages.  
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With the use of the questionnaire, social capital can be measured and compared 
between the two villages. Data analysis will be used to locate the numerical 
differences. A 10% confidence interval will be used. This interval is chosen 
because the target group, described in the following paragraph, is relatively small 
and the scale on which could be replied (often, scale 1 to 5) is rather limited. 
 
Differences in these factors of social capital are expected to give better insight in 
the way these communities organize themselves and how this is reflected in the 
management of small reservoirs. The questionnaire, that has been adapted to 
local needs and circumstances, can be found in the appendix. Questions 
changed so they relate more to the farming activities and make a clear link with 
the water management and maintenance activities. As an example of such an 
adjustment is the addition of seasonality within the questionnaire. A data 
analyses program will be used to analyze the information gathered with the help 
of these questionnaires.  
4.2.1 The target group of the measurement 
 
The focus will be on the farmers using the reservoirs in Tanga and Tonde. The 
reason for this is because very limited research data is available regarding the 
efficiency of the reservoirs for the purpose of irrigation. Both Tanga and Tonde 
were analyzed very recently by Faulkner (2006) and data regarding these 
reservoirs and their efficiency is generated within this research.  
 
When measuring social capital with the questionnaires, the main focus will be on 
the downstream farming communities. This target group is chosen as such 
because the published results of the report by Faulkner (2006) only give insight 
in the results generated by these farmers. These downstream farmers are 
responsible for the maintenance of the valves and channels, the way they 
distribute the water and will be the main players in the differences that were 
located in the research (Faulkner, 2006) between the reservoirs. 
 
Nevertheless, it is also understood that small reservoirs are multifunctional. 
Important therefore is also to integrate, if possible, aspects of other functions, 
such as fishing, in the analyses described in paragraph 4.1 and 4.3.  
 
4.3 The lifecycle of the reservoirs 
 
The third part of the research will be the analyses of the influence of the findings 
in the lifecycle of the reservoir. This lifecycle starts with the initiation of the 
reservoir, followed by the adoption and the usage of the reservoir. Future 
scenarios are not described in this report. A more extended explanation of this 
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lifecycle can be found in the chapter ‘Influence of the social capital in the life 
cycle of the reservoirs’.   
 
The existence of social capital, or the lack of it, will have different effects in the 
initiation of the reservoirs. The same can be said of the other stages in which the 
communities made decisions how the use the reservoir, for example the choice 
of the irrigation setup, and the current way the communities are using the 
reservoir.  
 
By means of in-depth interviews it will be tried to track the histories of the 
reservoirs and the processes the communities went through.  
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Analyses 
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5 Contextual Analyses 
 
In order to determine what differences within societies could exist, other than the 
factors from social capital, a general description of the societies is given. The 
seasonality, religious systems, ethnic characteristics, an overview of the 
characteristics of the two reservoirs and the local institutional systems will be 
described. 
 
These aspects can and, in some cases, will determine the success of the 
reservoirs. Differences in religious and ethnic characteristics can mean a 
difference in reference framing and create such a pluriformity that the functioning 
of the system can be affected. Differences in the characteristics of the reservoirs 
can determine the effective use of water, inputs, and outputs and so on. 
Seasonality, on its turn, will be the same for both groups, but is greatly 
determining the pace of living in the Upper East Region and is of importance for 
understanding certain aspects of life.  
 
A main source for the information in this chapter is the translator (Haruna 
Kumasi) used for this research. His knowledge was assumed to be up to date 
and relevant as he lived his whole life in the upper part of Ghana. He spoke the 
local language fluently and was involved in farming activities in the past. He is 
relatively well educated and socially active as a supervisor in schooling activities 
of illiterates.  
 
5.1 Seasonality and its impact 
 
Within the upper east of Ghana, seasonality plays a big part in the usage of the 
reservoirs. The seasonality divides the year in dry and wet season. The 
reservoirs have the most important function in the dry season when it enables the 
farmers to grow crops, mainly onions, while before the usage/existence of the 
reservoirs most of the farmers were forced to move down south. In the wet 
season, the rain provides enough moisture to farm outside the boundaries of the 
small reservoirs, which was traditionally done before the coming of the dams. 
 
With the change of seasons, the crops that the farmers grow change as well. 
While in the rainy season the focus is mainly on rice and corn and other crops 
such as ground nuts, sweet potatoes, cassava, shear nut, the focus in the dry 
season shifts mostly to onions, tomatoes and some other small crops.  
 
The main difference in these crops is that onions and tomatoes are grown with 
the focus on selling it with the idea of a profit. This is the case as well with the 
rice and corn, yet, these crops can provide the farmers community with the 
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needed food supply for the whole year. Onions and tomatoes have a limited 
function in this respect and form more of an addition to food than the main dish.  
 
Due to this, dry and wet seasons have different characteristics in the life of the 
farmers, which could be of influence on the social capital. As an example, the 
trust is likely to change when food becomes scarce. It is therefore important to 
include these aspects in the questionnaire or be specific about the time frame in 
which the question is placed. 
 
With the cycles of seasons, the differences of farming and so on, the hunger, 
price and budget cycle are determined for the farmers. Strategic decision of the 
farmers are partly based on these cycles and are therefore of importance to be 
understood. First of all the hunger and than the price and the budget cycles are 
described. After that a decision line is made in which decision points are marked.  
5.1.1 Hunger cycles 
 
Hunger is undoubtedly related in the mind of most people with Africa. It has 
clearly its impact on the societies in the continent and will have its influence on 
the social aspects. In order to understand how these cycles of hunger are 
created the following diagram (fig. 4) is made:  
 
Figure 4: hunger cycle diagram 
 
The diagram represents the cycle of hunger that is experienced by the farmers. 
The horizontal axis represents time, divided in dry and wet seasons. The vertical 
axis represents hunger. Where the line comes under the horizontal axis, it means 
that there is abundant food. When the line comes above the horizontal line, this 
means that food gets scarce. And for some families, this means hunger. 
 
The hunger is directly related to the food availability on the market. This 
availability is mainly created by the farmers themselves. During the first harvest 
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in the wet season, approximately, three months after the planting of the seeds, 
the hunger that is build up during the dry season comes to an abrupt end. 
However, as the year progresses, the food available will slowly decrease and the 
hunger will grow.  
 
When the hunger is at its most fierce and reaches its peak, the load of work 
experienced by the farmers is at its peak as well. It is the period on which the 
physical demand labour activities have to be done on the farming fields mainly 
containing corn or rice. The perceived hunger in that period will be even more 
intense due to this. 
 
Important is to understand that the amplitude and the time line are not exact. 
When some families will suffer from hunger other families are well off and will not 
face any hunger. Hunger will depend on the harvest, which is dependant on 
rainfall, plant disease, quality of seeds, fertilizer, irrigations, and successfulness 
of the farmers and so on. The wet season starts with the first heavy showers, yet 
these showers, the time of arrival and the amount, differ from one year to 
another. This will have direct impact on the hunger cycle.  
 
These diagrams should therefore be seen as schematic representation of the 
cycles but not taken too exact. The time of the wet and dry season can easily 
differ more than a month. In some years families will face hunger very early in the 
year and in some years food is (relatively) abundant.  
5.1.2 Funerals 
 
Another factor that plays a role in the hunger cycle as well as in the working 
cycles, are the funerals. Funerals are expected to be combined with an 
abundance of food in such extend that it has a big impact on the amount of 
stored food and take such a long time that farming activities are heavily 
interrupted by it. The ceremonies are a very distinct aspect of the culture and can 
differ from one place in Ghana with the other. Ethnic and religious background 
determines the way ceremonies are performed. 
 
The funerals and the burial ceremony are two time-independent happenings and 
often the funerals are delayed until there is enough time and money to perform 
the ceremony. It can happen that these funerals happen even 10 years after the 
person died and will only happen after a good harvest/season. Multiple persons 
can be buried in one ceremony. 
 
For traditional worshippers the funeral ceremonies take the longest: 12 days. 
However, this period fluctuates depending on the region. Muslims and Christians 
have considerable shorter ceremonies that are around two or three days. It can 
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happen that different religions are present in a family and two or more 
ceremonies are held for each religion.   
 
The greatest abundance of food is created in the first period of the funeral and 
can take up to 6 months of food supply for a family. This abundance depends on 
the size of the family (this includes in-laws and can easily reach up to 100) 
because family has to bring food as well. For relatively large sized family around 
150 animals can be slaughtered to give blood to the ancestors in the first 
ceremony alone.  Where mainly sheep, goats, chicken and guinea fowls are 
slaughtered in the first ceremony, pork is the main meat in the second ceremony. 
Other ceremonies include lots of drinks, tizzet (local porridge) and other local 
dishes. The family that is host of the ceremonies is obliged to supply food for all 
the visitors during the 12 days.  
 
It may seem cultural insensitive but Muslim and Christian locals often scolded the 
worshippers and told them they were fools to waste food in such extend and 
suffer the next moment. For the traditional worshippers it is a matter of the more 
food, the more pride the family has. Independent of which perspective is taken, 
the ceremonies have a large impact on the food stock of families and therefore 
the hunger cycles.  
5.1.3 Price cycle 
 
As with all market forces, the availability of the products on the market combined 
with the need determine the price. This is the case on the markets in Ghana as 
well, and so, the following diagram (fig. 5) for the food prices (this means: rice, 
corn and so on, not so much the onions) can be constructed: 
 
 
Fig. 5: Price cycle diagram 
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The first thing that becomes clear is how the hunger seasons are created. When 
the harvests in the wet season start, the market prices of the food drop due to the 
increase of food on the market. It brings an abrupt end to the hunger, but it brings 
an abrupt end to the favourable prices for the farmers as well. Yet, the amount of 
hunger that a farmer will experience will partly be determined by price it will get 
for his crops. Every harvest will cause an increase of the budget of the farmers. 
Yet, it also means the start of a new cycle in which he will have to invest in 
seeds, fertilizer and other inputs.  
 
The price cycle of the onions has the same wave characteristic only reaches its 
minimum just after the harvest in the dry season, which is around April. A bag of 
onions will cost around 160.000 Cedis (around 16 euros). Onions have roughly a 
three month storage capacity when it comes to the rotting and so the price will 
increase even more rapidly after that period. A bag of onions after three months 
will cost around 500.000. During wet season some farmers are able to grow 
onions and a price peak of, around, 800.000 Cedis is reached. 
5.1.4 Decision and work cycles 
 
Within these cycles, the farming and maintenance work of the farmers is 
performed (fig. 6). The seasons change but the work is roughly the same. The 
biggest difference is the independency of the reservoir, yet sowing, weeding, 
harvesting and so on are repetitive activities that come with every season. Some 
big maintenance activities often happen in the beginning of the dry season. 
Examples were proper cleaning and repair of the water channels. Small repairs 
were made during the season. 
 
There is a possibility as well for the farmers to have a second harvest after the 
onions are harvested. This harvest consists of vegetables other than onions. 
Only limited farmers could be seen doing this, mostly at Tanga.  
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Fig. 6: the decision cycle 
 
5.2 Religious systems 
 
The farmer communities can roughly be divided into four religious groups: 
Muslims, Christians, traditional worshippers and non-believers. The four types of 
believes live relatively peaceful next to one another and the freedom of religion is 
highly appreciated and well respected freedom in Ghana.  
 
The Christian belief does not differ that much from the European way of 
believing. The same can be said for the Muslims, although it is often seen as less 
strict compared with the Middle East: burka’s, stoning and other extreme forms 
are rejected.  Sex before marriage, as an example, is often not seen as a major 
problem. This of course is within the perception of individuals and cannot be 
generalized. 
 
Traditional worshippers are, as the word says, the traditional way of believing 
that exists in Africa, and in this case the Upper East Region. The religion finds its 
roots before the coming of Christianity and the Muslim religion and forms 
therefore a very old aspect of the culture. A cloud of mystery hangs above this 
type of believing, especially for Western foreigners, because one finds it hard to 
relate this type of religion to anything that is present in their religious traditions. 
Muslims, non believers and even Christian priests that were encountered on the 
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subject didn’t deny the ‘effectiveness’ of the belief. Yet they were hesitant to be 
named ‘traditional worshipper’, partly because it is not inline with their other 
believes. But it gives the importance and the fundamentally importance of this 
religious believe in African societies.  
 
It is not a strict and well defined religion and is very open to ones own 
interpretation: some believe in one god, some in more. The use of ‘Juju’ is 
however general. Objects, often in forms of rings, bracelets, necklaces often 
made from animals and containing some other objects, are believed to have 
special powers and protects individuals from bad spirits, knifes, bullets, evil 
forces and so on. Yet when used by a weak person or used in the wrong way, 
these objects will not help but harm the person.   
 
The gods/spirits are reached through offers. These offers are offered to shrines 
on the ground: often a sort of pot close to the family compounds. By offering 
animals, food and so on, the will please the god(s). They do not believe in 
predestination: they can alter the future by pleasing the gods. If in case of failing 
worship and non fulfilled prayers, they will go to ‘Sooth-sayer’: not a religious 
leader, yet, someone gifted by god and will be able to work out why it went 
wrong.  
 
In front of many houses one can see the gods of the traditional worshippers. 
These are often stones, trees or other objects. Often they are covered with 
feathers as part of the worshipping. Example of these gods can be seen on the 
pictures below (Fig. 7). 
 
Figure 7: examples of gods 
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So, the big difference between the traditional worshippers and the Muslims and 
Christians is, on one perspective, the fact that both Muslims and Christians 
believe in some sort of predestination: ‘It is Gods will’. The external factors are 
ruled by God and by nobody else than by him. The traditional worshippers 
believe they can influence these external factors by offering and performing 
rituals. For example, traditional worshippers do believe they can call for rain while 
Christian and Muslims do believe that is lost effort.  
 
5.3 Chiefs, Tindana’s, government, conflicts and ethnic background 
 
In the culture in the upper east, one can detect three parallel and relatively 
independent power structures. When one asks about it the local people refer to 
the sentence: ‘the chief is for the people, the Tindana for the ground’. These 
structures are historically determined and go back to the beginning of the 
settlements and still cause heavy conflicts most visible in Bawku, close to the 
study sites. Next to the chieftaincy and the Tindana’s the third power is the local 
government.  
 
One could state that for traditional matters, one goes to the chief; anything 
related to the government, one has to go to the assembly man. And when some 
unexplainable, out of the ordinary happenings take place, one will go to the 
Tindana.  
5.3.1 Tindana’s 
 
The conflicts in Bawku are mainly dominated by the conflict of chieftaincy yet, the 
Tindana’s have an, probably fundamentally more important role. Where power, in 
the form of chieftaincy is fundamental, the right of landowning and the dividing of 
land, possibly even more. In the history expanding kingdoms/states/etc was often 
not to rule yet another group of people but to get land and its resources that 
come with this. Because, nowadays, most landowning problems are solved and 
by law it is clear who own what, land issues are now somewhat settled, but still 
the Tindana’s impact is still there but arguably less. They still fulfil a central 
position in the societies. 
 
Although most people that were spoken with, were hesitant to confirm the 
historically accuracy of the story and very open to ones interpretation, the outline 
of the story goes that when the first settlers, the Kusaasis came, now seen as the 
originally inhabitants of the Upper East, they ‘opened up the earth’. This was 
performed by a shrine, often a tree and a stone. The Tindana is seen as the 
representative of the ancestors and the group that came first. The land that they 
were living on was not only from the people that were living on it, but from the 
ancestors and the people to be born as well. 
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These Tindana’s were not centrally coordinated and were independent and 
autonomic. The living communities and their tindana’s throughout the upper east 
formed a horizontal structure: there were no super Tindana’s and there was no 
central coordination. When one wanted to settle or start to cultivate a piece of 
land, one would go to the Tindana for such issues and the Tindana would open 
up the earth again. Normally one would inherit the function of Tindana but 
conquering was possible as well. With this a structure of land owning was 
created that was not very clear and definite (who owns what, did the past 
Tindana give the inhabitant the land or was this not the case, etc). 
 
Next to less controversial matter of land the Tindana can be seen as the 
traditional worshipper that is closest to the spirits. Worshippers don’t come 
together like Muslims and Christians who gather every week for their 
ceremonies. All worshippers perform their own rituals individually. So the 
Tindana cannot be seen as a representative of the worshippers, like a priest is of 
the Christians. When extraordinary things take place that are unexplainable by 
common sense or technology, that excludes sickness with a clear cause such as 
malaria, aids and so on, the Tindana will be approached to solve this. One can 
think for example of a child found dead in the river without any clear cause. The 
Tindana will, on his turn, ask the sooth-sayer for advice and which rituals to 
perform to calm down the matters.   
5.3.2 The cause of conflicts 
 
The structure of these autonomous groups, lead by the Tindana’s, ended when 
the Mamprusis, today’s greatest minority in the Upper East, came to expand their 
territory. The Mamprusis were warriors and had, in contrast with the Kusaasis, 
hierarchical structures with chiefs.  The Mamprusis managed to conquer the land 
and imposed the hierarchical structures on the indigenous tribe. Due to this 
course of history, a situation was created in which a minority, the Mamprusis, 
ruled over the majority, the Kusaasis.  
 
This abruptly came to an end after the military coup of Rawlings in the 70ties. 
Rawlings, still seen as a living legend and hero by many, had the philosophy that 
the indigenous people should have the chieftaincy as they formed the majority. 
With this philosophy, he made sure that the Mamprusi chieftaincy, with the 
paramount chief in Bawku, was replaced by a Kusaasi. This intervention proved 
more of an extra trouble than a solution. 
 
The change of power causes troubles till today. It is the struggle between the 
original inhabitants and the Mamprusis, referred to as the new comers by the 
Kusaasis. The riots mainly take place in Bawku where heavily armed fights take 
place every now and then. Military intervention often takes place but only solves 
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the conflict for the time being. The conflict however is so fundamental that long 
term solutions are hard to find and so the conflict is likely to continue for a long 
while. 
 
Mamprusis are not the only minority in the Upper East, but the most prominent. 
Other tribes such as the Fra Fra, Whombes, Moshi and others can be found in 
today’s population.  
5.3.3 The chiefs 
 
The chiefs, after the coming of the Mamprusis are the traditional leaders of the 
villages. For anything related to traditions, such as marriage, divorces, struggles 
in the village and other matters within those spheres, the Chief is the ruling 
power.  
 
Above the chief, there is a paramount chief, who, in this case, is located in 
Bawku. The paramount chief represents all the chiefs. Under each chief a 
subchief is representing the chief in each village. All functions are based on  
heritage. In the case of the reservoirs, both reservoirs are on the territory of one 
chief, the chief of Tanga. Tanga, in this case is the territory. Tanga reservoir, to 
avoid confusion again, is located in the Tanga area but is next to the village 
Gunga. So Weega, Gunga, Tonde and some other, roughly 13 in total are under 
the control of the chief. 
5.3.4 The assembly man 
 
The assembly man is elected by the people of the villages and is the 
representative of the people in the villages in the local government. Next to this 
there are the unit committees in every village that are elected by the people as 
well but are there for organising purposes such as tax inning, bush fires and 
other practical related matter. When individuals have complaints or wanted to get 
things done, one would go the assembly man, rather than the unit committee.  
 
The local governmental setup is very complex. For additional information the 
report of Poolman (2005) is recommended.  
5.3.5 The WUA 
 
The water users associations are the lowest institutional level and are 
responsible for the following tasks (Poolman, 2005): 
 
- Protection of the dam and reservoir 
- Maintaining the reservoir and irrigation facilities 
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- Efficient water use for the dry season 
- Crop production 
 
WUA consist of at least a treasurer, chairman and secretary. In the cases of 
Tonde and Tanga these structures are slightly different, as will be discussed later 
on. WUA are not only created in case of small reservoirs but for all types of water 
related structures, such as boreholes.  
 
Small maintenance is the responsibility of the WUA; failure by external factors is 
often handled by the government or the NGO’s.  
5.3.6 Agricultural extension agents 
 
Agricultural Extension Agents (AEAs). The Agricultural Extension Agents are 
responsible for identifying the problems that are affecting the communities 
surrounding the small reservoirs, which is done through observations made in the 
small reservoir communities, but also through communication with the Water 
Users Associations at the small reservoirs. (Poolman 2005).  
 
Apart from this function they communicate and advice the farmers on how to 
appropriatly use the reservoirs. Advice is given for maintenance of the reservoir, 
the usage of fertilizer, seeds, water, fighting of diseases and how to recognise 
certain diseases, strategic advices such as pointing a few individuals in the 
reservoir for growing seeds that will benefit the whole farming community. Next to 
this, the officers are often present or even initiate meetings of the farmers. For 
example, in Tanga, several attempts with meetings were made to convince the 
upstream farmers to farm downstream.  
 
The function of adviser goes without any formal power. The initiative to change or 
adapt certain practices is up to the farming community itself. The community 
itself is, in the end, fully responsible for the well being and usage of the reservoir. 
Reservoirs, such as Tonde and Tanga are handed over, officially, after 
construction to the communities and from there on, the responsibility is theirs.  
5.3.7 Political parties 
 
The politics is very polarized in Ghana, the two most important groups can be 
seen as NDC, the party of Rawlings, and NPP, new patriotic party. There are 
other parties, such as the PNC, but they have little impact in the Upper East 
compared to the other two.  
 
Either you are in favour of them or you are against them and villagers know 
exactly who supports who. Violence during election time is relatively normal due 
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to the polarisation. Different causes can be named for this. First of all, the 
democracy in Ghana is relatively young and past political activities were mainly 
characterised with violence, military action and coups. Secondly, the political 
system has some ethnical loading in the region as Rawlings changed the 
chieftaincy from the Mamprusis to the Kusaasis. This, as described in the chapter 
‘the cause of conflicts’, still creates serious tensions. As mostly Mamprusis do 
support the NPP, as NDC was the party of Rawlings, and Kusaasis mostly 
support the NDC, this political division is mostly an ethic division as well. This 
however, is not absolute; the assembly man of the Tanga district for example is a 
Mamprusi and supports the NDC. He, however, is one of the few of the whole 
Mamprusi community that does so.  
 
Thirdly the privileges that come with supporting a specific party increase stakes. 
Schools, initiated by former governments, are not finished because current 
governments want to start their own projects; farmers of the year are only 
supporters of current governments; poverty relieve funds are only given to party 
supporters and so on. At least, that is what is said in several occasions. Farmers 
reckon that applying for loans at certain sources is wasted effort because they 
are supporting another party than the institution supports. However, the research 
was on this point limited and incomplete and should be handled with care. 
 
5.4 Position of women in Ghanese society 
 
Although the government of Ghana is actively trying to support and improve the 
status of the women, the women are still considered less important than the man. 
This has partly to do with the ‘Dowry’, the traditions that one pays for a wife. It 
gives the impression that a wife it a type of trade ware although this is not seen 
as such in many cases. Muslims, for example do not follow this habit although 
they accept polygamy, some up to four or more wives, something that the 
Christians reject. Traditional worshippers can marry up to 10 wives. 
 
A Kusaasi wife is worth four cows, three goats and two chickens. She becomes 
worth more when she possesses exceptional beauty: this is worth an extra cow. 
Once the lady is paid for with 5 cows, automatically the first born will be worth the 
same as well. A cow can be bought on the local market between 700 000 Cedis 
(roughly 70 Euro) for a local cow. When a woman wants to divorce, she has to 
pay the family the dowry back minus 1 cow for every child. 
 
At the moment the Kusaasi chiefs are negotiating with each other to lower the 
price of a wife to two cows, to make it possible for every person to buy a wife. To 
put it in perspective: with a good harvest a farmer that works with the help of the 
reservoir, a farmer can roughly buy two cows. In some cases the family is happy 
to let the girl go to a proper household without payment. These rates differ from 
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tribe to tribe and for example, the Moshis do not have the dowry systems. When 
a Kusaasi marries a Moshi woman, he doesn’t pay the dowry. And for his 
children he will not be able to ask dowry as well which forms a block for some of 
the Kusaasi men.  
 
The idea of dowry is possibly strengthened by the setup of the family 
compounds. Families live often together in one big houses existing of more 
compartments. When a man marries a wife it is the tradition that the woman 
leaves her family compound and moves to the family compound of the man. The 
idea of seeing a wife as an asset to the family has therefore another perspective 
than, for example, the western way of marriage where the tradition is that after or 
even before marriage the couple moves into its own house so both families 
‘loose’equal assets.  
 
The status of a wife in the household is very traditional. The women is 
responsible for the cooking, washing, clearing, the children and all other aspects 
that come with the household, the man is responsible for generating income. 
With the lack of social security the women as individuals become a vulnerable 
group. Without the possibility of generating income, many, often older women, 
are forced to beg. Next to this, more women are illiterate than man which makes 
the position of the women even more vulnerable.  
 
During the interviews, mostly in Tonde, women were complaining in some cases 
that most men at the moment were wicked. While the women group arranged the 
dam the man often tried to take over with the help of his position. The man, in 
these cases, was controlling the budget and used it as a constraint for the 
women. When the women needed to buy fertilizer and seeds, the man used its 
position to control the situation and often this lead to a situation that the man 
decided the course of action of the plot.  
 
In Tanga, a woman complained about her family in law: plots were taken from 
her that were inherited by her, yet the family in law took over most land and as a 
woman, she had no say in it. Because her husband died, there was no one to 
stand up for her and a man’s word is more important than the word of a woman. 
Due to the illiteracy and low education rate, wills are not often made and 
therefore do not form a proper protection against such practices. Tindana’s, 
chiefs and other high ranked individuals are not able or do not want to form a 
counter weight in such practices as it is part of the tradition and culture.  
 
That a man’s word is more important comes forward in cross-religious marriages 
as well. A woman will need to take the religion of her new husband as her new 
religion. The women that were spoken to however didn’t perceive this as a 
problem and found it easy to switch from religion. 
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5.5 Farming activities 
5.5.1 Before the coming of the reservoirs 
 
Before the coming of the reservoirs, dry season farming already existed. Yet, it 
was on very small scale and was more labour intensive. The water gathering was 
done by creating a hole in a soaky area and due to the moisture in the ground, 
the water would gather in the holes and by means of calabashes or buckets 
water would be spread on the field.  
 
Because it was on smaller scale, often this method was experienced as not 
worthwhile and relatively more people decided to go down south in the dry 
season in order to generate income there. Next to this, externalities that come 
with the coming of the reservoirs were not there: the farming fields were fenced 
with mud walls as can be seen in the current reservoirs so, for example, cattle 
could not reach the water to drink, crocodiles could not be harboured and it was 
too small for recreational purposes.  
 
The farmers were independent and did not form water users associations. Not 
clear formal structure between different farmers was in place.  
5.5.2 Common Strategies  
 
Farmers have to make a range of strategic decisions throughout the year. With 
strategies, it is meant choices that affect future developments of the crop, the 
usage of the soil and the reservoir, the choice of seeds, fertilizer, and pesticide 
and so on. It has a great, if not critical, impact on the success of the farming. 
 
The strategies of farmers in both reservoirs had some commonalities and at 
some points there were some great differences. All strategies of dry season 
farmers start off with the choice between going to the south to find work there or 
to start their farming plot with the help of the small reservoirs. If the choice is to 
farm with the irrigation system a variety of choices will determine the 
successfulness of the farmer. First of all the choice of crops will have to be made, 
the next step is to determine the right time of planting the seeds. During the 
season, the choice to use fertilizer or pesticide comes up.  
 
When diseases come up, pesticides are used. Most common is DDT, used in the 
south with the coconuts. It is illegal due to its great impact on the environment 
and health; still most farmers use it and can get it relatively easily on the local 
markets. No government agents are on the fields to fine or stop these practices 
so it is of common use.  
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When asked to the farmers how they decided to determine their strategy the 
main response was that their strategy didn’t change in the past years. Some tried 
some different crops but, mainly, onions proved a crop that was able to provide a 
stable income and used little pesticide and fertilizer compared with tomatoes. 
Yet, some patches of earth proved less successful for the onions and often 
tomatoes were planted there. This could be seen as the main strategy of most 
farmers in both reservoirs. 
 
The amount of fertilizer and seeds used did not change for the past times. Either 
the farmers determined the amount with the help of other farmers, relatives, 
learned it from elderly people such as parents, very few named the agricultural 
extension officer. If the chosen amount of input proved successful than this 
amount was seen as good, or at least sufficient, and did not change over time. 
No communication between farmers or in meetings of the WUA’s was reported. It 
was mainly up to the farmers themselves.  
 
The agricultural extension officer tried to explain the local farmers that optimizing 
strategies could save a lot of money. Research was done by them and data were 
available for the right amount of inputs. These advices were of little use as most 
farmers used their own logic. According to the extension officer, these logics 
were mainly based on ignorance.  
 
Due to the individual characteristic of the usage of fertilizer, seeds and pesticide, 
it is hard to explain the big differences between two collectives of the reservoirs 
from this perspective. The only common characteristic difference between the 
reservoirs, apart from soil conditions, was the amount of experience, partly 
passed down from elderly or more experienced. As Tonde farmers were mainly 
new in the field of farming, the farmers of Tanga had considerably more 
experience. These farmers were active before the coming of the dam, mostly 
from the early beginning of their lifes. A knowledge/experience difference within 
the intellectual capital of the Tonde and Tanga farmers may be an explanation of 
the difference.   
 
The farmers apply two different types of artificial fertilizer: ammonia or 15-15-15. 
The 15-15-15 is used in the begin stadium of the process, ammonia is used in a 
later stadium, roughly two weeks after the fertilizer is used, to absorb the 
moisture and gives, as farmers reckon, the plants a greener appearance.  
 
The choice between the two main crops, tomatoes and onions, was mainly made 
on past experience. Most farmers in the area that were planting tomatoes started 
planting onions. Less fertilizer is used for these crops (so financial risks and 
investments costs are less) and the main advantage of onions is that one can 
store them longer (roughly three months) than tomatoes. Tomatoes will have to 
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be sold in less than two weeks after harvesting. Anticipation on possiblr price 
changes on the markets is therefore a more delicate, if not impossible task.  
 
5.5.3 Storage of onions 
 
When one examines the price, hunger and budget cycle, the storing of the onions 
seems like a very reasonable solution. When properly stored, onions can be 
stored up to three months. Due to rotting about 1/10th of the onions will be rotten. 
Where a bag of onions during the time of studying (harvest time) would generate 
160.000 Cedis on the local market, in three months time this easily would reach 
500.000 in three months. 
 
The majority of the farmers tried to sell their onions as fast as possible to gain 
immediate profit from the harvest. Institutions and individuals, such as the 
agricultural extension officer that was in function of both Tonde and Tanga, tried 
to convince farmers to store at least a part of the harvest. Meetings in Tanga 
were held to show how self made storage facilities could provide them with the 
needs and at minimal cost (around 400.000 Cedis) if one compares this with the 
extra profit. But the example storage facility in Tanga fell in disrepair because 
nobody was using it. 
 
All attempts from the side of the extension officer failed to convince the people in 
Tanga. In Tonde no attempts were made. Most heard comments from the side of 
the farmers were that they were hungry now and wanted the money now. When 
the reply was that the hunger would even become worse in the three months 
ahead in which vast labour had to be done on the fields, the people mainly 
replied that no matter what, they needed the money now.  
 
Another point was that for the usage of fertilizer, seeds and pesticides, loans 
were used that had to be repaid after harvest. For some this meant that a delay 
of money was therefore not possible.  
 
Some of the farmers of Tanga and Tonde were trying to store onions in their own 
houses on the concrete floors. Due to the heat in the concrete and inability of the 
air to go through the layer of onions, up to 1/3rd was spoiled this way. With the 
help of the self made facilities this rotting could mostly be avoided as the racks 
allowed the wind to cool the onions. Farmers approached in Tonde on the 
subject didn’t know such facilities existed while about 10km away in other 
reservoirs, such facilities could be found. Farmers in Tanga mainly replied they 
didn’t have the money to invest in it.  
The whole situation in Tanga however didn’t fit with the last comment while a 
common storage facility was made. This building however collapsed due to low 
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maintenance as a result of limited usage. More likely stubborn logics seem to be 
more of the fundamentals of the approaches of the farmers. 
 
Common facilities in other reservoirs to store onions could be seen as well, 
mainly sponsored by NGO’s. These were in function yet had little impact as only 
around three farmers could use the facility.  These facilities didn’t use the racks 
to cool the onions but used the system other farmers used as well: the onions 
were stored on the ground. 
5.5.4 Common wall 
 
In Tanga and Tonde, two different strategies for building the walls around the 
plots were chosen. In Tanga, every farmer builds his or her own wall and in 
Tonde there was a common wall build. A common wall has some advantages 
and some disadvantages.  
 
The advantage of a common wall is that the wall takes space on plots that 
otherwise could have been used for farming and the topsoil, needed for building 
the wall, is lost for this purpose as well. Levelling the ground, as many farmers 
said, was much easier with a common wall compared with separate enclosures. 
With a proper levelled plot, irrigation becomes less of a time and physical 
demanding job.  
 
Apart from this, animals breaking through walls are less of a problem because it 
becomes from an individual responsibility a common responsibility. However, it 
was reported that often young boys were used to chase the cattle away and this 
job took the whole day so they had no time to go to school. A proper maintained 
and build wall is therefore essential to be an advantage.  
 
The problem with a common wall as well is that norms of individuals regarding 
the height and steadiness of the wall differ. Apart from this, people are less 
willing to maintain the wall in the end of the season when the harvest is done. 
Farmers that started late in the season have a disadvantage because of this. 
Next to this, the part of the wall located near or in the water-lock area forms an 
unstable part of the wall. Because the wall is made of mud, water weakens it and 
animals find their way through this weak spot.  
 
A few old men told that they really wanted to farm; yet, they were too old to build 
their own wall and hoped for a common wall in Tanga, so they could start farming 
as well. Where farmers in Tonde were happy with their solution, many farmers in 
Tanga admired the wall of Tonde.  
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5.6 Descriptions reservoirs 
5.6.1 Local geographical and ethnical setup 
 
In the analyses different groups will come forward which either are geographical 
separate or separated ethnically. Tonde is relatively homogenous when it comes 
to ethnical background and is used by four villages: Tonde, Weega, Ganide and 
Atolombisi, which are closely located to the Tonde reservoir. The inhabitants are 
mostly Kusaasis.  
 
Tanga has more diversity when it comes to ethnical backgrounds. The groups 
that can and could be found can roughly be separated in four parts. On the site of 
Gunga along the reservoir there is a group of Kusaasis mixed with Mamprusis. 
The mix was estimated by locals to be between 50% and 30% Mamprusis and 
the rest mostly Kusaasis. On the upstream part of the Dam there is a group of 
Kusaasis as well but geographically separated as they live in Tang Dabot. On the 
other side, downstream a group of Fra Fra is located and some Kusaasis. 
Downstream, but on the site of Tanga, there is a group of Moshis located. This 
separation is not absolute and the ethnical groups are mixed. However, the Fra 
Fra group was distinctly recognisable because they own the only farming plot of 
Tanga that is surrounded by a common wall in which about 8 farmers have their 
activities.  
5.6.2 General description of the Tanga reservoir 
 
The Tanga reservoir, which is part of a cascading reservoir system, is 10.6 ha in 
surface area and the total area under cultivation is 1.6 ha. During the study 
period, 73 farmers maintained plots at this study site (Faulkner, 2006). According 
to management, the number of farmers grew with the year so a small increase in 
the number of farmers can be expected.  
Figure 8: left: deteriorated channel, right: individual walls 
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The impression of the field was mixed. Many different plots, some well 
maintained, some abandoned could be seen and every plot had its own mud wall 
around it. Next to this, the field was long stretched and had large areas where no 
dry season farming activities could be seen. Some channels were well looked 
after, some clearly were deteriorated (Fig. 8, left). Most farmers had a hand dug 
well in the, unevenly shaped, mud enclosure (Fig. 8, right). These hand dug wells 
were fed by the water of the reservoir by means of small channels. 
 
The usage of hand dug wells created a situation in which they were less 
dependent on water supply from the reservoir that was experienced as highly 
unpredictable and unreliable: the further the plots were located from the dam, the 
more complaints were made about water availability. When water was supplied 
to the farmers, some of the farmers with the ground holes still had the trench 
system which they used to water their crops.  
 
Respondents in interviews were asked to give their idea of what the difference 
between Tanga and Tonde is. A wide variety of answers came, yet one distinct 
difference of setup of the irrigation system was addressed. Farmers in Tanga 
addressed the difficulties due to the bad location of the construction of the 
valves: they were placed too close together and made it impossible to locate all 
the farmers between the two channels. Some farmers were forced to farm uphill 
(relative to the main channels). 
 
Another difference addressed by the farmers was the type of topsoil. The topsoil 
on the Tanga side was more clayish, which doesn’t allow the water to run into the 
ground properly although opposite stories in the field could be heard about this 
aspect. Combined with the shape of the farm ground, which could be described 
as steeper compared with Tonde and the fact that the farm field was shaped as 
sort of cup with the deep side in the middle, leads to a situation that the middle of 
the farm ground is underwater the whole year through. This area was relatively 
big compared to Tonde.  Because of this and the bad location of the valves 
farmers are able to use less ground in between the two water channels 
compared with Tonde.  
 
The shape of the field is partly a result of the actions of the farmers. The 
uncoordinated way of distributing land which resulted in single mud walls didn’t 
allow the farmers to level the ground. The background of the reasons why this 
uncoordinated distribution happened will be discussed in the third part of the 
report where the lifecycle and the history of the dams will be discussed.  
 
A possible explanation of the measured differences by Faulkner (2006) of the 
use of fertilizer can be found in these characteristics of the field. The abundance 
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of water is one reason why farmers use ammonia for their crops. The more 
abundant water, as could be seen close to the water lock area, the more 
ammonia is used. Next to this, the more clayish, the more fertilizer the crop 
needs. However, in the report of Faulkner, little detail is given about the usage of 
fertilizer. Only averages and not the standard deviation, was given. Farmers were 
asked to give an idea of the difference the main reply was that the yield of the 
field was asked in the interview and many people tend to lie about the data. Yet 
another explanation can be found in the usage of manure. The usage of local 
manure, which was heavily promoted by the Agricultural extension officer due to 
the effectiveness and decrease in diseases, could be a more adopted method in 
Tonde as compared in Tanga.  
 
The Tanga reservoir is located on two different assembly man election areas. 
The border roughly runs through the middle of the reservoir (so the lake itself) 
and the irrigated fields. The site is also located on two different Tindana 
properties. Roughly, the lake part belongs to one Tindana and the irrigated fields 
belong to another Tindana. The exact property boundaries were not clear as 
different people, including the Tindana’s, pointed out different borders. How the 
property rights were exactly handled regarding the Tindana issues is unclear. 
 
A community of upstream farmers can be found in the Tanga reservoir. Those 
farmers belong mostly to the Tang Dabot village. Little incentives could be found 
for the upstream farmers to come downstream as these plots, upstream, were 
said to be and appeared more fertile than the land downstream. More detailed 
description of the problems of the upstream farmers and the reasons why those 
farmers were located there will be discussed later on in the report.  
 
Figure 9: left: unused plots, right: the basin 
 
Another distinct, visual, difference could be noticed in Tanga as well. Different 
plots that were used in the dry season were separated from each other as big dry 
plots were lying between these used plots (fig. 9, left). One small basin 
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downstream (fig. 9, right), relatively far away from the dam, could be seen as 
well. This basin was fed by the reservoir by means of hand dug channels. From 
this basin, little channels ran to the hand dug wells from the farmers there. 
5.6.3 General description of the Tonde reservoir 
 
The Tonde Reservoir, which is a stand alone system not connected to other 
reservoirs, has a surface area of 11.9 ha and the total area under cultivation is 
6.0 ha and had 241 farmers in 2005 (Faulkner, 2005). The number of farmers 
was relatively stable according to the management. The angle of the field is in a 
steady slope and the water lock area in the middle of the field is relatively small 
compared with the Tanga reservoir. It had a straight line in the middle to the 
back. 
 
The most distinct difference with the Tanga reservoir is the single mud wall that is 
around the Tonde field. (Fig. 10, left and right) Roughly three individual walls can 
be seen on the site. The majority of the fields are irrigated with the trench 
method: small channels that have an input from a main channel (Fig. 10, middle) 
that is connected to the reservoir. By removing or adding mud plugs, water is 
distributed over the plots.  
 
Figure 10: left and right: the common-wall fenced field, middle: the main 
channel 
 
Relative few plots are abandoned and the place has an overall organised 
impression. Channels are well maintained, the plots looked after.  
 
During the study period a rush harvest happened. This was, according to the 
farmers on the field, mainly due to the many funerals at that moment. The wet 
season had brought a good harvest and loud bangs for the funerals could be 
heard during the whole day as part of these funerals. The amount of funerals 
didn’t allow the farmers to maintain the mud wall properly. Cattle came in and 
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young boys found their daily task in chasing it away. This was seen as a common 
task and people would rush through the fields to chase it away from plots not 
belonging to them. 
5.6.4 Crops planted 
 
Compared with the Tonde reservoir, more vegetables could be seen in the fields 
of Tanga. This was mostly visible near the end of the dry season when the Tanga 
farmers made use of the farming fields a second time after the onion harvest by 
growing different types of vegetables such as sweet potatoes and okro. The 
farmers in Tanga reckoned there was good profit in the second harvest. This 
second harvest might be a partial explanation of the yield difference measured by 
Faulkner. 
 
The reason given by the farmers in Tonde for not growing a second harvest in 
the dry season was the fact that the cattle could come in after the onion harvest 
because the mud walls would deteriorate. The animals would destroy the crops 
so it was of no use. Mainly the walls near the water lock area were an easy target 
for the cattle to break through as the water would weaken the wall. Some of the 
farmers in Tanga reasoned differently why farmers didn’t do the second harvest. 
They reckoned that the farmers in Tonde just started or started a few seasons 
ago and it was a lack of knowledge on the side of Tonde. The farmers in Tanga 
learned the farming from their parents and had therefore more knowledge of 
farming.  
 
5.7 Knowledge 
 
All the strategy towards the usage of seeds, fertilizer and pesticide is based on 
past experience. The choice of crop was based on the same reasoning. Once a 
successful harvest was completed, the same amount that was used as input for 
this successful harvest was used for next year input as well.  
 
The choice of onions, as the farmers said, proved to be the most stable income. 
Yet, in case of a fatal disease specific to onions, the whole harvest will be lost. 
Choosing one tactic means ruling out the others and makes the farmer more 
vulnerable when this strategy does not work out well. Growing more than one 
crop could reduce the risk and would keep the soil in better condition. 
 
In Tonde, where the group is so cohesive that initial knowledge is the baseline on 
which decisions are made, yet improvements or adjustments to this baseline are 
limited if not non existing: improvements can be made on this aspects. 
Knowledge generation can be established on three different ways: first of all, 
enhancing cross-cutting ties by actively searching for NGO’s, offices, or other 
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institutions with funds and knowledge that could help to update, improve and 
extend information. A second way is bridging links: actively search and 
participate in meetings/gatherings with other reservoirs. Relevant and probably 
very practical information can be found within these societies. Reinventing the 
wheel can be avoided in this way and the information flow will be increased by 
this.     
 
A third way, and possibly rather unusual way, could be that the group in Tanga 
make use of its own cohesiveness by starting its own ‘small scale knowledge’ 
field that is maintained or possibly financed by other group members. Relatively 
easy to measure experiments, such as an optimum of fertilizer or different ways 
of applying different types of pesticide, could create insights with which the 
intellectual capital could be improved. In the chapter ‘mentality’ it is described 
that this knowledge already exists at the agricultural extension office. Yet, this 
type of information is not adopted in the community. The generation of 
knowledge in such a community itself might help with the acceptance of such 
information. This idea however, seems nice on paper and in theory but will 
certainly face some serious difficulties in practice.   
 
The social cohesive group of Tonde can become or is already its own burden. 
Any bridging links with other reservoirs have not been made since the beginning 
of the farming at the dam. The cohesiveness of the group can be the cause of a 
certain group think within the farmers’ community. Possible inventions, 
improvements and solutions for possible problems at Tonde do not reach the 
field through those channels whilst these reservoirs are yet a very great potential 
knowledge asset. This is also partly the case at Tanga, yet due to the less 
cohesiveness of this group, individuals are tempted to find solutions outside the 
reservoir.  
 
Where these initiatives can be seen as too risky for individuals due to the poor 
financial circumstances of the farmers and the high dependency of the 
successfulness of the harvest, the community could together fund such initiatives 
and spread the risk of such activities. If successful, it could benefit the community 
as a whole. Yet another initiative, as suggested in past research, could be the 
building of a common storage building.  
 
5.8 The mentality 
 
One could see this strategy of choosing the type of crops and the amount of input 
as an approach based on satisfaction rather than optimizing. Improvements in 
the usage of the reservoir can, possibly, made on this aspect. The intellectual 
capital of the group was formed in the beginning of the adoption of the reservoir 
and sees limited updates. It is well possible that new insights or techniques came 
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up and did not reach the Tonde reservoir due to its limited communication with 
other reservoirs.  
 
New knowledge however is hardly adopted by the local farmers. The agricultural 
extension officer told of many occasions in which new knowledge was presented 
to the farmers but the farmers kept following their own reasoning. Examples 
could be found in the amount of fertilizer and seeds where optimal amounts were 
presented, the usage of local manure, the usage of amount of water, the storage 
of onions, the diversification of crops in the fields in order to let the soil recover 
and spread the risk, the centralized way of growing onion seeds for the 
community as a whole and so on. The extension officer, who gave the 
impression to be very devoted to his job explained many aspects in several 
occasions but hardly any advice that would lead to optimisation  would be used in 
the field. Advice regarding the use of pesticide however was used in the field, but 
this had more the purpose of saving the harvest and making it optimal.  
 
The mentality of the farmers can be seen in the way they strive for satisfaction. 
This strategy could be seen in more occasions. In many interviews the farmers in 
Tanga were telling that they didn’t get water in the past three days. Still, on the 
question whether they thought how the WUA and the valve-openers were 
functioning, the answer was that they had no complaints. Due to their hand dug 
wells, they were sure of water anyway, and if the valve-opener was so friendly to 
open the valves, it was handy. It saved them from dragging with calabashes.  
 
The statement on the small reservoir project homepage 
(www.smallreservoirs.org) that some reservoirs are functioning sub-optimally and 
that because of this, there is room for improvement should be dealt with care. 
Any efforts made to reach an optimum will easily be left aside, as western ideas 
of optimums are not recognised as such by the local farmers.   
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6 Measurements social capital 
6.1 Social capital in Tanga and Tonde 
 
Part of the events happened in Tanga and Tonde can be explained within the 
framework of social capital. A sound analysis of these factors can lead to insights 
that can partly determine the successful adoption of future dams.  
 
The significance level will be taken as 10% because of the limited number of 
questionnaires, 35 for Tanga and 38 for Tonde, and the rather limited scale on 
which could be replied (often, scale 1 to 5). The zero hypotheses will be that 
there is no relation between answers of the farmers and the location of the 
farmers: Tanga and Tonde.  
 
The farmers upstream were not taken into the sample; most of them didn’t 
participate in the WUA, didn’t pay the fees and often they were not even 
interested in a plot downstream. In order to understand the impact of social 
capital on the management and usage of the reservoir, this group had to be 
excluded. Fishers were excluded from the sample as well because they too had 
no hand in the maintenance of the plots and the water usage, apart from their fee 
contribution. 
 
It was attempted to interview the farmers who make the decisions on the farming 
plots. This could be either male or female farmers. The questionnaire that was 
used can be found in the appendix. The relevance of the different aspects and an 
explanation of the framework of social capital can be found in the chapter 
‘theoretical framework’.  
 
6.2 Religion, gender and ethnics in the reservoirs 
 
First of all, the ethnic backgrounds, the amount of men and women and the 
different religions were mapped that were interviewed in the reservoirs. These 
characteristics are independent of any groups or other forms of networks, other 
than the general farming community. 
 
In the compilation of religions among the Tanga and Tonde communities, 
characteristics do differ (Fig. 11). Whereas in Tonde most people are Christians 
(52.6%), followed by traditional worshippers (42.1%) and a small group of 
Muslims (5.3%), Tanga has mostly traditional worshippers (51.4%), followed by 
Christians (25.7%), again a small group of Muslims (20.0%) and with one 
individual that believed in none of the religions. She called herself a free-thinker.   
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Figure 11: Religions  
 
The differences in men-women ratio in Tonde and Tanga are not significant. The 
ratio is roughly 2/3 man and 1/3 women for both reservoirs.  
  
The difference for Tonde and Tanga regarding ethnic background is that Tonde 
has only Kusaasis (100%), Tanga has about 74.3% Kusaasis, 17.1% Fra Fra, 
that could be found mostly united in the middle of the farming field, united by a 
common wall, and a minority of 8.6% Mushi’s. It is known that Mamprusis are 
farming there as well; however, they were not encountered in the field. 
 
So overall speaking, there are no significant differences between the farmers of 
the reservoirs Tonde and Tanga on the aspect of gender. Any differences 
between the reservoirs cannot be explained by this aspect. For the aspect of 
ethnics, Tonde is homogenous and consists only out of Kusaasis whereas about 
a quarter of Tanga exists of minorities.  
 
In Tonde the Christians form the majority while in Tanga the traditional 
worshippers create the majority. Both reservoirs share the characteristic that 
none of the two are religious homogenous.  
 
6.3 Groups and Networks 
6.3.1 The amount and type of groups 
 
First of all, the amount of memberships in the family of the interviewee was 
asked. It was explained that with family, direct family was meant. So this means 
children, wife, and possible adopted children and so on, but not the 
grandfather/mother, niece or uncle. The memberships can be of formal or 
informal organised groups. The type of groups can be very diverse: organisations 
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or associations, a group of people that comes together regularly to talk about 
things and so on.  
 
It was measured that the amount of memberships of individuals in a family is 
significant higher in Tonde, with an average group number of 2.6 per household 
compared with Tanga, with an average of 1.4 groups per household.   
6.3.1.1 Most important groups in Tonde 
 
Fig. 12: Groups named in Tonde 
 
The second question was to name the most important group/network in the 
family when it comes to farming activities in the dry season. In Tonde, three 
important groups were mentioned by the farmers (fig. 12). First of all the WUA, 
second and third two NGO’s: Red Cross Society and a women group called ‘A 
Song Taba’ that is organised by the NGO ‘Yelwoko’. The WUA was seen as the 
most important group for farming by 28.9% of the farmers.  
 
‘A song Taba’, which means ‘help one another’ is a women group that is 
restricted to one village. Yet many villages have these groups, called ‘A song 
Taba’ and are organised by Yelwoko. Yelwoko is a Christian NGO that focuses 
solely on women and helps them with cheap loans for seeds, fertilizer, and cash 
and so on. They meet regularly and a wide variety of women do join the 
meetings: different social status, different occupations, yet mostly farmers. 10% 
of the farmers found this the group of people that had the greatest impact on their 
farming life.  
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The third group is the Red Cross Mothers group. They meet regularly and were 
active before the coming of the dam. Its members are women of different social 
status, different religions and different occupations. For example, traders are 
within the group yet the main part is, or rather, became farmer. Discussions 
about dealing with health, education, solving problems and where to go to for 
help are topics. It was this group that lobbied at the Red Cross Swiss for a dam 
and was together before the coming of the dam for more than 5 years, according 
to the former Red Cross Executive. 60.5% of all the farmers found this group the 
most important in their farming life.  
 
Percentage-wise, men and women have the same perception of which of the 
group is the most important in their household. The biggest percentage 
difference in the answers was 4.6% between the gender types. The amount of 
men that think the Red Cross Mothers group is the most important group in their 
household, when it comes to farming activities, is surprisingly high. It outnumbers 
the amount of men that see the WUA as the most important group. This 
underlines the importance of the Red Cross Mothers group and the externalities 
that come with the use of such group. A group that only contains women benefits 
the men in the community as well. 
6.3.1.2 Most important groups in Tanga 
 
In Tanga, the number of networks is very limited. 100% of the interviewed stated 
that the WUA is the most important group when it comes to farming activities. It 
held meetings a few times per year and discussed issues such as maintenance. 
Some meetings were with the top of the WUA only, some with all the farmers.  
 
Surprisingly, none of the interviewees mentioned the NGO ‘Action Aid’ as an 
organisation that played an important role in the farming for them. The NGO was 
only important for building the dam yet had no big role in any other form, not now, 
not in the past. Only a very few could remember to have received some 
hardware as a shuffle in the past.  
 
Action Aid, which had left the region about four years ago, left the responsibility 
to another NGO, called ‘CODI’. It also focuses only on women and gives loans 
and advice to women of different religions, occupations and status and is active 
in both Tonde and Tanga.  However, none of the interviewees ever heard of this 
NGO, let alone reckoned that they got support of them. Even more surprisingly, 
the representatives from ‘CODI’ reckoned in interviews performed during the 
research that a huge amount of loans was supplied to the women.  And if 
needed, they could supply the lists of names as well. However it may be, it 
clearly had such little impact or left so little impression that none of the men or 
women mentioned the NGO. 
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The number of groups was also influenced by the religious composition. Where 
in Tonde, more than half of the people joined a Christian church; in Tanga the 
traditional worshippers were the biggest group. The Christians meet regularly, 
not only on Sundays, but they go to seminars of other churches as well. It does 
not only bring the people of Tonde together, but creates bridging ties as well. 
Compared with the Traditional worshippers this can be seen as an advantage; 
the traditional worshippers do not have a common meetings place nor do they 
meet other groups regularly. 
6.3.2 Homogeneity of the groups 
 
The number of groups in Tonde that are gender homogenous is higher than in 
Tanga. This is because of the two gender homogenous groups in Tonde. The 
number of homogenous groups regarding occupation, educational background, 
religion and ethnic background is not significant different.  
 
In all of the groups in both of the reservoirs, the groups do have mainly farmers in 
the groups, which is not surprisingly, and are religious heterogeneous with 
Christians and traditional worshippers as the majorities. Regarding social status, 
all the groups are heterogeneous according to the interviewees. The same was 
said about the educational backgrounds. Well educated and illiterate people 
could be found in the same group.  
6.3.3 Friends and borrowing money 
 
The amount of friends that the farmers have differs over the two reservoirs. The 
farmer in Tonde has on average 4.5 friends whereas a farmer in Tanga has on 
average 3.4 friends. One could state that the intimate-networks of the Tonde 
farmer are significantly bigger than in Tanga. The cause of this is hard to trace 
and any significant conclusion is hard to draw except that the network of friends 
of the farmers in Tonde is more extensive in comparison with the network of 
Tanga farmers.  
 
The trust in these friends and close relatives are not less in Tanga compared with 
Tonde. In 94.7% of the cases in Tonde and in 91.4% of the cases in Tanga, the 
farmers were definitely sure that they could borrow small amounts of money in 
their direct environment. Only a few were hesitant about it. 
 
So in Tanga and Tonde there is no difference between the trusts among friends 
when it comes down to borrowing money, yet, the size of the network of close 
friends is bigger in Tonde in comparison with Tanga. Clear causes for the 
difference were not found. 
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6.4 Trust and Solidarity 
6.4.1 Common trust 
 
The zero hypotheses that the common trust (trust not only restricted to farming 
activities) in Tanga and Tonde is not different, can be rejected with the 10% 
confidence interval.  The common trust is significantly lower in Tanga compared 
with Tonde. As a response to the question ‘generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? ’, 92.1% of the farmers in Tonde gave the answer ‘People can be 
trusted’. In Tanga only 77.1% of the farmers reckon that people can be trusted.  
6.4.2 Willingness to help 
 
There is no difference found in the willingness to help in the dry season with 
activities such as harvesting. Most people agreed that most other people were 
willing to help. In Tonde 100% agreed strongly to the statement whereas in 
Tanga 85.7% agreed strongly. Nobody disagreed somewhat or strongly. Most 
answers came with the addition that it is likely that people will help due to the 
interdependency: often with harvesting the farmers help one another to be able 
to cope with the amount of work.  
 
An unwritten agreement is that when one helps, he or she expects to be helped 
as well by the farmers that he or she helped. Only circumstances, such as 
funerals, could be a reason to do not so and if so, a small amount of money 
could be paid instead of work. More interestingly therefore is the statement 
whether people take advantage in the dry and the wet season.  
6.4.3 Taking advantage in dry and wet season 
 
The statement ‘In this village, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take 
advantage of you in the dry/wet season’ is split in two with the focus of 
seasonality: wet and dry season. A common way of taking advantage of one 
another, stated by the farmers, was mostly the agreement that an individual 
would borrow (money for) fertilizer to a farmer with the agreement that part of the 
harvest due to this borrowing would be given the person that supplied (part) of 
the farming input. In many cases, this agreement was not fulfilled in the end of 
the season. This form of taking advantage happens in both dry and wet season.  
 
The difference between the dry and wet season and the (perception of the) 
chance that one takes advantage of one another is very visible in both reservoirs 
(Fig. 13). The hypothesis that both seasons have the same characteristics 
regarding this aspect is rejected. In Tonde 55.3% of the farmers agree that it is 
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very likely that one will take advantage of him/her in the wet season, compared 
with 10.5% in the dry season. In Tanga the difference is from 77.1% in the wet 
season, compared with 28.6% is the dry season. 
 
Interesting to see that the general trust and the trust in each other for not taking 
advantage of each other shows roughly the same characteristics in the 
reservoirs. In Tanga, where common trust relatively low is, a cumulative (so that 
is the sum of the replies from farmers who stated ‘agree strongly and agree 
somewhat’) 88.5% of the farmers agrees it is likely that one will take advantage 
of him or her in the wet season and a cumulative 40% in the dry season. 
Whereas in Tonde, 65.8% of the farmers agrees strongly or somewhat that it is 
likely that some people will take advantage in the wet season and only 18.4% of 
the farmers agrees strongly or somewhat that it is likely to happen in the dry 
season.  
 
Figure 13: Statement ‘people take advantage in dry/wet season’ 
 
In the dry season, a surprisingly low cumulative percentage of Tanga, 25.7% of 
the farmers compared to the 60.5% of the farmers in Tonde disagrees somewhat 
or strongly that it is likely that one will take advantage of him. The farmers in 
Tonde clearly have more trust in one another. Mostly it was stated by the farmer 
in Tonde that due to the low amount of people, relative to the amount of people 
farming in the wet season, it was harder to take advantage of one another.  
Another explanation is that the social interaction and control is higher in Tonde, 
which decreases the incentives to take advantage of one another.  
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6.4.4 Trust in institutions 
 
The hypothesis that the trust in the local district officials (in general) is the same 
among the two reservoirs cannot be rejected. The trust in this institution is very 
low, compared to the, by the people elected, assembly man (fig. 14). A 
cumulative 37.1% of the farmers in Tanga and a cumulative 42.2% of the farmers 
in Tonde have little or very little trust in the officials. This compared to the people 
that do trust them, 35.2 and 44.7%, is low. A rather great amount of people gave 
a neutral answer to the statement, mainly because they never heard of them or 
they never interacted with them. Reasons given by farmers for not dealing with 
the local government were mostly the impressions that when one is not among 
the current party represented by the officials, very little to no chance exists that 
those officials will favour the individual in any way.  
 
Figure 14: trust in local governmental institutions 
 
The trust in the assembly man is high (fig. 14) in both reservoirs and no 
significant difference could be found. Only one individual responded with the 
answer that he/she had very little trust in the assembly man. In Tanga, 82.9% 
has very great trust in him and 17.1% great trust. In Tonde, 92.1% to a very great 
extent, 2.6% to a great extend. A possible reason for the popularity of the 
assembly man compared with the district officials is that the function of assembly 
man is based on elections.  
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Figure 15: trust in the WUA 
 
The trust in the top of the WUA (Fig. 15) is significantly different in the two 
reservoirs. The amount of people that distrust the WUA in Tanga to a great 
extent is 42.9% and together with the people that distrust the WUA to a small 
extend, more than 50% is reached. In comparison, the cumulative percentage of 
the people that distrust the WUA in Tonde is 2.6 percent. The sample taken in 
Tanga is without the upstream farmers, so results could possibly have even been 
more polarized than the current results. 
 
The trust in the WUA in Tonde is very high. 94.7% of the farmers have very great 
trust in the WUA. Only two individuals thought different. Trust in leadership for 
the Mothers group of the Red Cross had an interesting aspect which possibly has 
its impact in the trust of the WUA now. In the past, a conflict between the women 
group and the initial chairman took place. He was the leader for the women 
group, before and in the beginning of the dam, and was accused of corruption. 
He left with the excuse that he was too busy to still maintain his position. In an 
interview held with him, he was not open about it and changed language, from 
the English to the local language, when he stated there was indeed a financial 
conflict in the past and disturbed relations. He holds a reputation of not being 
spotless. Yet, the group was able to ‘internally clean’ itself; it can be argued that 
this was due to the cohesiveness of the group which finds it reflection in the 
current WUA now.  
 
The reason that the top of the WUA in Tanga is not trusted can be called rather 
diverse and will be looked into in more depth in the coming part of the report in 
which the impact of social capital on the lifecycle of the reservoir is described. 
Quite a few farmers were met that would have liked to change the top of the 
WUA. Until now they were only able to change the valve-opener. This change 
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was possible because the valve opener was one of the farmers as well, with the 
same status. Overthrowing the top of the WUA was seen as impossible due to 
the power differences; trying it would be seen as creating serious problems and 
little support could be found for this.  
6.4.5 Importance of trust  
 
Trust and solidarity are without any doubt essential for the successful 
implementation of small reservoirs. It plays an essential role from the beginning 
of the coming of the reservoir when individuals need to trust one another to 
accept dependency from one another. Such dependency can be found in the 
common responsibility to maintain the reservoir. In Tanga such dependency is 
clearly less and had probably its influence throughout the lifecycle of the 
reservoir. Causes of the differences will later on be discussed. 
 
The forming of a common wall needs even more trust and solidarity: the group as 
a whole has to trust on other individuals performing their part of the duty. But 
once established enhances the solidarity due to mutual dependency. Examples 
of the mutual dependency can be found in the chasing of the cattle when it enters 
the enclosures. It is in the interest of all to chase away the cattle.  
 
6.5 Collective Action and Cooperation  
 
On the side of collective action hardly any differences could be found between 
the two reservoirs by means of the questionnaire. If there is a problem in one of 
the two reservoirs, both reservoirs use a whistle to notice the people that there is 
help needed. Almost all interviewee reckoned people would come rushing in, but 
that was mostly due to the dependency all these people have regarding the 
reservoir. People that had harvested and lost their dependency on the system for 
the season were expected to lose their incentive to come to help; only in 
emergencies they would come. Only two people in the Tanga reservoir replied 
that they thought it was somewhat likely that people came down to help, the rest 
of the people thought, mainly due to the dependency that is was very likely 
people would come and help.  
 
This pattern could be seen in the communal activities; due to the dependency 
people come out for such activities and a wide range of examples was given. 
Mostly the activities are related to the dam such as cleaning the trenches, 
building the common wall (in the case of Tonde), transplanting elephant grass 
against erosion, collecting stones for the enforcement of the dam and filling 
potholes in the road on the dam. Some individuals named building a school, 
drilling a borehole for water supply of the village and cleaning hospitals. Time 
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and money was spent in each of the two reservoirs on the projects. Only two 
people in each reservoir said due to a lack of money they wouldn’t give money.  
 
6.6 Information and Communication  
 
With the open question where the information, regarding actions of the 
government for example related to the agricultural extension office, was 
gathered, the 3 most important sources of information proved to be significantly 
different between the two reservoirs (fig. 16). Interviewees were allowed to give 
more than one answer, up to three.  
 
Figure 16: information sources 
 
In Tanga, the importance of the radio and the market as an information source is 
equal: 34.0% of respondents named these two sources as the most important 
sources. Friends and relatives came third with 21%, followed by 4.2% that 
represents the assembly man. Than the sound car, the WUA and the agricultural 
extension officer follow: they were named once. The fact that only one person, 
responsible for the 2.1%, named the agricultural extension office as the main 
source of what that office is doing, is surprisingly low.  
 
However in Tonde, the radio has a much more prominent place with 50.1% of the 
respondents that named the radio as one of the main sources. This was followed 
by friends and relatives with 26% and the market with 16%. The assembly man, 
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the phone and the chief followed with less than 4%. Again, surprisingly, none of 
the respondents named the agricultural extension office.  
 
The results give the importance of the three main sources: radio, market and 
friends/relatives. The hypothesis that there is no relation between a farmer in 
Tanga or in Tonde and the usage of the three main information sources is 
rejected. The reason however is less clear.  
 
The hypothesis that there is no relation between the reservoirs and the chance 
that a farmer used a telephone at least once in the past month cannot be 
rejected. In Tonde 65.8% never used a telephone, in Tanga 60.0%.  
 
So generally speaking the source of information regarding the actions of the 
government, and in this case the agricultural extension office, is the only 
significant difference between Tonde and Tanga regarding the measured aspect 
of information and communication. However, the cause of the difference is not 
very clear so limited conclusions can be drawn from this. One could argue that 
the networks in Tanga on the market are bigger compared with Tonde.  
 
6.7 Social Cohesion and Inclusion 
 
Most of the questions regarding social cohesion and inclusion were not asked in 
the questionnaire so no numerical evidence can be given. It was recommended 
by Eva Schiffer (an IFPRI researcher) that this part could lead to heated 
situations and it was better if this information was gathered differently. Questions 
regarding possible violence due to differences in the community were removed. 
By means of in-depth interviews it was attempted to get insight in the history and 
backgrounds of these facets.  
 
Social cohesion and inclusion proved one of the essential aspects where the 
Tonde and the Tanga reservoir had some fundamental differences that had its 
impact throughout the history of the reservoir. What is important is that two of the 
three incidents that will be discussed in this paragraph had direct links with the 
farming communities in Tanga. The incidents happened before the coming of the 
dam. They were about farming activities and created tensions within the 
communities that later on would share the Tanga reservoir. 
 
The first and most fierce incidents were the riots reported in 1984, initiated in 
Bawku. These incidents were caused years before by the shift of chieftaincy 
earlier described in the paragraph ‘the cause of conflicts’. The incident in ‘84 
caused casualties in Gunga, yet neither in Tonde nor Weega. In Tanga, it 
created a situation in which some of the Mamprusi men of Gunga had to flee the 
village after two or three casualties on the side of the minorities. They only could 
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return after a few months when the situation became less tense. The riots were 
reported as very severe and had a big impact on the community. It was unclear 
who caused the casualties. 
 
It was reported that most of the threat for the Mamprusi community came from 
the Zebilla site, a village nearby. Nevertheless, it was clear that within the 
farming community in the Tanga reservoir tensions were present based on the 
ethnic conflict too. During interviews this tension was noticeable and for example 
the Tindana for Tang Dabot was making statements as ‘that the Mamprusis no 
longer ruled them but that they ruled the Mamprusis’. The assembly man, who is 
in a more vulnerable position and function, didn’t use such terms but it was clear 
he was not flattered by the actions (later on discussed in this chapter) of the 
Tang Dabot farmers. 
 
The fact that ethnic differences caused troubles in Gunga and not in the Tonde 
reservoir can be related to the amount of and the percentages of the different 
groups.  The communities that use the Tonde reservoir have an estimated 90-10 
ratio of Kusaasi-Mamprusi. The village ratio of Kusaasi-Mamprusi in Gunga will 
be between 70-30 and 50-50. Intermarriages between the ethnic groups do 
happen and according to the (Mamprusi) assembly man the differences in 
ethnics do not cause any problems on this date.  
 
The assembly man who lobbied for the dam is a member of a big Mamprusi 
family that holds many organisational/governmental functions and was victim of 
the violence of the ’84 riots. Within the family the executive director of NFED is 
present, a regional minister and many women of the family are married to high 
ranked individuals. The tension must have had its impact and most probably still 
has.  
 
After the ’84 riots, violence between mainly the Gunga and the Tang Dabot 
villagers, in which these tensions were manifested, happened in at least two 
occasions. Contradictory stories were told about it by both parties but further 
investigation was ended as the feeling of growing tension was present and a 
clear idea of the cause of the tension between the two parties was clear enough. 
Only after countless visits and interviews these incidents came forward. The 
impression was that both parties still had some issues with each other that were 
not brought forward and that it was sensitive information as emotions could run 
high.   
 
The first occasion was about the silting of the lake that was there before the 
coming of the reservoir that is in place now. According to the Tang Dabot 
Tindana it was a proper lake with loads of fish and crocodiles, according to the 
assembly man it was not more than a pond. However it may be, some 
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Mamprusis were farming nearby that pond which was on the property of the 
Tindana of Tang Dabot. The farming activities caused silting of the pond/lake.  
 
The Tang Dabot people were not happy with the situation and organised 
themselves. With the organised group they started throwing mud into the rice 
fields of the Mamprusis and driving cattle into the farming fields to cause serious 
damage to the fields. When the Mamprusis noticed what was going on, they 
themselves organised them and came out with shuffles, other farming tools and 
even guns.  
 
It never came to such an extent that casualties were reported but in the end, 
armed police was brought to the scenery. They arrested a rather big group of 
Tang Dabot farmers. An estimated 50 farmers were kept in custody for a while. 
The rest of the story is rather contradictory and each story told by the different 
actors in favour of the actor himself: the Tang Dabot farmers reckoned that they 
went to the court and that the Tang Dabot farmers won the case. According to 
the assembly man it never came to a case. He claims he went to the police 
station to settle the case and redraw the complaint in order to settle the case 
within the village itself without the interference of a court.  
 
A side note must be placed in this story as well. Although the impression and 
general explanation of farmers was that the incidents were mainly based on 
ethnic differences, these separations were not absolute. Ethnic separation was 
the basis of the conflict and mainly due to the Tang Dabot side. Most Kusaasi 
farmers from the Gunga side however were referring to the Tang Dabot farmers 
as ‘troublemakers’ and were clearly choosing the side of the Gunga Mamprusis. 
Generalisation of the Kusaasis regarding the opinions towards the Mamprusis 
should therefore be avoided. Apart from this, no Mamprusi was encountered in 
the irrigation fields during the interviews.  
 
The impression that was left after the research was that what started as an ethnic 
conflict created more or less a separation between the villages Gunga and Tang 
Dabot. For several reasons its impact is not fully clear. The most important 
reason was that the parties only were willing to talk about the issue in a late 
stage of the research. Therefore only the stories and opinions of the leaders of 
the two groups (the Tindana of Tang Dabot and the assembly man, who lives in 
Gunga) were heard. Interesting would be to hear the opinions on the subject of 
other farmers in the field. However, it was felt such questions could have the 
effect of a catalyst of tension. Apart from this, it is very likely it takes a lot of effort 
to get to the core of the problem as not a lot of farmers were willing to talk on the 
issue. Several attempts were made to locate any ethnic based tensions in the 
area before the knowledge on the incidents but mostly avoiding answers were 
given by the farmers. 
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The second known incident was related to a pig and had less impact but clearly 
shows how the relations between the two villages evolved. A pig, of which the 
owner was an inhabitant of Gunga, took a drink in the pool of one of the Tang 
Dabot villagers and started eating the rice that was located near it. The farmer 
was not happy with the situation and decided to kill the pig. With the killing of the 
pig, it appeared that the pig was pregnant and had 9 piglets. When the owner of 
the pig found out that his pig was killed, he on his turn was not amused and a 
clash of words between the two villages was the result. Again, the case was 
reported to the police and an agreement was made that the farmers that killed 
the pig had to pay the pig and 9 piglets.  
 
Clearly, without any numerical evidence, the situation between the Gunga 
inhabitants and the Tang Dabot farmers can be called disturbed and had and will 
have its impact on the reservoir.  
 
In Tonde and Weega, these incidents didn’t happen. Probably partly because the 
Mamprusis are less represented in the villages, as could be seen in the 
percentages minorities in the dry-season farming communities: none of the 
farmers belonged to an ethnic minority, opposed to the situation in Tanga.  
 
Tension could be found in the meetings of the WUA in Tanga. No violence or 
other forms as such have ever been reported. Nevertheless, during the time of 
study it was recommended by some individuals that when meetings of the WUA 
would heat up, it would be favourable to leave the scene.  Mostly the concern 
was about the upstream farmers. This heating up never happened and all 
meetings were experienced as relaxed and friendly.  
 
The other minority that was encountered in the fields mostly were the Fra Fras, 
who formed an island with a common wall in the middle of the plots. Clearly it 
was a cohesive group that lived closely together. It seemed they included only 
Fra Fras in their farming activities. 
 
It was reported that mostly the Fra Fra group caused troubles in the beginning of 
the dam. After the construction of the dam the ground was levelled for farming. 
This meant that boundaries of farmland that was used before faded. The Fra Fra 
group was so annoyed that the boundaries were gone and reckoned their land 
was spoiled. Because of this, they refused to pay the fees to the WUA that in his 
turn didn’t allow the water from the dam to go to the Fra Fra group. After a few 
meetings, the case was settled and only a few individuals remembered this 
incident. 
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Yet another group, in the back of the farm field consisted out of Mushi’s. They 
formed a living community close to their plots. Most of the farmers that were 
talked to reckoned that this group didn’t form a separate group but was 
integrated in the community as a whole. This could be said about the Fra Fra as 
well when it came down to other activities than farming. Funerals, WUA meetings 
and so on were common activities in which every minority was represented. 
 
When one compares the situation in Tonde and Tanga on this aspect, one could 
say that Tonde was a more homogenous cohesive group compared with the 
social groups that were smaller and more diverse in Tanga. In Tonde there was 
no history of violence; Tanga has a rather dynamic history when it came to that..   
 
With the help of the questionnaire no difference regarding safety was measured. 
All of the farmers felt no threat from the direct environment: 100% of the 
respondents felt very safe in both locations, so no differences were found 
between Tonde and Tanga. Farmers on both locations said if they had to do a lot 
of work, they could easily sleep on the field without the feeling of being 
threatened by any form of violence. According to the assembly man the riots 
have lost their impact by now and no serious threat comes from the Tang Dabot 
villagers. The findings from the questionnaire do not prove the opposite. But 
again, it must be stated that the Tang Dabot farmers were not included in the 
sample. 
 
6.8 Empowerment and Political Action  
 
No numerical difference could be found for the difference of Tanga and Tonde in 
all of the aspects of empowerment and political action. The majority (85.7 and 
88.6%) of the people thought they were very happy and roughly the same figures 
can be given for the ability to make important decisions in life (92.1 and 88.6%). 
The note must be made that possibly the setting was not appropriate to fully go 
into details about the personal life of people. A lady reckoned that she 
considered herself very happy but in the same interview she told that she buried 
her husband a few days ago. These results should be handled with care and 
limited conclusions should be drawn from it.  
 
For both reservoirs, the amount of people that were voting was 100%. Mostly the 
response of the interviewees was that they would use wheel barrows to carry the 
old people to the voting location if needed. The political awareness and 
participation can be considered very high. None of the people in the reservoirs 
got together to jointly petition government officials or political leaders in the past 
years. Some said that, vocally and individually, leaders were approached yet 
never in a group. 
 
 82
The fact that the question regarding empowerment was time-limited, in the sense 
that it asked acts of empowerments in the past 12 months, lead to the impression 
that there was no difference between the reservoirs regarding empowerment. 
However, later on in the report, it will be argued that there is a difference in this 
aspect as the initiation of the Tonde reservoir was through an act of 
empowerment and the initiation of the Tanga reservoir was not.  
 
6.9 Conclusion Social capital survey 
 
Tonde and Tanga have distinct and significant differences on most of the aspects 
of social capital, in some aspects there was no difference found. In none of the 
aspects Tonde scored lower than Tanga. It can be concluded that the social 
capital is significantly higher in Tonde compared with Tanga mainly caused by 
the significant differences in trust, the networks and the social cohesion & 
inclusion. 
 
The most significant differences were made when it came to trust in the WUA, 
trust in general and trust in other farmers in the field. There are more 
memberships to gender and ethnic homogenous groups in Tonde compared to 
Tanga. On social cohesion and inclusion Tanga scored less due to the riots 
between Kusaasis and Mamprusis in ’84 over chieftaincy that came down from 
Bawku. Apart from this, some serious disagreements between two farming 
communities took place in Tanga. 
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7 Influence of the social capital in the life cycle of the 
reservoirs 
 
In order to place the differences in the context of the reservoirs, part of the 
events that lead to the current situation traced back. This is mainly done by in 
depth interviews or based on stories told by the farmers while filling in the 
questionnaires. The lifecycle of the reservoir will be used as a timeline (fig. 17).  
 
Figure 17: the lifecycle 
 
The lifecycle that started with the initiation, followed by the adoption and the use 
of the reservoir, are sketched and the influences of social capital as well as other 
factors are described. The future states, such as the breaking down of the 
reservoirs, are not looked at. Within the initiation phase the time of the trigger 
that started off the process of lobbying for the reservoir to the end of the building, 
or the beginning of the adoption is described. With the adoption is meant the 
period that determined and contained aspects of the way the farmers decided to 
use the reservoir and the process of building the reservoir. From the end of the 
adoption phase, the usage phase starts; when the reservoirs are used by the 
farmers as decided in the adoption phase.  
 
During those phases, it is likely that the social capital has changed. The 
measurements given in the chapter ‘measurement of social capital’ are taken in 
the usage stage. Nevertheless, due to events passed, for example the self 
empowerment act of the Red Cross mothers group that will be discussed, it is 
possible to make an educated guess of the social capital and its influences in the 
periods before the initiation.  
 
Stories told in interviews, mainly on the side of the Tanga reservoir, sometimes 
lacked consistency. Conflicting stories were mainly told at the Gunga and the 
Tang Dabot sides. At times, stories were even self contradictory. As these two 
sides seem to have a past in which conflicts were present, both sides tried to tell 
their story in favor of them. It was tried to construct the course of history as 
accurate as possible and stories told that seemed most likely will be taken as the 
guideline. 
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Not only interviews were used as an information source. During the research just 
‘small talk’ to local farmers, the translator, extension officers, people in the street 
and so on, were used as an information source to create an impression of what 
happened.  
 
7.1 The initiation 
 
The initiation may be the most interesting phase for institutes to look at when 
implementing the reservoirs. The choice of certain groups or community has a 
big impact on the sustainability of the reservoirs. It will determine the main actor 
in the following stages in which the reservoir proofs successful or a failure. 
Therefore, it may be considered the main field of interest for policy makers 
interested in implementing small reservoirs. 
7.1.1 Situation before the coming of the dam in Tanga 
 
On the site of the dam, where it is located now, dry season farmers were already 
active. This was partly with the help of hand dug wells for the dry season farming 
and many plots were only used for rainy season farming to grow mainly rice and 
corn.  Other than that, there was a small lake that didn’t always dry up in the dry 
season on the location where the dam is now. Local habitants used it for fishing 
and water supply. In the water pool crocodiles were located that were 
worshipped as their water gods by some of the local worshippers mainly located 
in Tang Dabot. A stone located near the lake was functioning as a shrine. 
 
Apart from this, around 150 mango trees were located on the site as well. This 
provided the local community with an income and food. The trees were planted 
there by the inhabitants themselves and often by the generations before them. 
Around, a rough estimate, 70 can still be seen on the site and are used by the 
people. 
7.1.2 The initiation of Tanga 
 
The creation of Tanga reservoir is initiated by Action Aid and forms a relatively 
different story compared to Tonde. It is one additional explanation for the 
individuality of the individuals farming on the plots and the rather reluctant 
adoption of the dam. 
 
In a meeting of the village initiated by ‘Action Aid’, the current assembly man 
asked to rank the problems people faced in the communities. All the groups, 
including the group of the Tang Dabot village, that fall under the responsibility of 
another assembly man, were represented. Within the ranking process, the 
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people ranked water as first. As water came first, a dam and two boreholes were 
a possible solution, ‘Action Aid’ was willing to provide them.  
 
The big difference compared with the coming of Tonde, is that the coming of the 
dam was not in a process of empowerment but in a process of community driven 
development. It was an option given by Action Aid that wanted to help the poor, 
but didn’t know in what form and decided to let the community become the prime 
actor in the decision process. The help in the form of the dam was chosen by the 
people, yet it wasn’t an initiative created by them.  
7.1.2.1 Distribution of properties 
 
In the process of this all, more than one problem was created that still have its 
influence till today. Different groups had to give up different properties for the 
coming of the dam which were unevenly distributed among the groups (fig 18). In 
the process, some groups, mainly in the adoption phase tried to take advantage 
of the situation and increased their properties compared to the other groups or 
individuals. These properties were mainly land, mango trees and the religious 
shrine of the traditional worshipper. An overview sketch is made to give a rough 
idea of the distribution of the properties before the coming of the dam. This 
sketch is very rough and the separation between the groups that may appear in 
the sketch as absolute is less absolute in reality.  
 
 
 
 
 86
 
Figure 18: schematic representation of distribution properties 
 
The location of the water reservoir was chosen on the area left of the lake, mostly 
on the property of the Tang Dabot people. 
 
The reservoir came roughly left of the lake on the property, mainly of the Tang 
Dabot villagers who are also the owner of the shrine. According to the Tindana of 
Tang Dabot, the whole area where the water reservoir is located is his territory. 
According to the assembly man, only half is in the territory of the Tindana that is 
located in Tang Dabot. Other sides for the reservoir were put forward by the 
villagers of Tang Dabot in an attempt to safe the properties, however, Action Aid 
insisted on the location because of its favourable geographical conditions. 
 
The boreholes would come on both sides of the lake. The process of the choice 
of the site was not without distortion and the main problems were caused by the 
separation of decisions, the shrine, the mango trees and, arguably, the assembly 
man.  
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7.1.2.2 The problem of the shrine  
 
The problem of the shrine was mainly the problem of the Tang Dabot villagers. 
The location of the dam was exactly on the site of a shrine of traditional 
worshippers. The worshippers heavily protested against of the coming of the dam 
because their gods would be disturbed by the machinery and the water.  
 
Their protest was of no use; the assembly man talked to the people and 
convinced them if their god was a water god, it would probably not harm the god 
if a water reservoir was build. The meeting in which the assembly man tried to 
convince the worshipper was said to be accompanied with some tense 
conversations.  
 
An additional problem was, according to the assembly man, that part of the Tang 
Dabot villagers mistrusted the assembly man based on his political background. 
He reckoned that the feeling at that time in Tang Dabot was that he tried to use 
his political powers to implementation of the dam. The assembly man is a 
member of the NDC, which had the majority in the government at that time, while 
part of the worshippers were supporters of PNC. The people of Tang Dabot 
however don’t agree with that point because, as they say, many, including the 
Tindana, are NDC as well.  
 
In the end, the traditional worshippers reluctantly accepted the reasoning of the 
assembly man and went to a sooth-sayer. He told them to relocate the god uphill 
and a tree was planted above the stone.  
 
7.1.2.3 The problem of the Mango Trees and the house(s) 
 
Yet another point was that in the valley there were the mango trees. Some of 
them had to be demolished for the coming of the dam. The owners protested 
heavily but again without success. The need for the community and the 
development of the area was considered more important than the individual 
needs and the chance of a new dam should not have been let for some mango 
trees that could be transplanted somewhere else, according to the assembly 
man.  
 
The sum of individual losses was smaller than the total benefit for the society that 
would benefit by the development of the area. This reasoning was the main line 
that justified the loss of properties held by individuals. This was the case as well 
with some small houses that had to move due to the rising of the water. The 
owners however, felt this as a smaller loss compared with the mango trees. The 
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houses were easily rebuild and were not in such great numbers as the mango 
trees.  
 
This way of reasoning is based on the ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’. ‘The outcome is 
more efficient if those that are made better off could in theory compensate those 
that are made worse off and lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Thus, a more 
efficient outcome can in fact leave some people worse off’ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaldor-Hicks_efficiency). The Pareto optimal is when 
at least one person is better off and nobody is worse off.  
 
The key difference between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks is the question of 
compensation. ‘Kaldor-Hicks does not require compensation actually be paid, 
merely that the possibility for compensation exists, and thus does not necessarily 
make each party better off (or neutral). Pareto efficiency does require making 
each party better off (or at least no worse off)’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaldor-
Hicks_efficiency). 
 
The farming community of the Tanga reservoir used the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
and didn’t compensate anybody. The owners of the trees and the houses didn’t 
get anything as compensation. With the rising of the water soon it became clear 
that more than the already cut down trees wouldn’t survive and would die as well.  
 
According to the Tindana, it was not known that where the reservoir would come 
it would threaten the shrine and the mango trees. But only with the rise of the 
water it became clear that the shrine had to be moved. They saw the situation as 
they were tricked. This seems unlikely and a more likely explanation came from 
the assembly man that said that during the decision period in which was decided 
to create the dam, it was not clear where it would be located. The decisions 
whether and where the reservoir would be located were two different decisions.  
7.1.2.4 The assembly man 
 
The assembly man cannot be seen as fully independent in the process.  This 
idea, based on his political background, was not only supported by the mistrust of 
the worshippers. At the time of the decision to construct the dam, the assembly 
man (who is still in function) was a former employee of Action Aid and his uncle 
was the deputy director of Action Aid. It was due to the lobbying of the assembly 
man that ‘Action Aid’ offered help to the area.  
 
According to some, the assembly man was still in function of Action Aid; 
according to himself he was not. However it is very likely that the lobbying for the 
dam served more than one interest. The dam served as development project of 
the area and was used as promotion for his coming re-election that easily could 
be combined with the influence he, or rather his uncle, had in Action Aid.  
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The people of Tang Dabot, however, do not fall into the electoral area of the 
assembly man. The dam is located on the border of two election areas and so 
without harming his popularity in his electoral area he could force the dam into 
place. The people of his electoral area were given important assets with giving 
up less assets compared with Tang Dabot. A side note must be placed that both 
sides reckon that the location of the border of the electoral area had no influence 
on the process. The election that followed was not even held: the people agreed 
that the assembly man, due to his good services, didn’t have to stand up against 
competition and was re-elected without any opposition. At the moment he is in 
power for 12 years. 
7.1.2.5 The separation of decisions and the process 
 
The process in which was decided to build a dam and the process, in which the 
location of the dam was decided, were separate. At the time when the villagers 
as a collective decided to ask for a dam, it was unknown where the dam would 
be located and this lead before and during the construction of the dam to 
confusion. 
 
Mainly the Tang Dabot people felt mistreated or even tricked by the process with 
the same reasoning as with the mango trees. During the decision to create a 
reservoir, it was unknown that the location of the dam would mainly be on the 
property of the Tang Dabot people and that they had to give up most property 
privileges. The Tang Dabot villagers said that they didn’t know, even when 
engineers of Action Aid came, that the water would raise so high that their shrine 
would be threatened and that most of the mango trees would die. And only 
during the rising of the water after the construction of the dam, the impact to 
these properties became clear.  
 
However, this statement of the Tang Dabot people seems unlikely, as the shrine 
was close to the dam and it was clear from the beginning that many mango trees 
had to be sacrificed. More likely was the statement of the assembly man that the 
Tang Dabot villagers were mainly interested in the benefits of the reservoir but 
when it came to the point of giving up some of the properties the group became 
less enthusiastic.  
 
Limited communication and tension between the assembly man that lobbied for 
the dam and the group of the Tang Dabot can be seen as causes for this. The 
assembly man stated that he gave special attention within the decision process 
to the side of Tang Dabot village. He and a brother of him went, after the meeting 
in which was decided to create a reservoir, to Tang Dabot with the main interest 
to hear the opinions of the elderly of that side as he felt these were 
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underrepresented in the process. In this meeting, he stated, tension had risen as 
well. However, on the side of the Tang Dabot people, this meeting was said 
never to have happened. When this statement was fed back to the assembly 
man, he stated that he would call for a meeting with all the villages to let the real 
story be heard. This offer was thanked for. 
 
More likely, whether the meeting was there or not was that the communication 
between the groups was distorted by past tensions. The decision making power 
was mainly on the side of the assembly man who was seen as a representative 
of Gunga and many of the  sacrifices had to be made on the side of Tang Dabot. 
Limited communication, due to mistrust and tensions created the feeling on the 
side of the Tang Dabot villagers that the reservoir was imposed on them by the 
assembly man. On the side of the assembly man, who tried to develop the land 
in favour of all villagers, saw the Tang Dabot people as troublemakers and a 
hurdle in the process to be taken. 
7.1.3 The initiation of Tonde 
 
The creation of the Tonde dam was initiated by the women group of the Red 
Cross. The Red Cross mother group was formed as an initiative of Red Cross. 
They organised regular meetings in order to share ideas and problems and find 
mutual support from one another. The group consisted of women from four 
different villages: Tonde, Weega, Ganide and Atolombisi.  
 
During the years before the construction of the dam the group was already 
organized and the Red Cross provided the women with clothes, food and other 
goods. The philosophy of the Red Cross was to focus only on women as they are 
the most stable part of the families, responsible for the wellbeing of children, 
while it is the most vulnerable group as well.  Next to this, alcohol consumption 
and the focus on men, as compared with the focus of men towards women, is 
considerably less and the women are limited to one man. 
 
Over time it was realized that this way of handling, giving help in the form of 
goods, was unsustainable. First a hand dug well was created but soon it 
appeared that this well was not sufficient for the need. When representatives of 
the Red Cross Swiss paid a visit to the area, the Tonde side was visited as well. 
Within the visit, the women took the opportunity and lobbied for a dam. The lobby 
proved successful. 
 
The land chosen to build the reservoir was already used by some farmers, yet 
their number was limited. It was agreed with the chief that the land used for the 
reservoir and irrigation would belong to the community after the construction and 
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no individual claims could be made. One farmer however tried to make a claim 
but found opposition from the chief and the claim proved unsuccessful.   
 
The success of the group could be seen as empowerment. The process before 
the coming of the dam could be seen as empowerment. ‘Empowerment 
presupposes that many competencies are already present or possible and that 
there are given opportunities to act’ (Schaurhofer and Peschl, 2003: 261). This 
opportunity came when the Red Cross paid a visit and the women took 
advantage from this. 
 
In this case the Red Cross funded the construction of the dam and the dam was 
given to the people: plots were for free yet, fees had to be paid. The women 
group received priority: they first got the ground and still the division can be seen 
in the reservoir. All the plots close to the dam till roughly halfway of the full 
farmers site is occupied by women only. Some men can be seen on those plots; 
mostly they are relatives of one of the women who are not able to farm anymore, 
often due to age. The women still create a strong and united group that clearly 
enjoys respect with all the farmers using the reservoir.  
 
7.2 Conclusion influence of social capital on initiation 
 
The main difference between Tonde and Tanga in the initiation was the trigger 
that started the process.  
 
Empowerment, which is a part of social capital, was the trigger of the start of the 
construction of the dam at Tonde. An already consisted group that was relative 
cohesive due to the similar situation where they were in, came regularly together 
to discuss problems and possible solutions. This group therefore could be seen 
as a voluntary network in which communication was used to, if possible, improve 
their situation.  
 
The effect, apart from the idea of empowerment, that a group found a possibility 
to change their situation, increased in later stages the idea of common 
responsibility of a common asset. Individual actions that would be counter 
beneficial for the dam as well as the farmers as a whole, such as reluctant 
payments or water wastage would create resistance of the group as a whole. 
Trust that an individual action to correct such unwanted behaviour would have 
the support of the group enabled social control.  
 
The trigger that initiated the coming of the reservoir in Tanga was mainly the 
assembly man that lobbied for the dam. No effort or initiative from the groups that 
would later benefit from the dam was made. The foundations of mistrust were 
laid by unevenly distributed assets among the different groups that would later on 
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benefit equally by the reservoir. Already existing mistrust due to tensions 
increased the feeling in Tang Dabot that the reservoir was imposed, this limited 
communication. It can be argued that the reservoir would have never existed if 
the trigger to lobby for the dam was left to the farmers by means of 
empowerment.  
 
In the framework of social capital, not only the bridging capital was bigger in 
Tonde than in Tanga but the bonding capital as well. The cross cutting ties were 
used in different ways. Tonde used the connection of the Red Cross to get 
access to resources that the group itself didn’t have. This created a bottom up 
situation where a clear preset network could take care of the reservoir. 
 
In Tanga however the cross cutting ties were used and created by an individual, 
the assembly man, to get access to the mainly financial resource. A top down 
situation was created. This created a situation where a scare resource was given 
to a divided group that existed of multiple, loosely connected networks.  
 
7.3 The adoption 
 
Within the adoption of the reservoir, critical decisions are often made that 
determine the usage of the reservoir. One can think of the election of the WUA, 
sharing of the plots, the strategy of water supply, the decision of building a 
common wall and so on. Social capital will have its influence in at least part of the 
events within this phase which determines for a great deal the future functioning 
of the reservoir.   
7.3.1 The adoption of Tanga 
 
When the construction started of the dam the commitment was asked to the 
locals in the form of help with the construction of the dam. The agreement was 
made in a meeting from the locals, that the work would be split in half. The Tang 
Dabot inhabitants and the Fra Fra would construct the channel plus the borehole 
on the side of their compounds and the Gunga inhabitants and the Moshis would 
construct the borehole and the channel on their side.  It was reported, by the 
assembly man, that the work performed on the side of Tang Dabot was done 
very reluctantly and took a long time. It was stated in Tang Dabot that the work of 
construction of the channels was not divided in half but only the maintenance of 
it. Again, this was not fully clear but as most farmers stated the first statement, 
the second seemed unlikely. 
 
After the dam was constructed and before the distribution of the land, the ground 
was levelled so a proper ground was formed to be distributed among the farmers. 
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It was agreed that any property rights that were in function before the coming of 
the dam would be expelled. A meeting was organised in order to divide the land. 
 
On the date of the meeting, only half of the people showed up, namely the Tang 
Dabot people were missing. The meeting was expelled for two hours and after 
the Tang Dabot didn’t show up, the assembly man blamed it on the fact that they 
felt mistreated and were trouble makers anyway, it was agreed to start the 
sharing of the land. Because, so was reasoned, the work was divided into two; 
the land division would be done the same. A line through the water lock area was 
drawn and it was stated that each half was for the people living on that side of 
the half. Some of the Tang Dabot people held up another story and reckoned 
they were there in the meeting on time. This version of the story was denied by 
multiple sources and seems unlikely. 
 
When some of the Tang Dabot people came in and saw what was happening, 
they strongly disagreed. According to their believes the land should have been 
divided according to the number of people, which was not more than reasonable 
if one looks at the property division before the coming of the dam into account. 
The meeting became tense and the parties each took their own route. Any form 
from communication, on the issues regarding the reservoir, was either not 
attempted or one-sided rejected.   
 
As no agreements were made, or agreed on, the division of land became 
lawless. People started to claim land randomly and some based their claims on 
the ownership before the coming of the dam. Some claimed their land only for 
wet season farming. The Fra Fra community saw that there was limited chance 
of a common wall with every group included and decided to build their own 
common wall on the place where they had their plots before. The Moshi 
community took the plots, close to their compounds, where they were farming 
before as well and were more concerned with the water supply to their grounds 
than with the efficiency of it. The small basin described in the common 
description of Tanga was the result of it.    
 
Mostly on the side of the Tang Dabot, people were very reluctant to claim land 
downstream. As fertile grounds were available upstream, tensions were present 
with the farmers downstream and quite a few farmers were there already before 
the coming of the dam, they preferred to choose that side. A rather ironical 
choice as the upstream farming was a reason for them to start a riot in the past. 
 
This individual run for land that caused the building of individual walls and the 
option to create hand dug wells that were fed with water from the reservoir. A 
common wall and the trench method that can be seen at Tonde clearly need 
coordination and a form of trust in the group as a whole. Other additional reasons 
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that explain the well and the individual walls, when one compares the situations 
with the Tonde site, can be thought of as well. For example, because the farmers 
on the Tanga site were used to build individual walls and used hand dug wells, 
the hurdle to build a common wall compared to Tonde was bigger as a tradition 
had to be broken. However, these hurdles were not barriers and with proper 
communication within the group this situation could have been prevented. The 
methods ‘chosen’ by the farmers clearly gives an additional explanation for the 
in- efficient water usage.  
7.3.2 The adoption of Tonde 
 
The adoption of Tonde is less of a complex story. For the building of the dam the 
Mothers group as well as the rest of the community was asked, as a sort of a 
commitment, to help with the construction. Stones and sand were collected and 
the workers were fed by the community. A commitment fee of 500 cedis of the 
women and 1000 cedis of the man was asked. Whereas the coming of the dam 
was initiated by the women, the dam was not restricted to this group and was 
build as help for the community as a whole. The women, however, had a 
privileged position. This came forward, for example, when only one channel was 
constructed and the women were allowed as the first to use this channel to water 
their crops.  
 
By the time that the dam was fully constructed land was divided for who that 
wanted to farm. In order to avoid jealousy and possible separation within the 
strong cohesive group the executive at that time proposed that the land, that had 
some more fertile and some more rocky area’s, should be divided under the 
farmers on basis of luck. This system he proposed was that the land patches first 
was divided under the women based on their village: each village had to choose 
a number without knowing which plots that number contained. Once the plots 
were divided for the villages, each village had to perform the same for each 
person within the group: each woman got their plots based on luck. Land was not 
given permanently but as a sort of borrowing basis. Once a farmer stops or 
refuses to pay, the plot is given to another farmer. 
 
The women were trained by the Red Cross society and were taken regularly to 
other, closely, reservoirs. This happened only in the beginning. When the funding 
was exhausted and once the women were able to fulfill their farming activities on 
their own, the training was stopped. If there are problems now, often mostly 
regarding diseases, this is solved with the internal knowledge: if this is not 
sufficient the top of the WUA or other representatives are send to the Agricultural 
extension office, located in Zebilla.  
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Next to this, one person that plays another central role of the successful adoption 
of the reservoir is an individual called ‘Isaac’ that had experience with the dry 
season farming. If help needed, he could give the support that was needed.  As 
women proved that dry season farming with the help of the reservoir was 
profitable the amount of men, as well as women, rose. Still patches of land are 
given away to both men and women on the back of the fields.  
 
7.4 Conclusion of the influence of social capital on the adoption 
 
Different aspects of social capital, can be argued, could have prevented the 
situation created in Tanga. Or, due to the lack of social capital, the situation as 
such was created. A lack of an overall connecting network between different 
groups was the basis of mistrust and a troubled adoption of the reservoir.  
 
With the top down approach a critical resource had to be implemented with the 
help of multiple networks. These networks were very pluriform. The pluriformity 
came forward in ethnic backgrounds, politically believes, possession held and so 
on. This created a situation in which each network tried to achieve its own 
objective, sometimes at cost of other networks. 
 
Communication came to a hold and due to limited interdependency the situation 
was created that individual needs overruled the need of the community. Again, 
limited bridging capital can be named as one of the causes. Mistrust between the 
groups, mainly based in Tang Dabot, lead to a sort of self exclusion which 
opened a window of opportunity for other groups to take advantage of the 
situation. This mistrust and exclusion created a situation in which incentives to 
initiate proper or even restore communication were lacking. Due to the lack of an 
overall network the mutual dependency was limited and individual actions ruled 
over coordinated actions that could benefit the community as a whole.  
 
In Tonde, however, the opposite situation was created due to the use of a strong 
cohesive group that had bridging capital in each of the villages as the mothers 
group consisted out of women from four different villages that were the future 
users of the reservoir. The pluriformity that possibly existed among the villages 
was equally represented in the group which allowed creating a relative large 
bonding capital. Acceptance of decisions of this group would therefore enjoy the 
support of each of the different villages or groups within those villages. 
 
The usage of this group created a situation in which unwanted courses of action 
could be avoided as each group had representatives that formed the group. 
Individual actions or actions of groups, other than the Mother group, that could 
have harmed the collective adoption of the reservoir could easily be blocked by 
the group. Due to its cohesiveness, exclusion of unwanted behaviour was 
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possible and because of this, incentives for attempts to strive for individual gain 
decreased.  
 
7.5 The usage 
 
The usage of the reservoir is the stage in which actions and decisions made in 
the adoption and initiation phase come into practice and show it effectiveness. As 
the report of Faulkner (2006) and the measurement of the social capital were 
made in this stage, explanations that make clear the different observations and 
measurements will have the most numerical significance. The common (miss)-
trust that was to be assumed to be constant or at least similar, might have 
changed over time. These, possibly wrong assumptions are sometimes not 
needed or less prominent is this stage which increases its reliability.  
7.5.1 The usage of Tanga 
 
The usage of Tanga can be said as troublesome in a manifold of aspects and the 
roots of this were in the initiation and adoption of the reservoirs. Silting of the 
reservoir due to the upstream farmers, weak management due to limited support 
of the farmers, miss payments, deteriorated channels and even a sort of 
sabotage by the flooding of the fields on purpose were reported.  
7.5.1.1 Unused plots 
 
With the problem of the distribution of the land, the current situation is heavily 
affected. Upstream farmers, starting farmers or farmers that had plots on the site 
of the dam that want to farm downstream, find it difficult if not impossible to get a 
plot. The plots now available for dry season farming are only the plots that were 
conquered in the run for plots in the adoption phase and are used for rice wet 
season farming only. These plots are of high value to most farmers as rice needs 
a valley to be grown and rice needs limited financial input.  
 
These plots can only be used on a sort of borrowing principle. The agreement 
must be made that the dry season farmer will hand the plot back to the wet 
season farmer when the season is over. The dry season farmers are not willing 
to take these plots because the fertility of the ground created by the use of, the 
expensive, fertilizer in the dry season would be used by the farmers in the wet 
season. The farming activities would harm the fertility of the ground, so the dry 
season farmers do avoid these plots. This results in unused plots between the 
used plots and is an extra barrier to create a common wall.  
 
People that have plots now are unwilling to give up these plots for redistribution. 
The chance that within the new distribution their share will decrease is present. 
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Most representatives, apart from the fishers that represent the Tang Dabot site, 
have plots on the site and any decision for redistribution will have to be led by 
these representatives. And apart from this, the upstream farmers that would like 
to come down would have the advantage of still maintaining their wet season 
farming plot upstream for rice while occupying a plot that is now used for the 
same purpose. The farmer that holds the rice farming plot downstream does see 
this as unfair.  
7.5.1.2 The contribution 
 
Payments form a problem in the current situation. People are unwilling to pay 
and have little incentives for a range of reasons. First of all, there is no 
consequence for not paying. The current setup doesn’t allow to stop water flow to 
plots without cutting of water supply of others. Strict regime from the WUA is 
lacking and no social control is in place. 
 
Farmers reported even that as a tactic, they would go to the first meeting of the 
year to see when the valves were to be opened that year and how many people 
paid their fee. If there were many people not paying their fee, they felt that they 
had the right not to pay as well. Meetings that should be partly for addressing 
other aspects than money were only about money. The inability to gather the 
money was increased by the fact that the individuals who didn’t pay their fees 
never showed up in those meetings.  
 
Redundant systems in the form of hand dug wells decreases the dependency of 
the dam water for irrigation. Farmers who were encountered didn’t get water for 
more than three days, yet, had little complaints about management. When water 
was flowing, it took away the hard work of using the calabashes. But if the water 
flow was lacking, no serious consequences for the crop was there.  
 
Apart from this, the WUA lost a serious amount of potential contribution because 
the upstream farmers didn’t contribute fees. Some of these farmers joined the 
WUA in the beginning but most of them, if not all, left the WUA. Different reasons 
were given. First of all, they didn’t have direct benefit of the water because they 
mostly used hand dug wells. Secondly, some told that they were willingly to pay 
in the beginning due to the idea that the dam was a common good. But when 
individuals took over, the incentive to pay was lost.  
 
As a result of this, the bank account is around 500.000 Cedis, 50 euro’s, which is 
by far not enough to do proper maintenance.  This leads to a decrease in trust in 
the WUA and payments are postponed.  
 98
7.5.1.3 The problem of the upstream farmers 
 
Upstream farmers, that form a serious threat for the silting of the dam according 
to the agricultural extension officer, cannot be placed downstream. Multiple 
reasons can be found for this. First of all there is no possibility for placing them 
downstream because of the unwillingness of the wet season farmers to give up 
their plots downstream. Secondly the tensions created in the past form a hurdle. 
And next to this, the upstream farmers are unwilling because the farming ground 
upstream is reckoned to be more fertile and the plots are close to their houses. 
And finally, there are no consequences for farming upstream that could be an 
incentive to move downstream.  An unsustainable situation is created in this way. 
 
The upstream farmers reckon they do not do any harm to the reservoir by means 
of silting the reservoir when the rain time comes and their walls rain away. They 
say their walls are so strong that they can withstand the rain. Downstream 
farmers say this is nonsense and that the walls of the upstream farmers 
crumbled down mostly in the rain season.  
 
The upstream farmers are the main suspects for the intentionally flooding of the 
plots by opening the valves during the night. Only when the community spread 
the word that the person doing this was facing a prison sentence when he was 
caught, it stopped. The situation is still not settled. Farmers downstream said 
they tried to approach the group of upstream farmers a few times and sort out the 
problems so they could join the downstream group. This only lead to an even 
tenser situation according to the downstream farmers so they left the situation as 
it is.  
 
This exclusion has still also its impact on the information flow. Although two 
members of the village are in the WUA as the representatives of the fishers, the 
information of meetings coming up are often not passed through to them which 
leaves them partly excluded from decisions that have influence on their dam as 
well. Although the farmers upstream are part of the WUA, some openly admit 
that they do not pay the fees. They don’t see the benefit in paying.  
7.5.1.4 The fishers 
 
The fishers form a big stakeholder group in the reservoir as well. Yet, because 
they have little to do with the management, maintenance and input use of the 
farmers they were left out from the sample. Some interviews were held with them 
instead. 
 
Little to no complaints were made by the fishers; the fish stock is stable over the 
year and they were mostly independent of the management apart from the fact 
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that they have to pay 10.000 cedis each month as a fishing fee. Some fishers 
mistrusted the management when it came to these payments. In the beginning of 
the reservoir a receipt was given by the people that collected the money when a 
fisher paid. However, this changed and now it is unclear to them whether the 
money is used for private use or whether it is handled properly.  Apart from this, 
their worry was that the reservoir became smaller every year. 
7.5.1.5 The WUA 
 
The structure of the Tanga WUA is slightly different compared with the standard. 
Whether this description is 100% accurate is not sure as ideas of the structure 
changed per person and over time.  
 
The top exists of 9 executives. Three fit in the standard structure: the treasurer, 
the chairman and the secretary. Apart from them, it consists two executives 
representing the fishers who use the dam for the fisheries, two are organisers 
responsible for practical things as getting the people together in case of a 
meeting, collecting the fees and so on and two valve openers.  
 
Each of the two valve openers is responsible for one of the valves and they share 
the key to open the valves. Punctuality is not their priority: the agreement is that 
they open the water between 13.30 and 18.00.  
7.5.1.6 The management 
 
Management was not strong in Tanga but this was not solely caused by the 
individuals in the management. Cooperation of the farming community, which 
was needed for proper management, lacked. Examples can be found in the 
collection of the payments. Due to this inability, the management was not able to 
do proper maintenance, which led to often malfunctioning of the reservoir. 
 
This bad maintenance had direct influence on the water management again. The 
more one goes to the back of the plots, the more people start to complain about 
the management that does not open the valves. Especially the plots in the back 
use a very inefficient irrigation method. It takes a long time before the water 
reaches the plots and the management is not always willing to open the valves 
for this. When individuals from the end of the plots complain of water shortage 
the valve openers make up excuses as that the key to open the valve is lost.   
 
On their part, the farmers close to the dam tell that it is impossible to let the 
valves open for longer: due to bad maintenance and fallen slabs, the time of 
opening the valves should be limited otherwise their crops would be spoiled due 
to the abundance of water. 
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Next to this, the fact that there were no strict rules set by the management, lead 
to lawlessness. People were wasting water, didn’t maintain the site properly, and 
were even making holes in the water channels on their own so they could create 
a water supply stream to their plots. This lead to malfunctioning of the channels 
and to worsen the deterioration of the already mal maintained channels.  
Management left these practices unpunished. 
 
The hypothesis posed by Joshua Faulkner (2005) that possibly water shortage 
would lead to stronger water management can on multiple points be rejected as 
unlikely. Management lacked any control over the water usage: individuals are 
opening the valves, water wastage stays unpunished, and a feeling of common 
responsibility and common dependency of the water was mostly lacking. Only if 
individual needs could be fulfilled people were willing to help.  
 
Practices around the reservoir itself lead often to pollution of the water inside the 
reservoir. These practices were mainly the production of local fibre for weaving 
mats used for housing. In this process a lot of unusable material is created and 
this was dumped in the reservoir. These materials in the water lead to 
congestions in the valves and trenches. Again, management was unable or 
unwilling to make sure this did not happen again and only due to the ability of 
individuals these practices stopped.  
 
All the farmers, including the upstream farmers, said that they were happy the 
dam came. Mostly benefits for the upstream farmers other than farming were 
named. The main benefit was that the cattle could stay close to the houses which 
reduced the chance of being stolen.   
7.5.2 The usage of Tonde 
 
The impression after interviewing 40 of the Tonde- farmers, lead to a conclusion 
that the management of Tonde can be described as strong.  
 
First of all, it was brought forward by respondents that the management stated in 
meetings that people should feel free to put complaints or annoyance forward 
towards management without any repercussion. The overall impression that was 
created during the interviews was that hardly anybody felt management lacked 
control or ability and interviews were very open.  
 
Strong points brought forward were the yearly meeting in the beginning of the 
year where agreements were made on how to collect the money, when to open 
the valves and when to start the building of the common wall. Collecting money 
was not seen as a problem: everybody paid and when some were reluctant to 
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pay intervention of management made sure that the fees were to get paid. In a 
meeting of the WUA however it became clear no fees for this years farming 
activities were collected yet.  
 
For maintenance clear agreements were made. When there is a problem, a 
whistle is blown and people, as farmers confirmed, rush in to help. Small 
maintenance that does not need a lot of man power is done by some individuals 
themselves.  
 
For the building of the wall the management makes clear agreements: every 
group of farmers is responsible for a part of the wall. If some farmers fail to build 
the wall, the social cohesion makes sure that these individuals do fulfil their task. 
If not, then they are that season no longer welcome but whether that ever 
happened in the past was not clear. With good reasons, such as funerals and so 
on, a small fee can be paid as compensation of not being part of the common 
activity. As earlier said, this year the wall was crumbling down already early in 
the season and the reason given by farmers for this were the many funerals.  
 
Management was actively busy with maintenance: plans were already made to 
make sure a leak in the dam will be repaired with the coming of raining season. 
The overall condition of the dam could be seen as good. The structure of the 
WUA in Tonde can be called classic. One has three people in the top: the 
treasurer, the chairman and the secretary. The only woman in this structure is the 
treasurer: she represents the Red Cross Mother group.  
 
One person is responsible for opening both valves and around 15 persons are 
scattered among the plots responsible for reporting water wastage, damage and 
so on. No clear was how strict and official the function of the 15 people in the 
field was. Not every farmer had heard of these functions and the number of 
people fluctuated per interviewee.  
 
Some farmers that started to farm only this year were encountered on the field. 
They didn’t encounter any difficulties to get a plot to farm on and it was a straight 
forward process. Farmers in the field were willing to explain newcomers how to 
farm. Whether these farmers had contacts in the network before their farming 
activities was unclear but the impression was that these farmers had friends in 
the field already.  
 
7.6 Impact of social capital on the usage 
 
Overall speaking one state that the usage phase is where the results of previous 
phases come together. In Tanga, previous stages created a situation in which 
only a part of the potential downstream farmers are using the reservoir. The 
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farming activities are seen as individual actions in every aspect and management 
is struggling as only limited support is granted. As a result, limited payments are 
made. Only part of the potential contributions is paid because part of the potential 
users of the reservoir farm upstream. Maintenance is falling behind and as a 
result, farmers see the management as weak. As a result of this, incentives to 
pay for the usage of the reservoir decrease. The multiple networks, limited 
bonding and bridging capital in the farming community, which found their basis in 
ethnic differences, are part of the explanation that the framework of social capital 
gives for the differences between Tonde and Tanga.  
 
The opposite characteristics found in Tonde can partly be explained by the 
opposite characteristics in a part of the framework of social capital. A strong 
network with limited pluriformity regarding objectives, ethnics and so on forms a 
strong basis in which externalities come forward for the farming community as a 
whole. Bonding capital creates social control with which the management of 
Tonde can fulfill their task much easier compared with Tanga.  
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Conclusion 
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8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 Conclusions social capital 
 
The usage of the framework of social capital gave additional insight and 
explanation in the networks of Tonde and Tanga. It was concluded that the 
farming community in Tonde has a significant bigger social capital compared to 
Tanga. Tonde and Tanga have distinct and significant differences (based on a 
10% confidence interval) in at least three of the six aspects of social capital, 
which came forward in the implementation and usage of the reservoirs. The most 
significant differences are in the: 
 
o groups and networks   
o social cohesion & inclusion 
o trust 
 
These differences in perceptions find their roots in the history of the rural dry 
season farming communities and have its impact in the differences of the 
lifecycle of the two reservoirs. 
 
Groups and networks play an important role in the differences between Tonde 
and Tanga. The four villages that are using the Tonde reservoir were 
represented in one cohesive, gender and ethnic homogeneous group. The group 
created positive externalities for the community as a whole because it provided 
the bridging (ties between networks) and bonding capital (ties within the network) 
that was needed for a successful implementation of the reservoir. This 
fundamental success factor was lacking in Tanga. Multiple loosely connected 
networks were present in Tanga. The networks had their own objectives and 
conflicting perspectives. 
 
Social cohesion and inclusion possibly created the biggest difference between 
Tonde and Tanga. Whereas in Tonde, no history of violence or conflict is 
recorded, the history in Tanga contains several incidents between two 
groups/networks in the farming community. The partly ethnic based incidents 
were about farming activities and are therefore significant as these two groups 
are the current users of the dam.  
 
The trust between and in the groups in Tanga is smaller compared to Tonde. 
Compared to Tonde, more farmers in Tanga have the perception that other 
farmers in the same reservoir are likely to take advantage of them or each other. 
The trust of the farmers in the WUA in Tanga is very low compared to Tonde as 
well. 
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8.2 Conclusion impact of social capital  
 
These differences in social capital had different impacts in different phases 
(initiation, adoption, usage) of the reservoirs. These impacts caused some of the 
differences between the reservoirs described in the report of Faulkner (2005). 
The limited maintenance, the weak management, the individual walls in Tanga 
and the differences in water distribution can partially be explained by the 
differences in social capital. These differences between the reservoirs find a 
more likely reason in the differences in social capital, rather than the different 
water availabilities as was suggested by Faulkner (2006). 
 
The initiation  
 
Empowerment, which is a part of social capital, was the trigger that started the 
start of the construction of the dam at Tonde. An already existing, cohesive group 
lobbied for the dam which created a sense of common responsibility for the 
reservoir in this network. 
 
The trigger that initiated the construction of the reservoir in Tanga was mainly the 
assembly man that lobbied for the dam. No effort or initiative from the networks 
that would later benefit from the dam was reported. The foundations of mistrust 
were laid by unevenly distributed assets on the side where the reservoir is 
located now. Different groups had to give up unevenly distributed assets while 
these groups that would later on benefit equally by the reservoir. Already existing 
mistrust due to tensions limited communication between the groups.  
  
The adoption 
 
In Tonde, strong management had the opportunity to establish itself on the 
foundations of the existing network that initiated the coming of the dam. Central 
coordination and the common acceptance of strategically decisions were 
possible due to the existing network and trust within the group. The common wall 
and the trench method are examples of such decision that need coordination. 
 
The multiple loosely connected networks that were present in Tanga lacked 
coordination. Each of the networks had their own objectives and conflicting 
perspectives. Mistrust and exclusion created a situation in which incentives to 
initiate or even restore communication were lacking. Due to the lack of an overall 
connecting network, the mutual dependency was limited and individual actions 
ruled over coordinated actions. 
 
This troubled adoption in Tanga created a window of opportunity in which 
individual actions ruled over coordinated action. Effects of the decisions taken on 
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individual objectives still can be seen in the current use of the reservoir such as 
the individual wall, the upstream farmers and hand dug wells. Individual run for 
plots created an uncoordinated distribution of land. As a result of the 
uncoordinated land distribution, land was often claimed on past property rights. 
Because some farmers use these plots only for wet season farming, this creates 
a lot of unused plots in the dry season. 
 
The usage 
 
Overall, one state that the usage phase is where the results of previous phases 
come together. 
 
In Tanga, the farming activities are seen as individual actions and management 
is struggling as only limited support is granted. As a result, limited payments are 
made. This effect is increased because there is a loss of potential contributions 
as part of the potential users of the reservoir farm upstream and the inability for 
farmers to get plots downstream due to uncontrolled land distribution in the 
adoption phase. Maintenance is falling behind, channels fall in disrepair and as a 
result, farmers see the management as weak. Due to this, incentives to pay for 
the usage of the reservoir decrease even further. 
 
In Tonde the opposite characteristics can partly be explained by the opposite 
characteristics in a part of the framework of social capital.  The WUA of Tonde is 
based on the cohesive network that initiated the coming of the reservoir. The 
already acknowledged and existing power structure of this network forms a basis 
for the WUA to function. Unwanted behavior, such as not paying the WUA or 
wasting water, can be excluded due to this. As the WUA has the support of the 
farmers, enough money for maintenance comes in and distribution of land can be 
controlled.  
 
8.3 Conclusion differences between reservoirs other than social 
capital 
  
The differences in output, usage of fertilizer, seeds and pesticide find no 
explanation in the differences of social capital. Additional explanation for these 
differences between the reservoirs may be found in various facets.  
 
The differences in the usage of fertilizer, seeds and pesticide find possible 
explanations in the different soil conditions of the reservoirs, the different location 
of the valves in the dam and the different shapes of the fields. Next to this, the 
knowledge baseline on which the farmers base their input decisions, education 
and experience may be an additional explanation in this process.  
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The impact of differences in knowledge and experience is bigger due to the 
‘satisfactory strategy’ farmer’s use, rather than ‘optimisation strategy’. No extra 
effort could be seen or detected in order to grow more or extra crops once a 
satisfactory level was reached. Errors or gaps in the initial knowledge therefore 
have a long term impact because there is no new information gathered. Due to 
the cohesiveness in Tonde, it can be argued, the knowledge sharing is increased 
and errors in the initial knowledge have its impact on the whole farming 
community.  
 
An additional explanation for the differences for the differences in input was 
provided by the farmers. They stated that wrong information was provided to 
researchers. The differences in the input and output/profit per hectare find 
another possible explanation in the fact that Tonde has only one harvest per dry 
season while Tanga has two. And as Joshua Faulkner (2005, p: 11) stated in his 
report that ‘The farmers were asked the initial cost of seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, 
and plot ‘rental’, as well as the amount of onions harvested, recorded in number 
of standard sacks. If the farmers grew any other crops, they were also asked the 
amount of profit received from the sale of this additional crop.’ This could have 
lead misinterpretation of the (intended) question which caused the differences.   
 
8.4 Conclusion framework social capital as multi-actor analysis 
 
Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the 
norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in 
which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together’ 
(Serageldin: foreword of Grootaert, 2001).The framework of social capital finds 
itself between social network analysis and Configuration analysis.  Social 
cognitive configurations are used to enable quantitative comparison of the actors’ 
perception of the structural characteristics of the network in which they act. Yet, 
no statements towards policy issues are integrated in the framework. The main 
focus of the framework is on the perception of network characteristics.  
 
In the case study of Tonde and Tanga, it can be argued that the perception of the 
networks by the actors has a significant impact on the functioning of the networks 
in which these actors act. Different perceptions on aspects of networks and 
relations in these networks have different influences. Examples can be found in: 
 
• The perception of differences within the networks: In the Tanga reservoir, 
different ethnic groups are using the reservoir. It can be argued that the 
perception of the difference in ethnic background and not the ethnic 
difference itself has a big impact on the functioning of the reservoir. In 
Gunga Kusaasis and Mamprusis live together and perceive the difference 
in ethnic background not as a significant problem. Kusaasis in Tang Dabot 
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however, perceive this ethnic difference between Kusaasis and 
Mamprusis as relevant and it forms a basis on which conflicts and 
arguments are built on. These conflicts influence the effectiveness of the 
local network. 
• The perception of the importance of trust in the networks: Influential in the 
functioning of the networks in the farming communities is which 
organisation is perceived to be important and how much this network is 
trusted. The WUA has the formal responsibility and ‘power’ over the 
reservoir. This formal power proved to be not very influential in the 
functioning of the network for farming activities in both reservoirs. In 
Tanga, part of this has to do with the fact that half of the farming 
community perceives the WUA is not to be trusted. Due to this mistrust, 
the cooperation of the farmers with the WUA is limited. In Tonde, the 
farmers perceive the Red Cross mothers group as more influential for their 
farming activities. This network was the basis on which the WUA is 
founded: the WUA functions well due to an already existing and trusted 
network. 
 
The empirical research suggests perception towards networks do matter. And so 
the theoretical framework of social capital can therefore be a useful addition in 
network analysis.  
 
In this case study of Tonde and Tanga, the framework of social capital gave a 
platform that functioned as a basis on which the two sites could be compared. 
The framework showed numerical differences on various aspects and covered a 
wide range of network characteristic. These differences allowed the qualitative 
analyses to be more focused.  
 
This broad focus of the framework however creates the need for additional 
analysis, such as in-depth interviews, if one wants to know the causes of the 
differences. With the help of the questionnaire, one will only know the numerical 
differences between the network characteristics but lacks the insight in the 
causes of these differences.  
 
The framework of social capital lacks the ability of a model in which possible 
policy implementations can be compared. The social capital measurement as 
performed can only be seen as a measurement in one point in time and does not 
allow studying any dynamics. The problem of time constraints comes forward in 
question 22 (see appendix) where there is asked for actions of empowerment in 
the past 12 months. In the measurement it didn’t come forward that one of the 2 
reservoirs came into place through empowerment while this proved to be very 
important. 
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Apart from this, the framework has some overlap in the six different aspects 
measured. Examples are the distrust that comes with ethnic conflicts, the 
collective action and the conflicts and so on. For example when high ranked 
government officials are mistrusted to a great extent, this could increase the 
feeling of togetherness in a community because of one common ‘enemy’.  
 
Next to this, the measurement of social capital in order to compare two 
communities may give results that are distorted. Important roles of individuals, 
such as the assembly man in Gunga, tend to be diluted. One cross cutting tie of 
such a central individual, for example, may prove vital for the community while 
the questionnaire this will not show this.  This is because the results are 
concluded on the basis of averages and/or distributions.  
 
As a conclusion, the framework of social capital has some advantages but, as 
with all studies, there is a tradeoff. It finds its function in comparative studies and 
can be used to quantify some relevant qualitative aspects of networks. 
Disadvantages, in some cases, are the broad scope of the framework, the time 
constraints and the lack of causal relations. 
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Recommendations 
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9 Recommendations 
 
It is worth investing time and money in the choice of the community for who the 
reservoir will be built. It will determine a very essential part of the future 
sustainability of the dam. Corrections afterwards will be very hard to implement 
and will mostly lack prosperity of success.  
 
In order to increase the likelihood that a reservoir will live up to its expectations, 
the following recommendations are made: 
 
• Use existing, strong cohesive groups as a basis for bottom up 
implementations of new reservoirs. 
o In this way one uses the highly interdependent and difficult 
organically grown structure of the society. A structure grown as 
such proved most successful in the society as it was under the rule 
of evolution. One avoids intervening in a system that is impossible 
to understand fully. Using a newly defined network in a top down 
approach will cause a dynamic of which the outcome is yet 
unknown.   
o A bottom up approach (where farmers state ‘we want/need a 
reservoir, such as in Tonde) has advantages compared to a top 
down approach (where there is asked ‘do you want a reservoir?’, 
such as in Tanga). A common effort from the farmers to get a 
reservoir increases common responsibility and common 
acceptance of the reservoir. 
o Newly created networks after the implementation of the dam, such 
as the WUA, will not function without the support of the farmers. 
With the usage of existing networks, one allows the WUA to use 
already acknowledged and existing power structures as a basis to 
function.  
o With a strong network, exclusion of unwanted behavior (wasting 
water, not participation in common labor and so on) is possible. A 
downside of this is that possibly well-willing individuals can be 
excluded from the group on other reasons, based on for example 
ethnic reasons. 
o To locate a strong cohesive group, the framework of social capital 
combined with common sense can be used. Local NGO’s have a 
lot of local knowledge and may be a tool for locating these groups 
as well. Important to realize is that individuals in these NGO’s are 
likely to have personal objectives and will therefore not always be 
the right information source. 
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• Use ethnic homogenous groups 
o Parts of the problems in Tanga were created by ethnic tensions.  
Ethnic homogeneity proved a binding factor that partly can be 
explained by the common frame of reference: a shared baseline on 
which decisions are made and that provides a certain kind of 
predictability on which can be anticipated. Next to this, one can 
speculate that the interdependency of individuals in homogeneous 
groups is bigger: with shared characteristics come shared activities, 
other than farming alone.  
o Emphasized should be the notion that heterogeneity, based on 
ethnics for example, itself is not a problem. It only becomes a 
problem if the actors perceive it as a problem. By choosing 
homogenous groups, one rules out the existence of (some) 
differences in a group and therefore the possibility for actors to 
perceive differences as a problem. 
 
• Use female homogenous groups. 
o Involving gender (female) homogeneous groups in the 
implementation of small reservoirs can be seen as a favourable 
course of action with the idea to strengthen the position of the 
women. It makes them less vulnerable and dependent on the man. 
This creates a possibility to create a type of social security and 
avoid a drop to poverty when a husband dies.   
 
• Let the reasons for locating proper sites for building a dam, not only be 
based on technical reasons.   
o The dam in Tanga was built on a site that was said to be technically 
the most appropriate. Socially, however it was not the most 
appropriate place and this had clear impacts on the technical 
efficiency of the reservoir. 
 
• Social capital is a good start to examine social factors that will influence 
the implementation of a reservoir, yet it is a start only. 
o As mentioned in the conclusion of this report, the aspects of social 
capital do influence the functioning of reservoirs. The networks, the 
trust and the social cohesion for example. However, the framework 
does not give a full overview of all factors in society that might 
influence the functioning of reservoirs. Local setups and situations 
are very deterministic for the successful implementation of 
reservoirs and only part of these situational circumstances come 
forward in the framework of social capital. 
 
• Additional research on social issues is recommended. 
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o Because social circumstances do influence the functioning of small 
reservoirs and social capital lacks the ability to locate them all, 
additional research is required. A range of other fields that need 
attention. Examples are the influences on the functioning of the 
reservoirs of education, the knowledge of farmers, land property 
issues. 
 
• When one want to implement reservoirs, solve the land (property) issues 
before constructing the dam. 
o Use existing and formal power structures to solve the land 
(property) issues. In the case of Tonde the chief who was involved 
made sure that the farmers, who were farming on the location 
where the reservoir was built, lost any right to make claims on land 
afterwards. In Tanga this was not done and created difficulties.  
o Use locations, if possible, that are not on borders of Tindana’s, 
chiefs, assembly men, ethnic groups and so on. In most cases this 
will not be a problem but these issues can be reasons to form a 
conflict. By avoiding these locations, one avoids potential conflict 
such as in Tanga. 
 
• Involve all stakeholders in solving land issues. 
o For land issues, Tindana’s are an important group to include in the 
issues as well. Some of the formal powers might not be in their 
hands but this group forms a very relevant stakeholder as they fulfill 
central positions in the communities.  Include farmers, fishers, tree 
owners, house owners and all other stakeholders that are affected 
by the coming of a new dam. By involving these actors early in the 
process, feelings of mistrust and exclusions that might affect the 
functioning of the reservoir, can be avoided. 
 
• In order to make the chance of a successful implementation more likely, 
one will need to supply the group not only with the necessary means in 
forms of materials but with essential cross cutting and bridging ties as 
well. 
o These ties, such as contacts with other small reservoirs and the 
agricultural extension office, should not be a one way tie. Actively 
participating as an organization or community within improvements 
and updating other target groups of these improvements can be 
seen essential. Long lasting errors in the knowledge of the farmers 
can be avoided in this way. Bridging ties form an important tie as 
this creates linkages with communities in the same economical, 
occupational and social situation. Acceptance of information of 
these groups is more likely. 
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• Let agricultural extension officers actively participate as soon as possible 
from the start of the conception and the building of the reservoir.  
o Although there was an extension officer in the area, the farmers in 
Tonde reckoned their main source for their initial knowledge for 
farming were other farmers and not the extension officer. The 
information of other farmers is often not based on optimization but 
on ‘ignorance’ (to quote the local agricultural extension officer). By 
actively involving the extension officer from the beginning on, such 
as in Tonde, the initial knowledge would be based on scientific 
knowledge. Attempts to make changes in the habits of farmers that 
are based on existing rural knowledge are very hard to make. 
 
• A lack of social capital or other forms of social inappropriate 
circumstances in a community is a sensible reason to abandon, or to 
postpone, the idea to implement a small reservoir.  
o A common resource needs common responsibility. Giving common 
resources, such as a reservoir, to a loosely connected network will 
probably not live up to its expectations.  
o This however does not mean that one should abandon the 
community as a whole. Changing the focus from community based 
to individual based aid might improve results. A more individual 
approach where the resources are not shared with a whole 
community may be a more effective solution.  Concrete examples 
depend very much on the local context. Shuffles, donkey cars, 
loans, onion storage facilities, plows and cows are examples that 
may fit individual needs for farming activities.  
 
Unsuccessful implementations cannot always be avoided. Implementations 
based on individual objectives do happen. These implementations will have 
limited support by the farmers. The creation of a toolbox as attempted by the 
small reservoir project will have limited effect in such cases.  
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10 Appendixes 
 
 
10.1 Final questionnaire 
 
• To which tribe do you belong to or do you consider yourself? 
• What is you religion? 
• Next to this, the gender of the person was written down. 
 
I would like to start by asking you about the groups or organizations, networks, associations 
to which you or any member of your household belong. These could be formally organized 
groups or just groups of people who get together regularly to do an activity or talk about 
things.  
 
1. Of how many such groups are you or any one in your household (wife, kids) a member? 
 
2. Of all these groups to which you or members of your household belong, which one is the 
most important to your household in the dry season for the farming activities?  
 
3. Thinking about the members of this group, are most of them of the same…. 
A. Religion (1 Yes 2 No):                                            
B. Gender (1 Yes 2 No):                                              
C. Ethnic or linguistic background/ race/tribe (1 Yes 2 No) 
 
4. Do members mostly have the same… 
A. Occupation (1 Yes 2 No):                                         
B. Educational background or level (1 Yes 2 No):        
 
5. Does this group work with or interact with groups outside the village (or reservoir)? 
1. No 
2. Yes, occasionally                             wet and dry! 
3. Yes, frequently 
 
6. About how many close friends do you have these days? These are people you feel at ease 
with, can talk to about private matters, or call on for help. 
 
7. If you suddenly needed to borrow a small amount of money [enough to pay for expenses 
for your household for one week], are there people beyond your immediate household and 
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close relatives to whom you could turn and who would be willing and able to provide this 
money? 
1. Definitely 
2. Probably 
3. Unsure                                              
4. Probably not 
5. Definitely not 
 
8. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? 
1. People can be trusted 
2. You can’t be too careful                   
 
9. In general, do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
A. Most people in this village are willing to help if you need it in the dry season?  
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree somewhat 
3 Neither agree or disagree              Answer = … 
4 Disagree somewhat 
5 Disagree strongly 
 
B. In this village, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you in 
the dry season. And in the wet season? 
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree somewhat 
3 Neither agree or disagree             Answer = … 
4 Disagree somewhat 
5 Disagree strongly 
 
10. How much do you trust…. 
 
A. Local district officials  
B. Assembly man  
C. Water user associations 
 
1 To a very great extent 
2 To a great extent 
3 Neither great nor small extent       Answer = … 
4 To a small extent 
5 To a very small extent 
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11. In the past 12 months did you or any one in your household participate in any communal 
activities, in which people came together to do some work for the benefit of the community? 
1. Yes 
2. No (skip to question 14)       Answer = … 
 
12. How many times in the past 12 months? And which was the most important one? 
 
Answer = … 
13. Did you or would you contribute time or money to that project? 
 
A. Time  
1 Will not contribute time                Answer = … 
2 Will contribute time  
B. Money 
1 Will not contribute money            Answer = … 
2 Will contribute money 
 
 
14. If there was a water supply problem, such as in the reservoir, in this community, how 
likely is it that people will cooperate to try to solve the problem? 
1. Very likely 
2. Somewhat likely 
3. Neither likely or unlikely              Answer = … 
4. Somewhat unlikely 
5. Very unlikely 
 
15. In the past month, how many times have you made or received a phone call? 
 
16. What are your three main sources of information about what the government is doing 
(such as agricultural extension, etc.)? 
Answer 1, 2 and 3! 
 
17. How many times in the past month have you asked advice to a group or friend regarding 
farming questions? And were they from the same reservoir? 
 
18. [IF NOT ZERO] Were any of these people…. 
 
A. Of different ethnic or linguistic background/ race/caste/tribe? (1 Yes, 2 No) Answer = … 
B. Of different economic status? (1 Yes 2 No)                                                         Answer = … 
C. Of different social status? (1 Yes 2 No)                                                               Answer = … 
D. Of different religious groups? (1 Yes 2 No)                                                        Answer = … 
 
19. In general, how safe from crime and violence do you feel when you are alone at home? 
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1. Very safe 
2. Moderately safe 
3. Neither safe nor unsafe                           Answer = … 
4. Moderately unsafe 
5. Very unsafe 
 
20. In general, how happy do you consider yourself to be (now)? 
1. Very happy 
2. Moderately happy 
3. Neither happy nor unhappy                                  Answer = … 
4. Moderately unhappy 
5. Very unhappy 
 
21. Do you feel that you have the power to make important decisions that change the course 
of your life? Rate yourself on a 1 to 5 scale, were 1 means being totally unable to change 
your life, and 5 means having full control over your life. 
1. Totally unable to change life 
2. Mostly unable to change life 
3. Neither able nor unable                                        Answer = … 
4. Mostly able to change life 
5. Totally able to change life 
 
22. In the past 12 months, how often have people in this village got together to jointly 
petition government officials or political leaders for something benefiting the community? 
1. Never 
2. Once                                                                     Answer = … 
3. A few times (<5) 
4. Many times (>5) 
 
23. Lots of people find it difficult to get out and vote. Did you vote on the last presidential 
election? 
1. Yes                                                                      Answer = … 
2. No 
 
 24: If you could improve something about or in the reservoir, what would it 
be? 
25: And to who would you go to? 
26: why did you start dry season farming? 
27: What do you see as the biggest difference between Tonde and 
Tanga? 
28: Did your life improve after the coming of the small reservoirs? 
Any comments or additives that could help the project? 
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10.2 Adjustments made in questionnaire 
 
During the first 2 weeks of the stay in Ghana, final adjustments were made to the 
questionnaire. Many involved cultural differences and definitions that were not 
clear.  
 
First of all, an addition was made with the questions  
 
• To which tribe do you belong to or do you consider yourself? 
• What is you religion? 
• Next to this, the sex of the person was written down. 
 
As well as in the end of the questionnaire the following questions were added: 
 
• 24: If you could improve something about or in the reservoir, what would it 
be? 
• 25: And to who would you go to? 
• 26: Why did you start dry season farming? 
• 27: What do you see as the biggest difference between Tonde and 
Tanga? 
• 28: Did your life improve after the coming of the small reservoirs? 
• 29: How do/did you determine your strategy regarding the crops seeds, 
the amount of fertilizer used and the amount of seeds? 
• 30: Do you have any comments or additives that could help the project or 
that you would like to share with us? 
 
The following clarifications were made: 
 
• Q1: household= direct family such as wife and children. This does not 
include uncles, nephews and so on, living in the same family compound.  
• Q2: was split into dry and wet season and focussed only on the dry 
season. Due to different farming activities, the importance of networks and 
associations could change with seasons as well.  
• Q7 till Q 9: was split into dry and wet season or focused on dry season 
only. The reason for this was the likelihood of change of trust during the 
change of season.   
• Q 11-13: in order to make the questions less socially desirable, which 
could influence the reliability of the questionnaire, these questions were 
changed in order and the way they were asked. Instead of asking ‘would 
you contribute time and money?’ these were changed first by asking In the 
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past 12 months did you or any one in your household participate in any 
communal activities, in which people came together to do some work for 
the benefit of the community? How many times in the past 12 months? 
And which was the most important one? Did you or would you contribute 
time or money to that project? 
• Q14: An addition was made by giving an example of a water supply 
problem and was related to the reservoirs. 
• Q16: Instead of supplying the respondents with a list of possibilities, the 
questions became an open question. 
• Q17: During ‘practice rounds’ with the questionnaire, it appeared that 
within these region the question ‘17. How many times in the past month 
have you got together with people to have food or drinks, either in their 
home or in a public place?’ was answered consequent with  the answer 
‘countless’. It was very common to do such a thing and so the question 
was replaced by the questions: ‘17. How many times in the past month 
have you asked advice to a group or friend regarding farming questions? 
And were they from the same reservoir?’ 
• Q20: more than one specialist of the SRP showed her/his concern about 
the word happy: in practice this appeared not to be a problem. 
 
10.3 Statistical tests  
10.3.1 Overview measurement gender/religion/ethnical background 
 
Weega     Tanga   
Religion     
no religion     
no 
religion 1
traditional 16  traditional 18
muslim 2  muslim 7
christian 20   christian 9
Gender     
man 23   man 23
women 15   women 12
Tribe/ethnical 
background     
Fra Fra 0   Farafara 6
Khusasi 38  Khusasi 26
mapusi 0  mapusi 0
      Mushi 3
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10.3.1.1 Chi-square test ethnics 
 
Skipping rows and/or columns filled with zeros. 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
       tanga_1  Tonde_1    Total 
    1        6        0        6 
          2,88     3,12 
 
    2       26       38       64 
         30,68    33,32 
 
    4        3        0        3 
          1,44     1,56 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  3,391 +  3,123 + 
          0,715 +  0,659 + 
          1,695 +  1,562 = 11,146 
DF = 2, P-Value = 0,004 
4 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
10.3.1.2 Chi-square test Religion 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         tanga    Tonde    Total 
    1        1        0        1 
          0,48     0,52 
 
    2       18       16       34 
         16,30    17,70 
 
    3        7        2        9 
          4,32     4,68 
 
    4        9       20       29 
         13,90    15,10 
 
Total       35       38       73 
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Chi-Sq =  0,565 +  0,521 + 
          0,177 +  0,163 + 
          1,671 +  1,539 + 
          1,730 +  1,593 = 7,958 
DF = 3 
* WARNING * 2 cells with expected counts less than 1,0 
          * Chi-Square approximation probably invalid 
4 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
10.3.1.3 Chi-square test number of man and women 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         Tonde    Tanga    Total 
    1       23       23       46 
         23,95    22,05 
 
    2       15       12       27 
         14,05    12,95 
 
Total       38       35       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,037 +  0,041 + 
          0,064 +  0,069 = 0,210 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,646 
 
10.3.1.4 Q1: Student T test number of membership to groups 
 
Two-sample T for C5 vs C6 
 
     N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
C5  34     1,441     0,504     0,086 
C6  38     2,632     0,913      0,15 
 
Difference = mu C5 - mu C6 
Estimate for difference:  -1,190 
95% CI for difference: (-1,543; -0,838) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6,74  P-Value = 0,000  DF = 70 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0,749 
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10.3.2 Q3-5: Overview homogeneity groups and interaction of groups 
 
Same religion?   Same occupation?   
  Tanga Tonde   Tanga Tonde 
Yes 0 0 yes 35 38
No 35 38 no 0 0
            
Same gender?   Same education?   
  Tanga Tonde   Tanga Tonde 
yes 0 27 yes 0 0
no 35 11 no 34 38
            
Same ethnic?   
interact outside 
reservoir?   
  Tanga Tonde   Tanga Tonde 
yes 35 38 no 35 15
no 0 0 occa 0 23
   frequently 0 0
 
10.3.2.1 Q3B: Chi-square test gender difference in group 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         Tonde    Tanga    Total 
    1       27        0       27 
         14,05    12,95 
 
    2       11       35       46 
         23,95    22,05 
 
Total       38       35       73 
 
Chi-Sq = 11,923 + 12,945 + 
          6,998 +  7,598 = 39,465 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,000 
 
10.3.2.2 Q3C: Chi-square test ethnics 
 
Hypothesis: there is no relation between being Kosaasi and farming in the 
2 reservoirs 
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Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         Tanga    Tonde    Total 
    1        9        0        9 
          4,32     4,68 
 
    2       26       38       64 
         30,68    33,32 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  5,086 +  4,685 + 
          0,715 +  0,659 = 11,146 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,001 
1 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
10.3.2.3 Q5: Chi-square test group working outside reservoir 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         Tonde    Tanga    Total 
    1       15       35       50 
         26,03    23,97 
 
    2       23        0       23 
         11,97    11,03 
 
Total       38       35       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  4,672 +  5,073 + 
         10,157 + 11,027 = 30,929 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,000 
 
10.3.2.4 Q6: Student T-test number of close friends 
 
Two-sample T for C1 vs C2 
 
     N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
C1  35     3,40      2,33       0,39 
C2  38     4,50      3,15       0,51 
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Difference = mu C1 - mu C2 
Estimate for difference:  -1,100 
95% CI for difference: (-2,402; -0,202) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1,68  P-Value = 0,097  DF = 71 
Both use Pooled StDev = 2,79 
 
10.3.3 Q7: Measurement overview willing and able to provide money in close 
atmosphere 
 
Borrow money     
 tanga   Tonde  
  counts % counts % 
Defina 32 91,4% 36 94,7%
proba 1 2,9% 1 2,6%
unsure 0 0,0% 0 0,0%
proba not 1 2,9% 1 2,6%
def.not 1 2,9% 0 0,0%
 
10.3.4 Q8: Measurement overview Can/cannot be trusted 
 
common trust Tanga   Tonde   
  Counts % Counts % 
can 27 77,1% 35 92,1%
cannot 8 22,9% 3 7,9%
 
10.3.4.1 Q8: Chi-square test common trust 
 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
       Tanga_2    Tonde    Total 
    1       27       35       62 
         29,73    32,27 
 
    2        8        3       11 
          5,27     5,73 
 
Total       35       38       73 
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Chi-Sq =  0,250 +  0,230 + 
          1,409 +  1,298 = 3,187 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,074 
 
10.3.5 Q9a: Measurement overview willing to help: dry 
 
willing to help Tanga   Tonde   
  Counts % Counts % 
agree strong 30 85,7% 38 100,0% 
agree somewhat 3 8,6% 0 0,0% 
neither agr/dis 2 5,7% 0 0,0% 
disagree somewhat 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
Disagree strong 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
 
10.3.5.1 Q9B: Chi-square test willing to help: dry 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
       Tanga_2    Tonde    Total 
    1       30       38       68 
         32,60    35,40 
 
    2        3        0        3 
          1,44     1,56 
 
    3        2        0        2 
          0,96     1,04 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,208 +  0,191 + 
          1,695 +  1,562 + 
          1,130 +  1,041 = 5,828 
DF = 2 
* WARNING * 1 cells with expected counts less than 1,0 
          * Chi-Square approximation probably invalid 
4 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
 128
10.3.6 Q9B: Measurement overview taking advantage: wet and dry 
 
people take advantage in dry 
season 
wet 
tanga 
dry 
tanga 
wet 
Tonde 
dry 
Tonde 
  Counts Counts Counts Counts 
agree strong 27 10 21 4 
agree somewhat 4 4 4 3 
neither agr/dis 4 12 2 5 
disagree somewhat 0 7 4 10 
Disagree strong 0 2 7 13 
 
10.3.6.1 Q9B: Chi-square test taking advantage: wet 
 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
       Tanga_2    Tonde    Total 
    1       27       21       48 
         23,01    24,99 
 
    2        4        4        8 
          3,84     4,16 
 
    3        4        2        6 
          2,88     3,12 
 
    4        0        4        4 
          1,92     2,08 
 
    5        0        7        7 
          3,36     3,64 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,690 +  0,636 + 
          0,007 +  0,006 + 
          0,439 +  0,404 + 
          1,918 +  1,766 + 
          3,356 +  3,091 = 12,314 
DF = 4, P-Value = 0,015 
8 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
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Due to the expected counts, the division is made between agree and not agree 
and neither agree or disagree. This led to a statistical situation in which the 
chi square can be used: 
Take 
advantage 
in wet 
season Tanga Tonde 
 counts counts 
agree 31 25 
neither 4 4 
disagree 0 11 
 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
            C1       C2    Total 
    1       31       25       56 
         26,13    29,87 
 
    2        4        4        8 
          3,73     4,27 
 
    3        0       11       11 
          5,13     5,87 
 
Total       35       40       75 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,906 +  0,793 + 
          0,019 +  0,017 + 
          5,133 +  4,492 = 11,360 
DF = 2, P-Value = 0,003 
2 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
10.3.6.2 Q9B: Chi-square test taking advantage: dry 
 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
       Tanga_2    Tonde    Total 
    1       10        4       14 
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          7,00     7,00 
 
    2        4        3        7 
          3,50     3,50 
 
    3       12        5       17 
          8,50     8,50 
 
    4        7       10       17 
          8,50     8,50 
 
    5        2       13       15 
          7,50     7,50 
 
Total       35       35       70 
 
Chi-Sq =  1,286 +  1,286 + 
          0,071 +  0,071 + 
          1,441 +  1,441 + 
          0,265 +  0,265 + 
          4,033 +  4,033 = 14,193 
DF = 4, P-Value = 0,007 
2 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
10.3.6.3 Q9B: chi-square test difference dry and wet  
 
cumulative Tanga 
 
Tanga wet dry 
 counts counts 
agree 31 14 
neither 4 12 
disagree 0 9 
 
 
Only agree and disagree taken 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
            C1       C2    Total 
    1       31       14       45 
         25,83    19,17 
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    2        0        9        9 
          5,17     3,83 
 
Total       31       23       54 
 
Chi-Sq =  1,033 +  1,393 + 
          5,167 +  6,964 = 14,557 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,000 
1 cells with expected counts less than 5,0 
 
cumulative Tonde 
 
Tonde wet dry 
 counts counts 
agree 25 7 
neither 2 5 
disagree 11 26 
 
Only agree and disagree taken 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
            C1       C2    Total 
    1       25        7       32 
         16,70    15,30 
 
    2       11       26       37 
         19,30    17,70 
 
Total       36       33       69 
 
Chi-Sq =  4,131 +  4,506 + 
          3,572 +  3,897 = 16,106 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,000 
 
10.3.7  Q10a: measurement overview trust in DC 
 
Trust in local district officials (DC) Tanga   Tonde   
  Counts % Counts % 
very great extent 12 34,3% 16 42,1% 
great extent 1 2,9% 1 2,6% 
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neither small nor great 9 25,7% 5 13,2% 
small extent 2 5,7% 8 21,1% 
very small extent 11 31,4% 8 21,1% 
 
 
10.3.7.1 Q10a: chi-square test trust in DC 
 
Values cumulatives of great and very great; small and very small 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
            C1       C2    Total 
    1       13       17       30 
         14,38    15,62 
 
    2        9        5       14 
          6,71     7,29 
 
    3       13       16       29 
         13,90    15,10 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,133 +  0,123 + 
          0,780 +  0,718 + 
          0,059 +  0,054 = 1,866 
DF = 2, P-Value = 0,393 
 
10.3.8 Q10b: measurement overview trust in assembly man 
 
Trust in Assembly man Tanga   Tonde   
  Counts % Counts % 
very great extent 29 82,9% 35 92,1% 
great extent 6 17,1% 1 2,6% 
neither small nor great 0 0,0% 1 2,6% 
small extent 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
very small extent 0 0,0% 1 2,6% 
 
10.3.9 Q10c: measurement overview trust in WUA 
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Trust in top of WUA Tanga   Tonde   
  Counts % Counts % 
very great extent 14 40,0% 36 94,7% 
great extent 2 5,7% 1 2,6% 
neither small nor great 1 2,9% 0 0,0% 
small extent 3 8,6% 1 2,6% 
very small extent 15 42,9% 0 0,0% 
 
Counts cumulative of great and very great; small and very small; neither 
condition left out, with small error as result 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
            C1       C2    Total 
    1       16       37       53 
         25,03    27,97 
 
    2       18        1       19 
          8,97    10,03 
 
Total       34       38       72 
 
Chi-Sq =  3,256 +  2,914 + 
          9,084 +  8,128 = 23,381 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,000 
 
 
10.3.10 Q15: number of telephone calls past month 
 
 Tanga   Tonde   
telephone used past 
month 
Times 
named % 
Times 
named % 
0 21 60,0% 25 65,8% 
1 6 17,1% 1 2,6% 
2 2 5,7% 4 10,5% 
3 0 0,0% 2 5,3% 
4 0 0,0% 1 2,6% 
5 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 
6 0 0,0% 1 2,6% 
countless 6 17,1% 4 10,5% 
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Hypothesis: there is no relation between being a farmer on Tanga or in 
Weega and the chance that one has never used a telephone.  
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
 
         Tanga    Tonde    Total 
    1       21       25       46 
         22,05    23,95 
 
    2       14       13       27 
         12,95    14,05 
 
Total       35       38       73 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,050 +  0,046 + 
          0,086 +  0,079 = 0,262 
DF = 1, P-Value = 0,609 
 
Hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
10.3.11 Q16: Measurement overview main information source  
 
 tanga   Tonde   
main source: 
times 
named % 
times 
named % 
relatives 10 0,212766 15 0,263158 
radio 16 0,340426 29 0,508772 
market 16 0,340426 9 0,157895 
phone 0 0 1 0,017544 
chief 0 0 1 0,017544 
assembly man 2 0,042553 2 0,035088 
car 1 0,021277 0 0 
wua 1 0,021277 0 0 
agricul 1 0,021277 0 0 
 
10.3.11.1 Q16: chi-square test main source information 
 
question main source info market/friend/radio 
 
Expected counts are printed below observed counts 
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       Tanga_2    Tonde    Total 
    1       10       15       25 
         11,05    13,95 
 
    2       16       29       45 
         19,89    25,11 
 
    3       16        9       25 
         11,05    13,95 
 
Total       42       53       95 
 
Chi-Sq =  0,100 +  0,079 + 
          0,762 +  0,604 + 
          2,215 +  1,755 = 5,516 
DF = 2, P-Value = 0,063 
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